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A great portion of people’s lives are spent in the workplace. I argue that many Western 
workplaces are neither sites of democratic practices or equality but are based on modes of 
exploitation that benefit the few. Consequently, workers experience alienation, a term used by 
Karl Marx to describe the separation of the worker from their work, from others, and from 
themselves. This separation manifests in the various mental health issues we see today in all 
arenas and walks of life, and these issues are being addressed in a variety of helping 
professions, including education and counselling. In recognizing that our society has not taken 
up an adequate degree of foundational analysis, this thesis proposes a Marxist analysis of 
alienation and its impact on citizens’ wellbeing. I use the counselling profession as an example 
at-hand to make the argument as to why the profession must offer critiques of capitalism if it is 
to properly address social justice issues and to effectively respond to a predominant source of 
mental distress within our current society. However, helping professions themselves are a 
product of, and a co-creator of, the capitalist system. Despite their concerns for social justice, I 
argue that they perpetuate injustice by supporting the status quo and by operating from 
individualistic, decontextualized, and ahistorical models. The prevalence of world-views that 
promote a materialistic individualism must be therefore challenged. Hence, it is proposed that 
consciousness, the original subject matter of psychology itself, must be accounted for within our 
world-view. An argument is put forth that panpsychism is a promising philosophical position from 
which to generate new understandings and appreciations for the world and our place in it. A 
panpsychic dual-aspect monism invites novel ways to consider the ways in which helping 
professions function at both the micro-level of the individual person, but also, simultaneously, at 
the macro-level of system change. I call upon Acceptance and Commitment Therapy as a good 
example of a micro-level approach that can be utilized within many helping professions that 
centers the experience of consciousness as a vital component to personal and societal change. 
The implications of addressing individual and systemic change in relation to education, 
especially within the context of our current climate crisis, are discussed.  
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Prologue 
It would be fair to say that if there is one activity that is ubiquitous in our lives in 
the modern era, it is work. Work can, of course, mean many different things to different 
people, from unpaid labour in the home, to artistic pursuits, to fulfilling some goal, to 
working on oneself, or for one’s community in some way. Because of increasing and all-
consuming work life wherein life and work are closely interlinked, in the present 
civilization, I am chiefly concerned in this dissertation with the work we perform in our 
workplaces, work we do for others in return for a wage, and how it impacts us and our 
relationships, shaping the direction of other endeavors in our lives, with a particular 
focus on why this domain must be analysed and critiqued by the members of any 
profession dedicated to helping others, like social work, counselling psychology, 
community services, and even schooling in K-12 and postsecondary, if they are sincere 
in their commitment to engage with broader, systemic issues, like social justice, within 
their practices.   
Working for others within some form of workplace (these domains, too, can vary 
greatly) has been a pervasive focus in our society, with every other aspect of life 
seeming to flow from it or around it, consciously or unconsciously.1 As a clinical 
counsellor I have an intake form with a list of sections that asks questions about work 
followed by sections on social connections, spirituality, sense of self, relationships, and 
leisure. The apparent equivalence given to each section on the page makes it appear 
that these areas of the person’s life are equal, with the same time and energy given to 
each domain. But in reality, this is not so. In actual fact, for most of us, work is the area 
that is principally privileged, affecting and permeating all the other areas of our lives in 
oftentimes obvious, but also subtle, ways. It is the primary center of our day, whether we 
want it to be or not. The practical matters of our day-to-day lives tend to revolve around 
work, its constraints and demands determining whether or not we can place our time and 
energies toward other pursuits. Our leisure, relationships, or friendships, for example, 
may be drastically transformed due to our commitments to our working lives. Many 
clients I meet within my counselling practice feel that they just do not have time for 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise indicated, I conceive of work as paid labour, a relatively recent understanding of what work means in 
society, and which is generally characterized as non-domestic, legally codified, institutionalized and socially safeguarded 
employment (Komlosy, 2018). Of all the varieties of work I have performed this is the one in which I have spent the most 
time. I dare say this is true for most people in our society. 
2 
friends, or a spiritual practice, or even connecting with their family the way they might 
wish to, after a long day at work and, as a sad consequence, these aspects of their lives 
disappear from view. As a result, people lose parts of themselves, and there is a kind of 
grieving around this which can percolate in the background of their lives. Sometimes 
people come to counselling to investigate this deep feeling. They wonder who they have 
become, or how their relationship reached the point that it has, or why they are so 
anxious, or bored, or dissatisfied in their lives. Still, work does not and cannot cease if 
we are to live in 21st century society. Despite insight into the impact our working lives 
have on the rest of our lives, we cannot stop working because we need to eat and pay 
the mortgage or rent, at the very least. Activities or interests in which one might have 
taken joy may, as the months and years pass by, be slowly abandoned, but yet work 
must continue. Other activities can go, but work cannot. 
I know this well myself. I worked for 30 years in a corporate government job, five 
days a week, eight hours a day. Yet, this narrative description in temporal terms does 
not really give a complete view of the way in which work permeated all areas of my life 
and, in extension, my partner’s life, shaping and forming the life we shared throughout 
the years. Despite working for eight hours I still needed to commute for an hour and a 
half morning and evening, and in addition to getting ready in the morning and perhaps 
going to an Aikido class in the evening, I found there was really never any time for much 
else. The working day for most people does not merely involve the eight hours spent at 
the workplace but all the other hours that are intrinsically connected to work. It is no 
wonder, then, that many people lose contact with friends, are unable to form new 
relationships, squabble with their partners over all sorts of issues related or not to money 
and time spent with each other, fail to exercise or get a good night’s sleep, skip the half 
hour meditation practice they had promised themselves every evening, and so on. The 
experience of our working lives not only affects the things we do, but also the things we 
do not do, with the latter often causing the most trouble for us personally and socially. 
I have always been fascinated by the messages we receive throughout our lives 
regarding the necessity and importance of work, and of being a good worker. For we are 
indoctrinated (as good a word as any) by the adults around us from a very early age that 
if we want to ‘get anywhere’ in life we will need to do two things: conform, and work hard. 
As adults, especially after a lifetime of engaging in work for others, it seems easy to see, 
if we are honest, how patently false these affirmations are. There are plenty of people, 
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most people probably, who have worked hard all their lives and ‘get no-where’, wherever 
that place was supposed to be in the first place, and despite their compliance never 
experience the kind and quality of life they had been promised through a lifetime of work. 
Still, this is the message of parents and educators, explicitly or implicitly, and it is 
dutifully followed (though sometimes wonderfully opposed) throughout our lives. 
Whether we work hard or not though, we must work, and all the forces of socialization 
and education converge to produce in us a good worker, which is to say, a productive 
member of society. In return we are rewarded with free time, perhaps a few hours in the 
evening and the weekends, but as Rosenthal (2016) points out, in reality “there is 
nothing free about it, because workers’ lives are dominated by the demands of 
capitalism: to prepare ourselves to work, to commute to and from work, to recover from 
the workday, and to raise the next generation of workers” (Chapter 1, para. 5). Even our 
vacations can be overshadowed by the dread of returning to work, with our work piling 
up, ominously awaiting us. The relaxation of a nice vacation can easily dissipate within 
five minutes of returning to our workplaces.  
Perhaps this account may sound like a demonization of work itself, but it is not. It 
is really the beginning of a critique of the ways in which we have been recruited to serve 
the interests of others within our workplaces, spending most of our lives in this pursuit, 
and having no real voice in how we work, or in the results to which our efforts at work 
are put. In other words, it is a critique of the ways in which our societies currently 
organize production, a critique of capitalism (Roberts, 2015). We may define capitalism 
as “a social system based on private ownership of the means of production and wage 
labor. It relies on multiple markets: markets for goods and services, the labor market, 
and the capital market” (Sunkara, 2019, pp. 21-22). Often our interests do in fact 
intersect with the interests of an employer but for the most part they do not, and despite 
the often sophisticated attempts to convince the employee to the contrary (i.e. wellness 
programs, team spirit, overtime, bonuses, etc.), employees are merely assets used to 
generate profits for others. Work itself, though, is (or, can be under the right 
circumstances) an area of life that should express a person’s creativity, possibility, 
intentionality, connection and service to others, and a curiosity about the world and what 
is in it. It should bring meaning, purpose, and a sense of value. Work is a natural 
expression of the human self, an engagement with nature to produce sustenance, 
culture, art, religion, science, and all things spiritual. Work is a means to creating 
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communion, rich and rewarding relationships with oneself, others, and the natural world. 
It touches all levels of one’s being and, because at its best it invites both attention and 
intentionality, both attributes of consciousness, it can be an entryway into Being itself. 
Toward the end of my 30 years as a corporate employee I started to consider 
new options for my own working life. I wanted to do something that would help others 
and be of service to them. And I wanted to work for myself. I had always been interested 
in psychology and so I entered a counselling psychology program and obtained a 
Master’s degree. I immediately went to work, opening up my own private practice, while 
continuing to work for Maple Ridge Pitt Meadows Community Services where I had done 
my internship. At the same time, and for the last few years before I took early retirement, 
I also continued to work for the government. The contrast between the two jobs was 
palpable. With counselling I was immediately engaged with work that was meaningful 
and purposeful and which interested me deeply. The counselling community was 
supportive and caring. I also enjoyed working for myself and relished the idea of not 
being anyone else’s employee. There was a great feeling of liberation in this. 
However, although the practice of counselling psychology was for me an  
emancipatory personal experience on multiple levels, it soon became clear to me that 
historically and in practice it is not without its concerns. Despite an historically obvious 
engagement with contextual and socio-economic issues when addressing mental 
distress, it quickly became apparent that counselling is nevertheless itself deeply rooted 
in capitalist practices. The models it tends to adopt, although there are exceptions, are 
generally individualistic and ahistorical in character with the effect that its approaches 
and methods often perpetuate the very systems and inequalities it professes to oppose, 
while ignoring the alienation experienced by working people within modern workplaces. I 
will explore this claim further in the first three chapters of this dissertation, showing how 
it is revealed in the practices of counselling, and why alienation from work, a prominent 
attribute of today’s work experience, is ignored as a site for mental health complaints. 
Interestingly, I found that there is not a lot written in the counselling psychology literature 
(with only a few notable exceptions outside the field) that addresses these issues; nor 
are there many outright critiques, aside from passing acknowledgements, of the way 
capitalist modes of production manifest in alienating the lives of working people, surely 
an otherwise obvious site for an analysis of the causes and maintenance of mental 
health issues, and other concerns, and especially since capitalism’s functioning through 
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markets and private ownership is not restricted to workplaces but permeates all of 
society’s social, economic, demographic, cultural, and ideological relationships (Mason, 
2015). 
Reflecting on counselling profession’s own complicity in the system of oppression 
that creates alienation, as above, opened for me the door to the larger view that showed 
me how pervasive alienation is throughout all aspects of human lives. For, capitalism is 
a ruling ideology that shapes and governs every aspect of social design and 
arrangement, from birth to burial. Schooling and other educational institutions and 
helping professions are not excluded from the rule of capitalism.   
Purposes and explorations 
The purpose of this dissertation is, in part, to bring to the forefront the centrality 
of exploitation and injustice in the places where people spend most of their waking 
hours, the workplace for adults and schools for students. In this dissertation my site-
specific focus is the workplace, the primary structural site for the activity of capital; 
however, all the analysis generated at this site generally applies to other areas of social 
organization. In the workplace, alienation is created and maintained and it is the felt 
experience of alienation which I propose is a root cause of mental health issues within 
today’s society. I also argue that the helping professions, despite their general 
acknowledgement of the necessity to address social justice issues in people’s lives, are 
by and large ill-equipped to deal with alienation and its effects because they have not 
developed a sufficient critique in their literature of the real structural inequalities they 
often name as problematic to people; that is, they do not name capitalism itself, with its 
unequal and undemocratic divisions of labour, with its concurrent furtherance of division 
manifesting in racism, sexism, classism, and so on, as the systemic problem that it is. 
Attempting to address the expressions of alienation without confronting the systems 
which foster them really only serves the short-term material interests of various helpers; 
in the case of counselling psychology, for instance, it is doubtful that temporarily ‘fixing’ 
people up to expeditiously return them to their workplaces does anything to prevent or 
truly resolve the pervasive struggles found in the lives of people. In this dissertation I will 
use counselling psychology to illustrate examples of this failure within helping 
professions as a whole, primarily because it is the field with which I am most familiar.   
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Another major argument within this dissertation is that our modern conception of 
what constitutes reality, usually imagined as an unqualified materialism, is coetaneous 
with capitalist enterprise and itself fosters the experience of subjective alienation. 
Alienation cultivates dualistic splits not only in the relations of production within 
workplaces, with similar intersectional divisions permeating multiple areas of the social 
and environmental spheres, but it also actualizes a dualistic isolation of the separate 
conscious self from the dead, unconscious other, the world. Materialist notions of a 
confined and exclusive consciousness interacting within an unconscious world suits 
capitalist interests as it makes commodification far more efficient and justifiable, 
encouraging utilitarian relationships that are competitive and systematized, but which are 
ultimately alienated and unfulfilling. It seems to me that capitalism, along with the 
alienation it produces, is intimately related to a materialism that developed from the 17th 
century onward which consigned consciousness to human beings principally, and even 
then only to certain regions of their being (that is, to brains). It was within the crucible of 
these capitalist and materialist contexts, supported by Protestant religious requirements 
to work long and hard for one’s reward, that modern helping practices developed. Yet, is 
materialism justified in consigning consciousness only to complex structures like brains? 
Is it right to think of the world outside these structures as mere dead matter, and so 
unconscious? Could new paradigms of the place of consciousness in the world 
transform our current, almost mesmerized, dependency on our current capitalist 
systems? The latter part of this dissertation explores my belief that there needs to be a 
new understanding of the central place of consciousness in our world paradigm so that 
we see the world anew as an alive, vital, and, indeed, conscious entity in its own right. I 
argue for a monistic panpsychic paradigm that recognizes the permeation of 
consciousness throughout the material world, which is enlivened, and enchanted, 
thereby. Such a worldview, focusing on the subjectivity and experientiality of 
phenomena, tackles capitalism from the other end, as it were, because it challenges the 
dualism that capitalism thrives on, exposing its practices as unjust, unequal, and 
undemocratic. It is within an understanding of a living world that the basis for an ethic of 
justice and compassionate care can emerge, and that, in particular, would serve as the 
foundation for the helping professions which have been heretofore functioning from an 
individualist and competitive perspective, mirroring the capitalist economic and social 
systems they evolved alongside. 
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Some comments on my approach and assumptions 
I should make some comments regarding my philosophical approach throughout 
this work, and some of my assumptions. As indicated above, my approach may be 
considered as having two aspects, a view from the outside and a view from within, both 
necessary for an effective engagement of any helping profession with more trans-
personal issues like social justice. Here I define helping professions as “occupations that 
provide health and education services to individuals and groups, including occupations 
in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, counseling, medicine, nursing, social work, 
physical and occupational therapy, teaching, and education” (APA Dictionary of 
Psychology). 
First, I am not shy to name capitalism as the social and economic system against 
which we, as participants within helping professions, whether they are as counsellors, 
educators, doctors, or social workers, must oppose. This naming of capitalism as 
problematic has gained some traction in recent years, particularly after the crash of 2008 
and the development of movements like Occupy and, as demonstrated in the United 
States, in the political runs of people like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, 
and in the United Kingdom, Jeremy Corbyn. Many writers, authors, academics, and 
politicians are making the case for the introduction of new forms of society based on 
truly democratic principles, justice, and equality, and are identifying capitalism as the 
main impediment to realizing these goals.2 I have myself been inspired by democratic 
socialists of the past who fought for trade unions, free medical care, free university 
access, voting rights, regulations around working hours, and so on. Moreover, more and 
more analyses recognize the role of intersectionality in the development of, and solution 
to, issues of racism, sexism, climate change, economic, political, and social injustices of 
all kinds, since it is clear that they are mutually interdependent. We now know that, for 
example, fossil fuel companies were aware for decades that their products were 
causing,3 and would continue to cause, massive changes in the environment, and yet 
they chose to cover these facts up, anticipating that acknowledgement of them would 
                                                
2 John Nichols (2011) has written an excellent history of socialism in America, most of which is quite unknown to North 
Americans. 
3 See: http://climateaccountability.org/ and the report from the Guardian news-site: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/09/revealed-20-firms-third-carbon-emissions 
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impact profits. This was countenanced and supported by governments and politicians.4 
The adverse effects of these practices are multiple and diffuse, touching almost every 
level of the political, economic, social, and environmental spheres. Clearly, these 
business methods are fundamentally undemocratic and destructive, and they must be 
challenged, but this challenge must come in the form of an exposition of capitalism itself 
which operates on the basis of exploiting resources, both human and non-human, for the 
benefit of a few (Foster & Clark, 2018). Ultimately, workplace arrangements need to 
become democratized so that employees have a full voice in workplace functioning, 
which will result in practices that benefit workers, their communities, and the 
environment (Wolf, 2012).  
I use Karl Marx’s concept of alienation to assist in developing an understanding 
of the ways capitalist workplaces engender mental health issues in particular, and as a 
concept with which helping professions like counselling must engage. Marx wrote about 
alienation mostly in his early writings when he was reflecting on the price that brutal 
capitalist practices of his time were having on the society around him. His descriptions of 
alienation are an astute summary of the psychological, emotional, and physical toll that 
work had on the people toiling in industrialized workplaces. Although times have 
changed, at least in Western countries, I would argue that the workplaces of today 
continue to foster alienation, although the forms it takes may differ from the form it took 
in the 1800s. The psychological experience of alienation still manifests in the various 
ways that workers feel disconnected from their work and from each other (Mandel, 
2015). Marx recognized that capitalist modes of production created divisions of labour 
and class formation, establishing massive inequalities in society. These inequalities have 
continued and have been well-documented in recent years, clearly demonstrating that, 
while there are a few individuals doing very well within the current system, for too many 
individuals life has become quite a struggle. The inequality created by capitalism itself 
produces mental health issues.  
Second, I advocate in this dissertation that there must be a dual transformation to 
remedy our current situation, involving both an outward systemic change as outlined 
above and also what might be called an internal change within individuals and societies, 
and that helping professions must engage with both aspects within their practices. As an 
                                                
4 A recent example of this type of collusion is the Liberal government’s purchase of the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion 
Project. See: https://thenarwhal.ca/kinder-morgan-s-canadian-executives-earn-millions-governments-discuss-bailout 
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example of what I am advocating, I consider how my argument for engaging with both 
aspects within its practices would play out in counselling, my current field of service. I 
argue for the adoption of a dual-aspect monistic panpsychism as a philosophical means 
to not only ground this approach in theory, but also to invite possibilities for living out the 
ramifications of this world-view within both individual lives and society. I believe it is 
important to problematize consciousness itself and its place in the natural world in order 
to revolutionize the way we understand and live our lives. As mentioned before, a 
recognition, both intellectual and experiential, that the world itself is conscious, and 
therefore alive, invites an ethic of compassion, care, and justice. This inner 
understanding necessarily accompanies outward changes to social practices. These 
topics might seem oddly incompatible with one another, and I often thought, while 
considering the matter, that they were really two radically different areas of concern. Yet, 
surely the subject of consciousness, the very channel of experience itself, is, or should 
be, a primary theme for any psychologically or interpersonally oriented helping practice, 
along with the way in which the phenomenology of consciousness plays out in the 
arrangements of society. Indeed, what if these two areas, the inner and the outer, turn 
out to be the same thing? What if the focus on one is the focus on the other at the same 
time? What if the world-view that matter is inherently conscious demands a society that 
is caring and just? If so, all helping professions, of which counselling is my specific 
example in this thesis, will need to address themselves to not only the workplace, the 
primary source of capitalist alienation, but also their own individualistic and 
decontextualized practices, pedagogy, models, and assumptions if they are to effectively 
engage with mental distress permeating these fields. 
Some considerations… 
I recognize that in describing the nature of work, especially when connecting it to 
history and the exercise of power through specific social relations, there can be a danger 
of simplifying something that is actually quite complex and multifaceted. As Komlosy 
(2018) points out in her extensive review of the history and meaning of work, linear 
historical descriptions, especially focused on European examples used as a universal 
model and comparison to other areas of the world, tend to hide “the diversity of actually 
coexisting alternatives, countertendencies, labour relations and discourses at each 
historical juncture, obscuring some aspects entirely” (Chapter 1, Limits Eurocentric 
Narrative, para. 3). Nevertheless, despite alternatives always existing to the dominant 
10 
practices during any historical epoch, it is important to name what they were alternatives 
to, resisting the temptation to avoid descriptions of actual historical conditions in the 
name of a post-modern and post-structuralist relativism (Cole, 2003; Cole & Hill, 1995; 
Parker, 1998). My assumption is that we currently live within a capitalist society, fuelled 
by neoliberal philosophies, but I am aware that there are always lines of divergence from 
these perspectives, operating sometimes simultaneously to them, and within them. I 
certainly experienced counter-narratives within my old workplace which took the form of 
a variety of practices intended to invoke other ways of working including non-conformity 
to norms, the use of humour to oppose technocratic procedures, non-performance of 
requirements, ‘forgetting’ to do unnecessary tasks, and going on strike, among others. 
Yet, all these practices were situated clearly and unambiguously within and against a 
capitalist business structure, and thus it is within capitalism that I ground my critique. 
Turning to the subject matter of consciousness and my consideration of its role 
within the material conditions of reality and social relations, I advocate in this dissertation 
for a panpsychic world-view, keeping in mind the vast varieties and histories of the idea. 
Although panpsychism can be seen to invite other paradigms for consideration, like, for 
example, pantheism or panentheism, I have tried to avoid veering too much off-course in 
this regard. Personally, I am inclined toward a species of panentheism, but I think it is 
sufficient to merely introduce the notion of the inseparability of mind and matter at all 
levels, which is the primary feature of the panpsychic view of the world presented here. 
Moreover, I have relied on Western analytic philosophers to advocate for this position, 
while acknowledging that there are certainly other traditions (like many continental 
philosophers, the new materialists, and most of the Eastern traditions) that give various 
forms of accounts of it. I confess that, despite my familiarity with many of the Eastern 
traditions and practices in the formative phases of my life, I have, for the most part, 
exclusively focused on particular Western analytic philosophical arguments simply 
because in my current phase of intellectual pursuits they interest me. Part of my interest 
and excitement is seeing a renewed interest in consciousness within these traditions in 
recent years. 
Finally, my arguments should not be taken as any particular explication of 
Marxism. Marx himself famously said that he was not a Marxist, and whereas I conform 
to some orthodoxy around the notion of alienation itself, and of the relevance of 
recognizing class division as sources of mental distress, I am not a Marxist dogmatist. 
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Marx’s main contribution was a critique of capitalism, a critique that has enjoyed a 
revival and quite correctly been given more credence in recent years. I am happy to join 
those who believe Marx was right in his analysis of capitalism and its effects. 
Nevertheless, the re-recognition of consciousness per se as an important area of study, 
and not merely an epi-phenomena caused by complex neurology or the totality of social 
relationships, along with the additionally controversial assertion of its inherent 
inseparability from all matter, would probably be dismissed as bourgeois philosophizing 
by Marx who held a strictly materialist view of the world, and who early on rejected 
similar Hegelian views of the nature of reality. I think, however, that materialist views of 
matter, especially with the arrival of the new physics, are inadequate to explain what we 
take to be real and that, along with Thomas Nagel, Galen Strawson, and others, any 
good explanation of physicalism, which seems like a good enough starting point as any 
other, must entail alternative explanations of the datum of consciousness. The final part 
of this Prologue describes how chapters are arranged to make my arguments. 
In Chapter One I discuss the idea of alienation and why it is particularly relevant 
for the mental health issues that are increasingly recognized as central to the practices 
of the helping professions. It begins with some historical context to the idea, Marx’s 
critique of some of the older versions of it, and its connection with labour and with 
industrialized and modern workplaces. Marx’s understanding of the effects of alienation 
on people’s lives is outlined. One of his unique insights was commodity fetishism and 
how this phenomenon replaces real relational connections within society. I then discuss 
the work of others who have attempted to expand on the more sociological and 
psychological effects of alienation, grounding it in analyses especially pertinent to the 
helping professions. I concentrate mostly on the work of Melvin Seeman for this 
discussion. This chapter will give examples throughout of the diverse ways in which 
alienation affects people individually and also relationally, linking it explicitly to the 
reproduction of mental distress in various forms.  
In Chapter Two I focus on counselling psychology, its history, and its historical 
approach to the mental health field as a specific example of how one particular helping 
profession has engaged with wider, contextual social issues in its attempt to assist 
people seeking help. I discuss its efforts to address social justice within its practices and 
pedagogy, and its forceful critique of structural discrimination. I go on to review its 
advocacy of multiculturalism as the primary representation of its embrace of social 
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justice concerns. I then explore some of the more recent attempts to broaden the notion 
of social justice as it applies to counselling psychology, but I suggest that current 
conceptions are, nevertheless, not explicitly grounded in any solid philosophical 
foundation for their critiques, as they necessarily should be. Finally, I propose that 
alienation theory, based on an exploration of capitalism, class division, and the inequality 
these generate, offers a philosophical basis for an analysis and critique of society that is 
well-suited to counselling psychology’s interest in engaging with broader conceptions of 
social justice within its practices.  
In Chapter Three I discuss specifically why counselling psychology has failed to 
provide a strong philosophical foundation for a social justice perspective since, in 
actuality, it is embedded within modern neoliberal assumptions and is itself historically 
and practicably a functioning arm of capitalism. It unwittingly empowers the very 
conditions that the profession purports to challenge. I will review a number of ways in 
which this is borne out. Many of the helping disciplines, including psychology, co-evolved 
with the growth of capitalism, simultaneously flourishing within the contextual crucible of 
an emerging materialism, which relegated consciousness/soul/spirit to small parts of the 
human brain, while rejecting the ancient understanding that the universe was alive, thus 
reducing it to dead mechanistic matter. I discuss how this led to an individualism that 
encouraged competition rather than co-operation, and to political systems like capitalism 
that sustained such understandings. Psychology, in particular, developed individualistic 
models and practices which reflected the new political and ideological world-view. I will 
look at the construction and use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual as an example 
of the ways in which the ‘psych’ helping professions perpetuate the commodification of 
persons and their distress for the financial benefit of their practitioners. 
In Chapter Four I discuss the proper subject matter of any relational helping 
practice, mind or consciousness, and will advocate for understanding consciousness in a 
new (though, actually quite old) way, that is, through panpsychism. I say ‘proper’ 
because helping professions using psychology (which is most of them these days) have 
been highjacked by ideological concerns to predict and control behaviour within the 
narrow parameters of capitalist expectations of the good worker and consumer. 
However, psychology is predominantly the study of subjectivity, and I will argue that 
subjectivity is shared, in some form, by all reality. Consequently, a relational inter-
subjectivity, not just between humans but between all subjectivities, invites the 
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emergence of ethics of care, compassion, justice, and democracy. I use arguments from 
contemporary Western analytic philosophy to make the case for the adoption of a 
different, though ancient, understanding of matter’s relationship to mind. I discuss the 
implications of this view, what might be called a panpsychic dual-aspect monism, for 
how we could experience and function differently in the world as a result. 
In Chapter Five I will concern myself with how the helping professions might 
move beyond their own capitalist foundations and more effectively address systemic 
social justice issues within their domains of practice. Some of the newer mindfulness-
based therapy approaches currently being used by various helping professionals are 
potentially promising for opening up possibilities for initiating change at multiple levels of 
experience. I illustrate how counselling at the personal, individual level can effect 
changes at the broader, systemic level through an explication of the processes found in 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, or ACT, a therapy approach I practice with my 
own clients and which is used by a variety of helping professionals. I use Goodman et 
al.’s (2004) six principles for working within a social justice framework to exemplify how 
ACT’s six main therapeutic processes can function to simultaneously influence both the 
micro- and macro-levels of change. Ultimately, this involves engaging with a revised 
understanding of the centrality of consciousness, a recognition of the aliveness of the 
world in its dual aspect of being both matter and mind, an appreciation of what this 
means in terms of equality and justice, and a commitment to change at both the level of 
the self and of the society.   
The Epilogue concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the place of 
education as a location for meeting the challenges of the current climate crisis, the 
potentially catastrophic expression of an essential theme throughout, that human beings’ 
interaction with nature through capitalist work arrangements has created an alienated 
condition, which results in disconnection with nature, with others, and with ourselves, all 
leading to health issues on an individual and planetary scale.   
This dissertation represents the written expression within an academic 
framework of much that I have been studying both professionally and personally over 
many decades. Its emphasis on pursuing both social and individual change at the same 
time, as it were, comes from not just a conviction that this is the most sensible approach, 
but also, on the one hand, from a frustration in a politics that ignores the person and 
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their inner experiences, thus reducing persons to mere social constructions, and on the 
other hand, psychologies and spiritualities that focus on inner experience to the 
exclusion of the necessity of social change. I believe that a focus on one without the 
other is mistaken, and ultimately unproductive. As David Loy (2018) states: “As we begin 
to wake up and realize that we are not separate from each other, nor from this wondrous 
earth, we realize that the ways we live together and relate to the earth need to be 
reconstructed too” (Chapter 2, Selfless Engagement, para. 4). All helping professions 
and in particular for me because of my professional affiliation, counselling psychology, 




















“Alienation is a form of living death. It is the acid of despair that dissolves   
society”. 
Martin Luther King Jr. 
 
“Alienation and loneliness plant the seeds for rebellion and consciousness”.      












Chapter 1: Alienation 
1.1. Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter I will explore alienation and its effects, using Karl Marx’s (1818- 
1883) description of the term within the context of political economy as a guide to 
understanding it, and particularly as encountered in the domain of the workplace. I am 
especially drawn to the notion of alienation because it seems to me to have been a 
common experience in the workplaces I knew. The manifestations of it were often varied 
and complex, but despite being sometimes obscured through habituation or the subtlety 
of its expression, they were for the most part quite obvious. For example, 
disengagement was a major issue for the corporate company I worked for, and 
management always seemed to be ‘implementing strategies’ to rouse the workers and 
get them more engaged. Yet, this particular sign of alienation-as-disengagement was not 
unique to our organization. In a 2013 Gallup study of 142 countries, only 13% of 
employees were found to be engaged with their work (Crabtree, 2013). The notion of 
alienation pre-dated Marx, of course, with discussions found historically within various 
religious, philosophical, and political writings. In this chapter I will give some brief 
background on the idea of alienation as formulated by G. W. F. Hegel and Ludwig 
Feuerbach in order to provide some framework to Marx’s historical materialist 
formulation of the concept, and to highlight some of the ways Marx disagreed with these 
two thinkers, but also some important ways in which he drew from them, particularly 
Hegel. I will then explore Marx’s understanding of alienation as connected to labour and 
why this is vital to the argument that it is within the domain of people’s working lives, and 
the structural inequalities that inhabit such contexts, that many mental health issues in 
our society are reproduced. In other words, I shall argue that a preponderance of mental 
health issues arise from the experience of alienation in modern capitalist society and that 
one may look no further than within capitalist class structures formed and codified within 
a society’s work relationships, and the social and cultural relationships which intersect 
with them, to locate an obvious source of the experience of mental distress. Many 
modern workplaces are sites of oppression because they are structured by employers to 
create barriers on multiple levels to the realization of self-determination and democratic 
participation for powerless workers. Workers internalize these material conditions as 
negative views of the self, marked particularly by the sense of being unworthy of more 
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resources or more involved participation, all to the benefit of those in power 
(Prilleltensky, 2008). Since alienation manifests in psychological issues within these 
contexts, they may be viewed as natural and inevitable responses to the conditions of 
oppression and inequality found there, resulting in escape, avoidance, or self-soothing 
strategies. These responses are subsequently labelled as disordered or pathological by 
the expert classes, although for ideological reasons, in accordance with mechanistic 
conceptions of reality, the conditions under which they arise are minimized or ignored. 
Consequently, any argument for a focus on social justice as a necessary and essential 
aspect of the helping professions, like counselling psychology, must problematize and 
theorize alienation in people’s working lives, and its effects. I offer comments toward the 
conclusion of the chapter regarding the role of the individual in effecting change; very 
often Marx’s thought is presented as a mere social philosophy, rendered such that if 
there were solely future systemic changes to more democratic forms of living,5 people 
would naturally lead fulfilled and unalienated lives (Clarke, 1971). It seems to me that 
this approach, verging on the sort of utopianism about which Marx was quite ambivalent 
(Eagleton, 2011), abandons his notion of the dialectic, and ignores the role of individual 
vision and initiative. I believe conscious intention is vital for change to occur, and I agree 
with Sayers (2011) that “there is an individual, subjective dimension to alienation and its 
overcoming. Will and choice are necessary” (p. 8). I propose that these qualities are 
grounded in consciousness itself, within which will, intention, purpose, and meaning lie, 
and which must, therefore, be part of any analysis of alienation and, more broadly, of 
social justice. Consequently, a philosophical materialism that is the basis of a critique of 
capitalist workplace arrangements requires an account of the place of consciousness 
within its analysis. This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Four of this 
dissertation. Helping professions of all kinds are in a unique position to not only critique 
matters of social inequality found within systemic structures like workplaces as it relates 
to mental distress, but also engage with the phenomena of consciousness itself, both in 
a philosophical understanding of its pervasiveness in the world, but also in an 
experiential sharing of its inter-subjectivity with clients, and indeed, with all things. These 
philosophical and experiential perspectives create and maintain an ethic of equality, 
                                                
5 My assumption in this dissertation is that democracy should extend to all, and to every area of our lives. Currently, this is 
not the case, and the workplace is a prime example of an undemocratic social institution. Historically, many thinkers have 
not favoured a pure democracy. Neither Socrates or Plato endorsed it, and James Madison, one of the U.S.’s Founding 
Fathers critiqued it, believing that power should always rest with the wealthy whom he considered more responsible and 
civic-minded (Chomsky, 2017).   
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justice, and care which are inherent in such an outlook, and which serve as a way 
forward to construct a good and compassionate society. 
1.2. Marx and Alienation: Some Initial Comments                         
Beginning early on in his writing career, particularly within the pages of the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (otherwise known as the ‘Paris 
Manuscripts’), Marx formulated a notably expansive and integral description of alienation 
and its effects, which some believe represents the core of his entire philosophical 
approach to political economy (Raekstad, 2015). Although he developed his economic 
arguments later on in relation to it, even to the extent that the actual term almost 
disappears from his writing, Marx was unequivocal from the beginning of his career 
regarding the existence and influence of alienation, and its origins. His understanding of 
it was comprehensive, which has caused some problems for commentators searching 
for specific definitions, and for those social scientists wishing to operationalize the term 
for empirical purposes. Furthermore, and further complicating matters, Marx often 
described conditions which might normally be described as alienation without explicitly 
using the term (Schmitt, 1996). This has led some to conclude that he abandoned the 
concept after 1844; the Marxist scholar Louis Althusser, for example, claims that as 
Marx and his thought matured he had, by the time he wrote Capital, discarded the 
notion, turning away from his earlier humanism in favour of a purely economic analysis 
(Sharma, 1979). Moreover, some have argued that the concept is not relevant for 
today’s world, especially in light of changes in the nature of work over the last 100 years 
and the expansion of globalization (Archibald, 2009; Seeman, 1983).6    
This chapter will not address these debates as they are peripheral to the main 
argument, except to state that it is my own view that Marx was intensely concerned with 
alienation throughout his career (Allen & Boyle, 2011; Mandel, 1973; Meszaros, 1970; 
Musto, 2010; Ollman,1977; Sayers, 2011; Sharma, 1979; Silva, 2017) and that, 
accordingly, it is reasonable to draw on Marx’s full oeuvre to explore his understanding 
                                                
6 Indeed, since Marx’s concept of alienation is very much connected to the level of control that a worker has in their 
workplace, it is clear that expectation of control, autonomy, and gratification may be lower in developing countries, for 
example, and, in fact, may be threatening to such workers. Thus, workers in developing countries may be alienated not 
because of lack of control but because of unrealistic expectations around what work will provide for them materially. 
Consequently, ‘alienation’ in developing countries resembles a more Durkheimian ‘anomie’ than a Marxian alienation. It 
could also be the case that even although powerlessness is experienced in the same way in different regions or cultures, 
the manifestations of alienation differ in expression (Archibald, 2009). 
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of the concept. Furthermore, despite globalization and the increase in technology in the 
hands of workers, it is “not that objective alienation has now ‘migrated’ from factory to 
office workers, but, with Marx, that office workers are sinking to the extremely alienated 
position of factory workers” (Archibald, 2009, p. 154). Moreover, work in information, 
technological, or knowledge-based occupations has intensified, with increasing demands 
for productivity, leading to work hours that in many cases well exceed the classic 40-
hour week, thus increasing alienation rather than reducing it. 
There are also those who are happy to accept the fact of alienation as a kind of 
vague ontological category, but who display a reticence to explore the individual 
manifestations of it and its experiential effects in the real lives of people. This appears to 
be primarily due to disagreements over what Marx thought about human nature, its 
relation to what he calls ‘species-being’, and what significance, if any, these concepts 
might demonstrably have to the conditions of alienation itself. Accordingly, Ollman 
(1977) complains that theorists often render Marx’s concept of human nature invisible, 
or, when it is acknowledged, fail to position it alongside Marx’s other theories. Thus, for 
example, Schmitt (1996) says that despite Marx’s elucidation of the conditions that foster 
alienation “he is less steadfast in his view that the basic condition that causes those 
manifestations should be described as some problem with each person's human 
essence” (p. 164). Despite these scholarly concerns which touch more broadly on the 
perennial question of what constitutes a human being, I am content at this point to 
mention that Marx, uninterested as he was in abstract philosophical debates (Eagleton, 
2018), was in practice quite loquacious in his descriptions of what we today might call 
the psychological effects of alienation on people, with especially colourful descriptions in 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. These effects, and the ways 
people use to manage them, illustrate the intersectionality of alienation and mental 
health issues under capitalist modes of production, and, therefore, are especially 
relevant to the call for competent and clearly defined understandings that social justice 
might be theorized within the helping professions, and specifically within practices like 
counselling psychology. Indeed, the beauty of Marx’s analysis, one which is quite 
integral and intensely interested in nature at all levels, is that it allows for an account of 
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alienation and a description of its effects at every level of the human experience from the 
social to the intra-psychic.7 
Although there has been a decline in scholarly interest in alienation in recent 
decades, it may be argued that alienation is now actually more prevalent than ever 
before in today’s Western capitalist society (Seeman, 1983; Woodford, 2017; Yuill, 2011) 
and that the helping professions are particularly well-positioned to address it, both in 
research and in practice. Indeed, the helping encounter itself is a unique opportunity to 
not only give persons voice to their experiences of alienation, but to contrastively offer 
within the helping relationship an alternate way of being with others since it represents a 
genuinely human interaction as opposed to the commodified relational interactions 
otherwise found within conventional capitalist life. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter Five of this dissertation. Regardless, while the effects of alienation in people’s 
lives are often not labelled as such (Seeman, 1983), further complicated by an historic 
hesitation by many Marxist theorists to consider the usefulness of empirical research into 
the subject, I agree with Archibald (2009) that Marx was a lifelong proponent of empirical 
research into both the existence, and psychological effects of, alienation within workers’ 
lived experience.  
1.3. What is Alienation? 
What is alienation, exactly? We might define it as “a state or a process whereby 
one becomes separated or estranged from one’s original condition, hopefully as a 
prelude to a subsequent return or recovery of it” (Burston, 1988, p. 84). I intend to 
explicate what might be meant by original condition in Chapter Four, but for me this 
phrase speaks to any movement away from an experience of oneself as what one might 
call undifferentiated consciousness, a pure subjectivity that is fundamentally intrinsic to 
oneself and others, including nature herself, by which one is connected to all things and 
through which moral and ethical prerogatives, like equality and justice, are seen to shine. 
Comparable to the perspectives of Emile Durkheim (who coined the term anomie, similar 
in general intent but not quite the same as alienation), George Simmel, and Max Weber, 
Marx’s notion of alienation is descriptive of a situationally experienced loss of self or 
relationship that deeply distorts individual and relational experience, and which, 
                                                
7 For an excellent, though controversial, explication of this type of holism found in Marx, see Ollman (1977) who refers to 
this as internal relations. 
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particularly important for Marx, is grounded within a person’s larger social and historical 
contexts (Yuill, 2011). 
Historically, however, alienation was often understood in different terms, some of 
which may be described as religious, or versions of idealism (Musto, 2010; Thompson, 
1979). Marx himself was quite knowledgeable of, and influenced by, these systems of 
thought, but he eventually settled for a more foundational materialism, connected to the 
organization of labour within society, in his major philosophical writings.8 Nevertheless, 
two contemporaries who had a profound influence on Marx’s thinking were G. W. F. 
Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach. 
1.3.1.  G. W. F. Hegel  
Prior to Marx there had been descriptions of alienation in theological and 
philosophical literature and, more recently, within the discourse of English political 
economic theories (Musto, 2010). It was, however, G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) who 
addressed alienation in a grand philosophical manner, particularly in his book The 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Hegel was an idealist who thought that all phenomena 
were ideas within a primordial Mind or Spirit. He used the terms Entäusserung (self-
externalization) and Entfremdung (estrangement) to describe the condition of Spirit as it 
objectified itself into the world of objects, including the realm of human existence. History 
was for Hegel a dialectical movement in which human beings gradually increased their 
consciousness of their true relationship to Spirit, thus allowing It to become truly Self-
conscious (Thompson, 1979). Hegel believed that the non-alienated state is a non-
dualistic, integrated, and whole state of Being; alienation is the splitting of this primordial 
Subject into two, and human history is the complex narrative of this dualism, played out 
via alienation, as human beings journey to return to wholeness. It is interesting to note 
that these ideas are once again gaining traction in contemporary times. David Loy 
(2019), the Buddhist philosopher, for example, believes that human beings are the 
mechanism by which the universe not only becomes more complex but also more 
conscious, ultimately manifesting as a self-consciousness. The important ramification of 
both Hegel and Loy’s observations is that through consciousness, revealed through 
                                                
8 For a comparison with existential accounts of alienation found in Heidegger and Laing, see Burston (1998). 
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human beings, the universe comes to know itself as the Self itself, thus challenging our 
conventional limited sense of self as separate from others and from nature.  
Hegel’s contribution to Marx’s thought was important for a number of reasons, 
but particularly as it relates to Marx’s understanding of history and relationships (Sayers, 
2011). Primarily, Hegel was concerned with developing a theory of history, one that went 
beyond the static Rousseauian division between civilization and the state of nature 
(Swain, 2012), and that instead described a history that moves and changes, indeed, 
improving over time. Improvement implied the realization of freedom which for Hegel 
meant the ability to express oneself in the world. The freedom of creative expression 
was the pathway to a reintegration with Spirit and in its Self-realization. It was only in this 
way that alienation from Spirit could be overcome. Nevertheless, as Hegel was an 
idealist, it was primarily in the realm of thought that this re-union would occur.   
Importantly, Hegel’s philosophical system contributed to Marx’s holistic 
understanding of the nature of reality, what Ollman (1977) calls ‘the philosophy of 
internal relations.’ Hegel was keen to establish the meaning of specific things in the 
universe in terms of, and in relation to, the Whole, which he called Spirit, God, or the 
Absolute. All things for Hegel were related not only to the Whole but to each other in a 
vast and complex web of interdependent relationships. Unlike Kant before him, Hegel 
thought that an object was not merely the sum of its qualities but that each of a thing’s 
qualities must be analysed in terms of the whole which had ultimately given rise to it. 
Hegel thus believed that both truth and knowledge could only be fully grasped when it is 
connected to the whole and so “to state what is known about any one thing is to describe 
the system in which it exists; it is to present, as Hegel invariably did, each part as a facet 
of the whole [and to affirm that] through their interrelations things are more than they 
appear” (Ollman, 1977, p. 32). This is a particularly crucial notion that I expand on in 
relation to my discussion of consciousness in Chapter Four of this dissertation, and a 
key component of how I conceive of how an otherwise traditionally individualistic 
counselling psychology can effectively engage with social justice issues at a broader 
systemic level (discussed in Chapter Five). Marx retained the relational, intra- and inter-
dependent concept of the connection between things and relations, while discarding 
Hegel’s theistic idealism in favour of an unabashed materialism, influenced by the work 
of Ludwig Feuerbach, a contemporary of his who thoroughly critiqued Hegel’s idealist 
doctrines. 
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1.3.2. Ludwig Feuerbach  
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) was a contemporary of Marx who critiqued 
Hegel’s system in his 1841 book The Essence of Christianity. Feuerbach argued against 
the idealism of Hegel and, in particular, thought that all religious ideas, especially the 
notion of God, were a projection of human qualities onto another, a Being created by the 
human imagination itself (Allen & O’Boyle, 2011). In this way, human beings split 
themselves off from themselves, with alienation being the predictable and unfortunate 
result. Alienation for Feuerbach involved the manner in which human qualities like 
creativity and freedom are appropriated by the imagined Divine Other, increasing its 
magnificence and at the same time depreciating human imagination and potential, thus 
making humans powerless and inconsequential (Brien, 2009). If Hegel believed that idea 
preceded functioning in the world, it was Feuerbach who completely reversed this and 
claimed that actual engagement with the world preceded ideas, both religious and 
philosophical, and that if change was to occur it was in the material realm and not in the 
realm of ideas (Brien, 2009; Swain, 2012). Friedrich Engels, Marx’s long-time 
collaborator, describes the impact of Feuerbach’s hypotheses as follows:  
With one blow, it pulverised the contradiction [of the Hegelian system], in 
that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. 
Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon 
which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. 
Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious 
fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. 
(as quoted in Swain, 2012, p. 21) 
The primacy of engagement with nature was to be an essential point in Marx’s 
thinking on alienation. For him it was the actual, historical, and material conditions of 
existence that determined legal, philosophical, theological, and social ideas, and not the 
other way around (his infamous and controversial base and superstructure theory). Yet 
Marx was not only to dismiss Hegel’s idealistic system in favour of a vigorous 
materialism, but also to criticize Feuerbach himself (Silva, 2017). 
1.3.3. Marx’s Critiques of Hegel and Feuerbach 
Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel was that he had matters backwards; alienation was 
not a result of a dualistic split between human beings and God whose remedy was to re-
establish their union, but rather that the split itself was the result of alienation (Silva, 
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2017). However, for Marx this analysis did not go far enough. While Marx agreed with 
Feuerbach’s adoption of a materialist analysis of society, he still felt that Feuerbach, 
whose solution to the problem of alienation was education regarding the real nature of 
people’s status in the world, was still far too concerned with the world of ideas. Marx 
retained Hegel’s understanding of the world as interconnected, inter-related, and as 
aspects of a whole, but he rejected both Hegel’s idealism (Swain, 2012) and 
Feuerbach’s solution to resolve the matter. Marx began to develop an understanding of 
alienation as a result of the material conditions of humans as they engaged with nature, 
which is to say, in their performance of labour. Feuerbach proposed that education was 
key to changing society to an unalienated state because he had fixed notions about 
human nature itself (Swain, 2012). However, Marx did not consider human nature to be 
describable in isolation and in static terms, but instead considered it to manifest 
dependent on the context of the social relations humans find themselves within history 
(Brien, 2009). Consequently, for Marx it was necessary to analyse the structure of 
society, the central foundation of which was labour and its organization. 
1.4.     Marx’s Idea of Alienation: Labour and Relations of Production 
Marx understood alienation as it related to the way in which humans engage with 
the objects they produce through the labour process. Thus, within capitalist society he 
associated alienation with the expansion and control of private property, and with the 
resultant ensuing class divisions. Marx considered alienation a manifestation of 
corrupted relationships within the personal and social spheres arising from the practices 
of capitalist accumulation that eroded human creativity and control within places of work 
(Yuill, 2011).             
Historically, Marxist literature has tended to treat alienation as an ontological 
category, approaching the subject from an oftentimes abstract philosophical perspective, 
and, as mentioned previously, eschewing the notion of empirical research into the 
concept. Consequently, the division of labour itself is frequently considered to be 
alienation under capitalist modes of production (Clarke, 1971). There have, however, 
been alternative approaches to the subject, many advanced by Western sociologists. 
These analyses primarily follow the lead of Melvin Seeman (Seeman, 1959), who 
focused on the social-psychological effects of alienation, with an unambiguous agenda 
of making the concept accessible to empirical study. As might be expected, these non-
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Marxist attempts to define and test alienation were criticized for de-emphasizing 
alienation’s connection to the economic relations of people’s material working conditions 
and instead treating it as a purely subjective experience (Musto, 2010). Clearly, these 
differences in approach would have ramifications for possibilities of practical personal 
and political change. Since the sociological approach was seen to ignore the actual 
socio-historical conditions that lay at the root of alienation, it was critiqued by Marxists as 
a form of reductionism to the individual level with proposed solutions that were 
essentially personal and individual. Critiques of the capitalist mode of production were 
obscured by sociological discourse in favour of “individual maladjustment to social 
norms” (Musto, 2010, p. 94).   
Despite the differences between these two approaches to the subject of 
alienation, it is apparent that one need not negate the other (Yuill, 2011). On the 
contrary, both approaches are complementary and, indeed, useful for a broad 
engagement with alienation’s causes and effects at all levels of the human experience. 
Therefore, I agree with Yuill (2011) that these differences simply describe “whether one 
[seeks] to explore the sociological causes of alienation with reference to certain social 
and historical structures, or whether one [wishes] to chart the psychological experiences 
of alienation as played out in the subjectivities of individual workers” (p. 106), but that 
they are, nevertheless, not mutually exclusive areas of consideration. I also think that 
embracing both aspects of alienation fits particularly well with Ollman’s concept of 
‘internal relations’ and with the dual-aspect monism I argue for in Chapter Four of this 
dissertation, which recognizes the presence of parts within wholes, but also wholes 
within parts. To this end, Yuill considers alienation to be a ‘bridging concept’, a term he 
borrows form W. R. Heinz (1991), to emphasize the necessity of considering the socio-
historical conditions as a foundation for the appearance of certain socio-psychological 
experiences. 
Alienation is thus a way of describing human experience on three inter-related 
levels: the intra-psychic, the inter-personal, and the supra-personal, or social. These 
levels are interconnected and relational (Ollman, 1977). For the purposes of this 
dissertation, alienation as a bridging concept emphasizes not only the contextual and 
historical conditions under which it may manifest but also the social-psychological impact 
on the lives of real individuals (Crinson & Yuill, 2008). It is these conditions and impacts 
that, I argue, are the principal causes of mental distress in today’s world which the 
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counselling professions are potentially in a unique position to address, but as we shall 
discover in Chapter Three, very often do not.  
1.5. The Importance of Labour 
It is through labour and the eventual creation of some form of product that Marx 
conceived of how human beings engage with their world, constructing and nurturing 
positive and healthy relationships with themselves and with others (Brien, 2009). For 
Marx, “labour is an intentional activity designed to produce a change in the material 
world….[and] as activity through which human beings give form to materials and thus 
realize themselves in the world” (Sayers, 2011, p. 33). Labour is a way of externalization 
or objectification through which human beings realize their creative potential within 
societies of like-minded people. In many ways, Marx may be considered a non-dualist 
thinker, for while he did not espouse a distinction between humans and society, he did 
not reduce one to the other. Thus, not only is the environment and society transformed 
through labour but individuals themselves are also correspondingly changed (Clarke, 
1971). Here we see the way in which Marx incorporated Hegel’s spiritual notion around 
the unfolding of history into a materialist account of historical progress (Sayers, 2011), 
while rejecting attempts to reduce the individual to society, and vice versa. Unlike other 
creatures who satisfy their needs in a natural, immediate, and purely pragmatic manner, 
human beings labour in a variety of ways, not just creating for the sake of immediate 
personal consumption (as in, for example, hunting, fishing or gathering vegetables, etc.), 
but also with the intention to conserve an object, to transform animals or people, or to 
change social relations. It is through our work in the world that humans can objectify 
themselves, transform themselves, humanise their communities, and find a place on the 
land to call home (Sayers, 2011).  
According to Sayers (2011) there are four main stages in the development of 
labour. The first is direct appropriation which is the most unmediated and conceptually 
simple form of work. Hunting and fishing are examples and although there is very little 
transformation of the object, it nevertheless involves transformation of the labourer in 
that it involves socially mediated intentionality and the use of tools or weapons (Sayers, 
2011) which themselves are objects that have previously been transformed through 
labour. The second form of work is agriculture in which it becomes more evident that 
nature is transformed according to the social relations of production as arranged by 
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human beings. In agriculture human beings actively participate in changing the 
environment to meet needs but, concurrently, the society itself is transformed and begins 
to reflect certain modes and relations of production. The third form is craft and industry. 
Craft can be distinguished from agriculture by its relative autonomy from natural 
processes and from dependence on nature’s fluctuations. The making of crafts involved 
the production of a material object through the worker’s direct action (Sayers, 2011). 
Craft work was especially suited to reflect the ingenuity, skill, and creativity of the 
craftsperson and was particularly directed toward the needs of the individual and close 
community. However, with the rise of capitalism in particular, craft work became the 
foundation for the development of industry that impacted not only the division of labour 
into capitalists and workers but, with the introduction of machinery, the way in which 
tools, that were once directly operated by the worker, were now operated by a machine. 
Work became a vehicle for the creation and growth of capital, rather than a means to 
contribute to society or of simple subsistence (Komlosy, 2018). Mass production created 
an unusual group of workers who ostensibly worked for the same goal; however, the 
goal no longer functioned to meet individual needs or to establish social bonds, but 
instead served to achieve market requirements. Furthermore, machines encouraged 
mechanical work, dictating how work was done, when it was done, and where it was 
done. The introduction of industrialization and the machine began to create the 
conditions for the replacement of human beings altogether from the mode of production. 
The final stage in the development of labour was post-industrial work which includes the 
expanding service industry, IT jobs, and other forms of the modern information economy. 
Despite much of this work existing in the realm of knowledge, information, 
communication, and even emotional appropriation (see, for example, Hochschild, 2011), 
this does not mean that it is divorced from the material conditions of a society. 
Intellectual labour is no less essential or impactful in the economy than labour that 
produces material things. This kind of work still operates by intentionally molding and 
altering the material world, whether through the use of ideas, symbols, speech, or affect, 
and is consequently of use-value (Sayers, 2011).  
1.6. The Workplace as a Source of Alienation 
It is within the world of labour, which I use here in a comprehensive sense to 
include all forms of human involvement with nature (Erikson, 1986), that the potential 
roots of alienation lie. Marx sees nature, and human beings’ engagement with it, as the 
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starting point of his analysis of society and political economy. Human interaction with 
nature is essential to human activity and survival (Foster, 2000). Contrary to Aristotelian 
notions that humans should strive to exist beyond the drudgery of work, pursuing instead 
the rational life of the mind (Komlosy, 2018), Marx believed that human beings were 
primarily producers as they actively interacted with nature through their labour. The 
importance Marx gives to nature, and his view regarding humans’ absolute inseparability 
from, and inter-connection with, nature, can be seen in his assertion in the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 that 
man lives on nature - means that nature is his body, with which he must 
remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That man’s physical and 
spiritual life is linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, 
for man is a part of nature. (Marx, Estranged Labour, para. 24)   
The ‘continuous intercourse’ Marx speaks of in this passage reflects not only his 
understanding of the way humans engage with nature through labour, but more 
generally of his appreciation, no doubt influenced by Hegel, of the ontological reality of 
the existence of the part within the whole and the whole within the part (Ollman, 1977).  
The relevance of labour as an intermediary between humans and nature has 
been pointed out by many academic disciplines. Within human evolutionary theory, for 
example, it is thought that human organs and functions, including the nervous system 
and imagination, were shaped and molded by their interaction with nature through labour 
(Erikson, 1986). Similarly, one can see this idea reflected within contemporary 
psychological circles by theorists like Abraham Maslow whose first two levels of his 
proposed hierarchy of needs are physiological needs (e.g. food, water, warmth, rest) and 
security needs (security and safety), both of which are procured through labour. These 
physical and security requirements are the necessary basis for what Maslow thought 
were the higher needs of humans, including belonging and love needs, esteem needs 
and, finally, self-actualization (Maslow, 1971). Work, in fact, broadly encompasses all 
these needs (a spiritual practice is a practice, after all, requiring work) but it is especially 
evident in the maintenance of physiological and security needs.  
As societies grew more complex there also developed more sophisticated 
divisions of labour, with certain individuals and groups taking responsibility for more 
specialized aspects of the production process, leading to socio-political divisions within 
societies, and thus identifiable divisions of power (Komlosy, 2018). These developments 
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resulted in the formation of various classes in society, culminating in the particular forms 
of class division we see in capitalist societies today. Since one class was now liberated 
from producing through the private ownership of the industries of production, they began 
to control the production of others, with the effect that the producers lost control of their 
labour and thereby became alienated (Cox, 1998). 
It is important to note that Marx did not think that industrialization itself 
necessarily led to alienation. It was not the means of production but the relations of 
production that he felt created alienating working conditions. Furthermore, he was 
interested in who controlled the means of production, how they controlled it, and, most 
importantly, for what purposes. His critique of industrialization concerns not 
mechanization per se, for which he was enthusiastically in favour, but the capitalist 
system of private ownership of the means of production and the class divisions that 
formed as a result.      
1.7.    The Effects of Alienation 
If human beings are essentially social beings whose realization of their social and 
individual natures is found in the production of objects through labour, then “any 
transcendence of men's products over men so that they do not see their interests, 
powers, and abilities affirmed and expressed therein, is evidence of the alienation of 
man from his self-activity, his objects, and himself” (Horton, 1964, p. 289). Capitalism, 
especially in its modern and insidious neoliberal configuration, is a system that 
effectively separates the worker from their product to the detriment of the worker’s 
freedom, creativity, potential, and self-actualization. This is in contrast to work in a non-
alienating environment wherein conscious, self-directed activity not only fulfills the needs 
of the individual and others, but also brings a sense of satisfaction and joy, and the basis 
for a healthy and happy life (Raekstad, 2015). Human beings, through creative labour 
and the production of objects, not only achieve something distinctive but by doing so 
affirm their own uniqueness and individuality. Consequently, through labour people grow 
as human beings, not only in relationships with themselves and others, but also with 
nature herself.9   
                                                
9 Hannah Arendt (1998) makes the distinction between labour, work, and action. Labour is activity related to the fulfillment 
of needs and the requirements of survival. It is marked by a kind of drudgery and a sense of futility. Work is defined by a 
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Conversely, when labour in any of its forms is transformed to a means for capital 
accumulation that ultimately benefits only a small minority of people, where products are 
created merely for their exchange-value as opposed to their use-value, there is a 
pervasive loss of meaning, freedom, engagement, creativity, and expression in the lives 
of the majority of people (Schmitt, 1996). Due to the exchange for wages of the 
fetishized commodity of labour power, the only possession a property-less worker owns, 
there is an experiential estrangement from oneself and others, leading to a pernicious 
stifling of individual potential along with a degradation of fully human relationships. 
Despite humans’ intimate connections to the natural world, alienating social systems 
simultaneously lead to the subjugation of the human spirit and the rapacious decimation 
of nature through its exploitation and expropriation (Benton, 2018; Foster & Clark, 2018). 
1.8.     Marx’s Fourfold Conceptualization of Alienation and its Effects 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx outlines his 
conception of four ways in which alienation affects the worker within capitalist society, a 
society primarily (though not solely) distinguished by two antagonistic classes, the 
property owners, or employers, and the property-less workers, or employees. I am 
particularly drawn to Marx’s conception of alienation and his description of its effects as 
it resonates deeply with my own experiences as a long-time corporate employee. But it 
was not just the work itself that epitomized the condition of alienation, it was also the 
culture and environment. From the blandly coloured, homogenous cubicles, with their 
partitions that served to discourage interaction with others but which still allowed for 
surveillance by management, to the systems and procedures that functioned to deliver 
the cost-saving requirements of the bosses but which failed to meet the needs of both 
the employees or the customers, to the infantilization of employees through bizarre and 
sometimes incoherent communications and protocols: all of these representations, and 
many more, served as manifestations and signals of alienation from the product, from 
the means of production, from others, and finally, from oneself, explicated so 
compellingly by Marx’s analysis. 
 
                                                
utilitarian creation of objects, with a more definitive beginning and ending. Action represents the expression of the individual 
in word and deed, and functions to establish and maintain relationship. 
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1.8.1.  Alienation from the Product 
Marx’s integral and relational approach to nature through labour can be seen in 
his discussion of the way in which workers under capitalism become estranged from the 
products they create as they engage in wage labour. As a consequence of the 
employer’s appropriation of the product, within which the worker has invested their life-
energy, the employee finds that  
his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this 
activity, the greater is the worker’s lack of objects. Whatever the product of 
his labor is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he 
himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his 
labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside 
him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power 
on its own confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on 
the object confronts him as something hostile and alien. (Marx, 2016, 
Estranged Labor, para. 9)  
In previous forms of society products made by the worker were fashioned by 
creative activity and were kept, exchanged, or sold according to the desire and needs of 
the producer. For hundreds of years, even in the feudal societies that preceded capitalist 
societies, at least part of the person’s labour, perhaps up to 70%, was retained by 
workers to do with as they wished (Mandel, 1973). However, in capitalist societies the 
item produced is immediately seized and made use of by another, the capitalist 
employer, who, after paying wages, sells it for profit. Under capitalism, the worker has no 
control over the product of their labour and, since the product has now become the 
property of someone else who disposes of it as they see fit without consultation with the 
worker, alienation from the product naturally follows for the worker (Allen & O’Boyle, 
2011). 
This aspect of alienation is further exacerbated by the reality that in many cases 
the workers are themselves unable to afford the very products they are making so that 
“workers produce cash crops for the market when they are malnourished, build houses 
in which they will never live, make cars they can never buy, produce shoes they cannot 
afford to wear, and so on” (Cox, 1998). For Marx this state of affairs is a unique function 
of the capitalist mode of production, and despite improvements in some sectors of the 
modern workplace (although this is often merely a function of easy access to credit), 
particularly in North America and Europe, it is as true today worldwide as it was in 
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Marx’s time. Indeed, currently workers in China earn $172 per month for making Apple’s 
iPhones, products which the workers could barely, if ever, afford. Worldwide, more than 
one billion workers earn less than $1 a day, and two billion earn up to $2 a day (Swain, 
2012).  
Alienation from the product shows up in another way. The objects that workers 
themselves produce often function to oppose the interests of those same workers. The 
introduction of machinery and, in more recent times, computerization, all of which are 
made by workers, forces employees to work according to the dictates of the machine’s 
program, which are inevitably determined by the employer. In this way, machines often 
dehumanize workers because they tend to eliminate their skills (Allen & O’Boyle, 2011) 
and reify their ‘insider knowledge’ of work processes and practices. Consequently, 
workers must oftentimes work harder, faster, and under conditions that are more suited 
to machines than human beings. Shift work, and engaging with emails and texts outside 
of working hours are examples of the effects modern technology has had on the natural 
rhythms of the working day, and which can for many people result in physical and mental 
disturbances (Mandel, 1973). Arguments have been made that computerization has 
made work more efficient, accessible, and faster for certain workers but it still remains 
true that manual production workers and low-status service workers do not experience 
such freedom as compared to others. As well, computerization invites employers to exert 
more control, surveillance, and discipline over users, both at home and at the workplace 
(Archibald, 2009). Hence, the machinery that workers themselves produce serves to 
oppress those very same individuals. 
It is in the act of creating an object, in its objectification, that creativity and 
fulfillment in work is realized; however, as we have seen, under capitalism this object is 
taken by another for their own purposes. Thus, unlike Hegel’s belief that objectification 
per se was problematic, it is not the process of objectification itself that is an issue in 
Marx’s analysis, but instead the capitalist mode of production, consisting primarily of 
wage labour in exchange for the production of objects that become divorced from the 
workers themselves (Musto, 2010). By appropriating the object created by the worker, 
the employer simultaneously procures their creativity. There is, therefore, a 
psychological and spiritual decrease in the experience of the worker, an impoverishment 
of the natural joy, freedom, and expression that should normally accompany 
engagement with nature through work. These effects are especially increased within the 
33 
Tayloristic business practices of today’s workforces wherein the harder and faster a 
person works, the more and more exhausted they become both physically and 
psychologically (Sharma, 1979).   
1.8.2.  Alienation from the Act of Production 
Marx understood that not only were employees alienated from the objects they 
produced but also from the act of producing those objects, which he considered “active 
alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation” (Marx, 2016, Estranged 
Labor, para. 19). There are many aspects to this form of alienation. It is the employer 
who sets the times of work, the hours of work, and the schedules for breaks. The 
employer also supplies the tools or equipment to be used and dictates the pace of work. 
The worker has no control over the processes of the workplace, nor how it is organized 
(Cox, 1998; Davies, 2015). The work and its processes, much like the product itself, 
appears to the employee as extrinsic and remote, and this has clear psychological and 
emotional effects (Weyher, 2012). Labour, says Marx,  
is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that 
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does 
not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and 
mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker 
therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside 
himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he 
is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced 
labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to 
satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact 
that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned 
like the plague. (Marx, 2016, Estranged Labor, para. 19)  
Assembly type work and the introduction of various forms of Taylorism in the 
20th century, like Toyotaism and ‘lean management’ practices, saw the specialization 
and fragmentation of work functions expected to be performed at high intensity and 
which created inherently boring, physically repetitive work (Allen & O’Boyle, 2011; 
Harriford & Thompson, 2008). These practices were not limited to the factory floor, 
however, but also implemented within white-collar occupations, resulting in a de-skilling 
of the work force.10 Furthermore, concentration on smaller and smaller working tasks 
                                                
10 I am all too familiar with these practices. However, it was always my observation that the unending reviews, meetings, 
committees, checks on authority, and all the other countless means of surveillance seemed to hinder productivity rather 
than enhance it.   
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allowed management and employers to further control the workers through surveillance 
and disciplinary measures. Workers were essentially treated as machines (Cox, 1998). 
Marx decries this as the worker’s loss of the self, a situation in which human beings lose 
connection with their higher intellectual and spiritual functions, being reduced to living 
solely from their animal natures. Allowing that “drinking, eating, procreating, etc., are 
also genuinely human functions”, Marx nevertheless felt that “in the abstraction which 
separates them from the sphere of all other human activity and turns them into sole and 
ultimate ends, they are animal” (Marx, 2016, Estranged Labor, para. 21). 
A central and important feature of alienation from work-process is the glaring lack 
of control that workers have over their working conditions. The significance of this will be 
developed later but it is clear that capitalist workplaces of whatever sort conspire to allow 
workers very little, if any, control over their working conditions in the interest of 
increasing surplus value11 and profits for the company. A stark example of this extreme 
form of control may be given from a February 2018 article in The Guardian news-site 
documenting a patented design by the mega-company Amazon for a wristband that is 
designed to electronically monitor the location of a worker’s hands, so that a vibrating 
system can move the worker’s hand in the direction that would more efficiently fulfill a 
particular order. As the article points out, apart from the indignity of treating employees 
like human robots, the wristbands would also arm Amazon management with new 
workplace surveillance capabilities that can identify when workers are wasting time, 
however defined (Solon, 2018). As workers are demeaned and dehumanized in this 
manner, essentially mechanized for the purposes of increased efficiencies, more 
productivity, and better surveillance purposes, it is difficult to imagine that people would 
not be psychologically damaged by such practices. Additionally, for the employee there 
is always the lingering fear that the real thing, full automation, will make the person’s job 
redundant. Marx was indeed prescient in foreseeing that “since the worker has sunk to 
the level of a machine, he can be confronted by the machine as a competitor” (Marx, 
2016, Wages of Labor, para.18).  
                                                
11 Surplus may be defined as the excess amount of value created by a workers’ labor above the value paid to them in 
wages. If an employer pays a worker $10 per hour, they need to get back more than $10 worth of extra output per hour to 
sell. Surplus represents an employer’s revenue after direct input and labor costs are satisfied to produce the output in the 
first place. A business’s profits represent one portion of the surplus. In any event, all of the surplus, created by the labour 
of the worker, is appropriated by the employer (Wolff, 2012). This practice is the heart of a system that is unjust, 
undemocratic, and unfair, and is the basis for the economic inequalities which result from it. 
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The determinative factor here is a sense of lack of control, powerlessness, and 
certainly a lived experience of being controlled by others (Yuill, 2011). Interestingly, lack 
of control has been theorized by some to be the main component of depression. The 
theory of learned helplessness, for example, was proposed by psychologist Martin E. P. 
Seligman (Seligman, 1972) in the late 1960s and 1970s as an explanatory framework for 
depression in humans (Seeman, 1983). Experimenting with classical conditioning, 
Seligman found that dogs that had received unavoidable electric shocks refused to take 
action in follow-up situations, despite the possibility of escape or avoidance, whereas 
dogs that had not received the unavoidable shocks immediately took action in follow-up 
tests. The experiment was subsequently replicated with human subjects (using loud 
noise instead of electric shocks), and the results were much the same. As Yuill (2011) 
proposes, the concept of alienation provides a useful ‘bridging concept’ between the 
helpless and powerless conditions of working life in society and an individual’s 
emotional, psychological, and spiritual response to those conditions. 
1.8.3.  Alienation from Others 
There are two main manifestations of Marx’s claim that work under capitalist 
systems leads to alienation from others. The first aspect is the alienation between the 
employer and the employee, between those who produce surplus value and those who 
appropriate it for their own profit. This form of alienation is thus the essence of class 
formation (but also the ground for class struggle), an artificial division in socio-political 
life that separates people according to conflicting economic interests, and is the basis of 
our current understanding of inequality and its effects. The impacts of social inequality 
are well documented.12 Even in contemporary times, working people are subject to 
higher rates of chronic illness, early mortality, and increased morbidity, despite 
modernization of the workplace and improved medical services (Yuill, 2005; Davies, 
2015). It is important to note here that class is not defined simply on the basis of strata 
or population aggregates ranked on the usual economic indicators of income, 
occupation, and education, for example, but instead on relations inherent within the 
production process itself (Gimenez, 2001; Scambler & Higgs, 1999). As Marx points out:  
                                                
12 For example, an extensive report produced in Britain in 1998, Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health Report, 
found that the preponderance of scientific evidence pointed to socioeconomic explanations of health inequalities. Ill health 
was attributed to factors such as income, education, and employment, in addition to material environment and lifestyle. 
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If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as 
an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to some other man than 
the worker. If the worker’s activity is a torment to him, to another it must be 
delight and his life’s joy. Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can 
be this alien power over man. (Marx, 2016, Estranged Labor, para. 42) 
The worker is alienated from the employer but the employer, despite their ‘joy’ 
and ‘delight’, does not escape this fate themselves. They, too, are alienated but it 
reveals itself in different ways as it might for the worker (Ollman, 2007). Unfortunately, 
any chance of a natural and truly human relationship between employer and worker is 
destroyed by the economic imperatives of the system within which they both work. 
Indeed, relationships become defined by labels which describe people’s functions and 
not their being. Hence, we relate to others as bosses and employees, competitors and 
team-players, those in-the-know and those who are not. These are what Istvan 
Meszaros calls ‘second-order mediations’ which effectively prevent true human 
connection not only between the worker and the employer, but also between human 
beings and nature, including their own self-nature (Meszaros, 2006). 
The second aspect of alienation from others is that it disturbs, distorts, and 
endangers the relationship between workers. As neoliberal capitalism is based on an 
almost religious individualism, it actively encourages competition and the so-called 
survival of the fittest mentality among workers (Allen & O’Boyle, 2011). Workers not only 
compete for jobs, but once employed they are required to compete with each other to 
‘get ahead’. In many ways Marx’s critique is fundamentally a critique of the spreading 
individualism, and the consumerism based on it, that was becoming ubiquitous during 
the time he was living in, and which is now rampant within our own modern society. 
Commodities, including the worker themselves, become the measure of the worth of 
individuals, who are defined by their possessions (Klotz, 2006).   
A corresponding aspect of Marx’s theory of alienation, particularly relevant to our 
interest in the adverse effects it has on relationships at all levels between individuals, is 
his notion of commodity fetishism. Alienation, when conceptualized as a lack of worker 
control over the labour process, and although existent in many different systems of 
production, takes a peculiar and particular form under capitalism (Swain, 2012). One 
might look at feudalism for a comparison. During feudal times there was a direct 
relationship between the serf and the lord whereby the product of the serf’s labour was 
exchanged in a direct, immediate fashion. This was still clearly a relationship of power 
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and coercion of one class over another, but nevertheless the relationship itself was 
unambiguous. Capitalism, however, does not display such a direct and unambiguous 
relationship between persons. Instead, capitalism organizes itself based on relationships 
of exchange in the market, with the worker’s own labour power as the commodity bought 
by the capitalist. Relationships are not direct or based on human connection; they are 
turned into relationships between objects, which Marx called commodity fetishism 
(Swain 2012). When any object, including the labour power of the worker, is regarded as 
something with value, it becomes a commodity and immediately comes into a kind of 
transcendent relationship with other commodities (Roberts, 2015). The value of a 
commodity should normally be understood in relation to the social relations that 
produces it, but, under capitalism, it is not; rather, its value is determined in relation to 
other commodities and to money, and the goods money can buy (Billig, 1999). Thus, the 
social relationships normally found between workers is transferred onto their labour 
power and the products of their labour, depriving them of the richness and fulfillment of 
genuine human relationships, and replacing them with the unnatural, commodified 
relationships of the marketplace (Allen & O’Boyle, 2011).  
As a result of this, and as it becomes more and more entrenched within the 
system and within the experience of individuals, there is a collective forgetting of the 
nature of real and truly human relationships. Society’s customs are the means by which 
a general social forgetting is produced so that unawareness is embedded into the 
system (Billig, 1999). Social media is a good example of the way in which advertisers 
target users under the pretense that they are developing and nurturing real 
relationships.13 Gilroy-Ware (2017) argues that “social media platforms exploit our 
compulsive, emotionally-driven relationship to them, seeking surplus value in the misery 
that capitalism itself creates” (Preface, para. 8). Fetishized objects thus attain a 
relational status that drives consumer capitalism, but to the detriment of real, human 
relationship both in and outside the workplace. 
Swain (2012) makes the point that Marx is not suggesting that the accumulation 
of objects themselves is problematic, but because commodities are given all the qualities 
                                                
13 Advertising of products and psychology have a long history together. Segal (2017) notes, for example, that in the early 
twentieth century Freud’s nephew, Edward Bernays, employed the analyst Abraham Brill to use psychoanalytic techniques 
to assist in advertising cigarettes for the American Tobacco Company, which were branded as ‘torches of freedom’, and 
representative of women’s liberation. 
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of real relationships, people’s sense of themselves, indeed their very identity and who 
they consider themselves to be, is deeply connected to the appropriation and 
possession of material objects; to have is to be (Billig, 1999). People are bombarded 
with seductive advertising in one form or another advocating consumption from every 
possible direction, 24 hours a day. The fundamental message is that to be any sort of 
valued person in the world, whatever that may mean, one must acquire objects to realize 
it. Workers displace their potential for real relationship, connection, and creative self-
worth into the objects they produce; these products are appropriated by the capitalist 
class and sold back to workers for profit in the marketplace as commodities with the 
narrative that these same products are the sure means to creating satisfying lives and 
relationships. There is a perversion to this. It is thought that human beings are one of the 
most social creatures on the planet and that relationships are essential to not only 
physical health but also to mental well-being. The capitalist mode of production, 
however, transfers relational connection onto commodities, and, for a price, we are 
convinced that these important aspects of our existence can be found and developed 
through consumption.   
Yet, it goes further than this. As Naomi Klein (2009) argues in her book No Logo, 
selling commodities is not enough. Companies now are far more interested in selling 
their brand which is their real product, so that although advertising is connected to 
selling a specific product, branding is about ‘corporate transcendence’ (Klein, 2009). As 
a consequence, companies are selling not just things, but experiences, lifestyles, and 
ways of being, resulting in an associated colonization of the mind. The pernicious effect 
of these practices is that individuals develop the ever-present feeling that they are not 
good enough in some way (but usually in multiple ways), reflected generally in a 
pervasive sense of low self-worth and self-acceptance, anxiety, depression, and other 
mental health concerns. 
Furthermore, by selling brands and labels rather than commodities per se, there 
is a mass societal forgetting of the relationship between the commodity and how, where, 
and when it was produced, and, most importantly for an analysis of human relationship, 
who produced it. The labels attached to products themselves become objects of 
fetishism, and are intimately tied to the purchaser’s sense of themselves. Despite the 
fact that other brands may be of high quality, allegiance to the preferred label is 
obligatory and all other labels are, consequently, rejected (Billig, 1999). Just as the 
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worker, as the producer of products, very often can never afford to purchase that product 
themselves, and are thereby alienated from the product, so too the consumer who 
purchases the product must never consciously make the connection between the 
product and the maker of it. Social relations must be obscured for the product to be 
effectively felt to be truly owned by the purchaser. This unconscious, alienated darkening 
of actual relationships is required for the construction of the capitalist sense of self since, 
as Billig (1999) points out, “my sense of possession would be diminished - as well as my 
consuming self - if I took seriously those dark, busy fingers, working in conditions far 
removed from the life-world of my playful self” (Billig, 1999, p. 319). Thus, a sense of self 
is constructed based on relationships to commodities owned, and to comparisons with 
the commodities owned by others (Billig, 1999). Consumerism constitutes a societal 
basis for the construction of identity, with the purchase of products being a measure of 
status, popularity, group-identity, and other such qualities normally associated with 
identity formation. But because consumerism involves the consumption of branded 
ideas, rather than the fulfillment of natural human psychological needs, our consumption 
becomes an alienation between our sensuous and emotional bodies, creating a kind of 
constructed capitalist rationalism, a continuous perpetuation of endless need and 
consumption. Yet, these needs can never really be satisfied through consumption. Not 
only are the needs themselves artificially contrived, but their satisfaction is dependent on 
artificial ideas rather than on real products which meet actual needs. Identity may be 
manufactured in this way but ultimately the sense of self constructed is false (Matthews, 
2019) because it is really only an unnatural internalization of capitalist social relations 
and commodification (Cohen, 1986). A false self can never feel authentic, nor can it be 
actualized in terms of its relationship to itself or to others. It is trapped in inauthenticity 
because its lived relationships are, first, unconscious of the real nature of production and 
the actual relations between producer and consumer and, second, because these 
commodity relations are inherently oppressive, always promising what they can never 
truly deliver and, most significantly, causing feelings of not-good-enough as a result. A 
primary way of dealing with such psychological pain is, of course, to consume more 
products, thus endlessly perpetuating the cycle.14    
                                                
14 This might easily be described as addiction. For an excellent explication of this view see Alexander (2010), especially 
pages 255-260. 
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Despite a superficial recognition that the pursuit of consumer goods is essentially 
unsatisfying, there appears to be a cultural obliviousness to all this, a form of cultural 
forgetting, or, in psychological parlance, repression. Billig (2011) connects this social 
and cultural ‘forgetting’ (with some caveats) to Freud’s theory of repression, but he does 
not specifically discuss the mental health consequences of these practices in people’s 
lives. Yet, it is not unreasonable to make this connection. Certainly, there have been 
many studies that show a correlation between attempts to repress negative thoughts and 
an increase in anxiety and depression. Any attempts to control unwanted thoughts and 
emotions, either through avoidance or escape strategies, can account for much mental 
health distress (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). For example, individuals have 
reported that their chronic thought suppression leads to obsessive behaviour and 
feelings of depression and anxiety (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994).   
Our current system not only functions to supply commodities to fulfill basic 
human needs but must then continue on to manufacture and promote more and more 
unnecessary and trivial needs. The circulation of capital requires the construction of a 
society of perpetual need, consequent dissatisfaction, and competition between its 
members. The working class becomes divided against itself, with friends and neighbours 
contending for jobs, products, and brands. It is within these cultures of individualism, 
generated by a rapacious capitalism’s profit motive, that inequalities due to class are 
strengthened, intersecting and emboldening sexism, racism, and homophobia (Swain, 
2012), and leading to many of the mental health issues presented to the helping 
professions today. 
Capitalist divide and conquer strategies means that there is less likelihood that 
workers will mobilize to stand up to unfavourable working conditions. Since unionization, 
historically one of the primary forces to oppose workplace inequities, has in recent 
decades reached an all-time low,15 it becomes safer now to show up for work and hope 
for the best, despite possible poor working conditions or outright oppression and abuse. 
If we define oppression as a situation wherein there exists asymmetric power relations 
evidenced by domination, subordination, and resistance, and where “the controlling 
person or group exercise its power by processes of political exclusion and violence and 
by psychological dynamics of deprecation” (Prilleltensky, 2003, p. 195), then this is none 
                                                
15 See Statistics Canada report: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2015005-eng.htm 
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other than a description of capitalist social relations in general, and workplace conditions 
in particular. By persistently showing up for work and enduring the conditions there, 
there is always the aspiration of ‘getting ahead’ and, through hard work, perhaps 
eventually removing oneself from a difficult work environment (Swain, 2012). In this way 
employers encourage workers to work harder, for longer, but for the same pay, thus 
increasing the surplus value for the employer which, in a vicious cycle, only inevitably 
serves to increase the feeling of alienation between workers, and between the worker 
and the employer. It also encourages companies to do more with less workers, allowing 
them to close locations at home and re-locate to off-shore locations where labour is 
cheaper and regulations are poor or non-existent.  
1.8.4.  Alienation from Oneself 
Marx’s final manifestation of alienation due to working conditions under capitalist 
systems is alienation from oneself, what he calls alienation from ‘species-being’. Marx 
writes that 
It is just in the working-up of the objective world, therefore, that man first 
really proves himself to be a species being. This production is his active 
species life. Through and because of this production, nature appears as 
his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification 
of man’s species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in 
consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he 
contemplates himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from 
man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him 
his species life, his real species objectivity, and transforms his advantage 
over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken 
from him. Similarly, in degrading spontaneous activity, free activity, to a 
means, estranged labor makes man’s species life a means to his physical 
existence. (Marx, 2016, Estranged Labor, para. 31)  
Here Marx discusses the impact of alienation on the person’s sense of 
themselves as a human being in the world. Using the much debated term ‘species-
being,’ Marx indicates that although work, and its products, whatever they may be, 
should be expression of the unique human ability to creatively express their life while 
engaged with nature, this is destroyed by capitalist modes of production. Despite 
capitalist systems of production being extraordinarily efficient in creating commodities for 
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society,16 there is a high price to pay for those who must produce them. Certainly, it is 
the capitalist, and not the worker, who enjoys the benefits of goods produced; but, more 
crucially, the worker experiences a fundamental lack of power and control which may 
result in profound physical and mental challenges. Marx therefore argues that whereas 
labour under capitalism creates riches, possessions, property, and beauty for the owners 
of capital, it creates privation, hovels, and deformity for the workers, turning them into 
machines. Furthermore, Marx thought that these systems of production invited 
intelligence, but only for the owners; for the workers it produced idiocy and cretinism 
(Marx, 2016). 
Thus, Marx was concerned with the impacts of working conditions and divisions 
of labour on all aspects of the self. For example, in the first volume of Capital, Ollman 
(1977) lists stunted size, bent backs, overdeveloped and underdeveloped muscles, 
gnarled fingers, enlarged lungs, and death pale complexions as some of Marx’s 
observations of the physical effects of production on workers of his time. But it is clear 
that Marx was greatly concerned with the mental consequences of the repetitive, 
uncreative, stressful work he witnessed in industrial workplaces, performed within 
conditions that were oppressive, exploitative, and undemocratic, all of which engendered 
class divisions and inequality. Of course, Marx did not provide a psychological theory of 
the impacts of alienation on workers’ mental life, but it is undeniable that he was 
nevertheless troubled by the effects of alienated existence on the wholeness and 
integrity of the human condition, and with the ‘loss of the self’. Two of these aspects are 
alienation from emotional life and alienation from sensual life. 
1.9.     Alienation of the Emotions      
Yuill (2005) suggests that alienation theory offers the proposition that lack of 
social cohesion results in the generation of the so-called negative emotions which in turn 
adversely affect health. Alienation theory takes into account the emotional distress that 
people experience in situations of inequality, powerlessness, and lack of control and it 
provides an explanation, therefore, of the genesis of mental health issues people 
subsequently and frequently experience (Weyher, 2012). Consequently, taming 
                                                
16 Despite Marx’s critique of capitalism, he thought that it was a necessary condition for the rise of socialism. As Eagleton 
(2011) points out, only capitalism’s greed can lead to the development of the productive forces to the extent that they can 
be transformed into the means to benefit all. 
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emotional experience, rather than looking to the socio-economic determinants of their 
origination, becomes the objective of the society. Anger, for example, often a response 
to injustice and important energetically for righting perceived wrongs (Holmes, 2004; 
Segal, 2017), is pathologized and frowned upon within Western culture. Since anger is 
perceived by those in power, whether they are school authorities or employers, as a 
dangerous or destructive emotion, steps are taken to neutralize or repress it, or, perhaps 
through learning ‘anger management’ techniques, often through a suitable ‘expert’, learn 
to express the emotion in a more acceptable, and usually benign, fashion (Zembylas, 
2007a). The assumption behind such practices is that rationality must make docile any 
emotional expression that challenges the status quo, that reason is the handmaiden of 
good sense and order as opposed to the unpredictability and chaos of the emotions. 
Inevitably, distinctions between the reasonability of the rational and the wildness of the 
emotions are gendered, creating a sexism, entwined with classism, that perpetuates 
discriminatory practices against women. Alienation of the rational from the emotional 
thus demands techniques of control, curative strategies to encourage the development 
of emotional intelligence. Managing emotions, especially in school and in the workplace, 
becomes a necessary life-skill for the undisturbed and unopposed production of 
capitalist wealth. This requires emotional labour, a rational, unpaid form of internal work 
which, despite perpetuating psychic splits within individuals, has the ultimate intent of 
supporting the continuous flow of capital. Emotional labour in the workplace requires the 
management of emotion through prescribed ‘feeling rules’, which function to regulate 
one’s own emotions and manipulate those of others (Zembylas & Fendler, 2007). The 
alienation and disciplining of the emotions not only creates anxiety in the lives of persons 
but it marginalizes emotional experience to the periphery of experience, instead of 
recognizing that emotions, seen in a holistic and integral way, are vital to the production 
and health of the individual, and with the individual’s interaction with society (Zembylas, 
2007b). 
1.10. Alienation of the Senses 
In many respects Marx’s notion of alienation was a critique of the way in which 
our sensuous life, the full and vital activity of the senses, was thwarted within the new 
industrial political economy. The individualism of capitalism and neoliberal philosophy 
results in an alienation from the senses themselves, a kind of sensuous break from the 
social community of sharing and meaning-making. Capitalist economic arrangements 
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depend on individualism, isolation, and competition (as Margaret Thatcher infamously 
said ‘there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women…’) but 
these forms of being-in-the-world are unsocial and unnatural, and they embed the 
sensuous life of people within fragmented inner spaces, devoid of empathy and 
possibility. Marx emphasized, in contrast, the importance of individuality as entirely 
dependant on its social sphere such that individual life was always a reflection of the life 
of the society in which it was embedded (Marx, 2016), and this included the sensuous 
world of individuals. Marx’s unalienated vision was for the freeing of the senses from 
commodification, towards an   
emancipation of the senses [which] means freeing them from their 
embeddedness in the possessive individual. The eye only becomes a truly 
‘human eye’ when the beauty enjoyed by another becomes available as 
‘my own appropriation.’ What Marx envisions here is nothing less than the 
abolition of the Cartesian mind/body split, along with the opposition 
between public and private. (Klotz, 2006, p. 412) 
It would be worthwhile to pause here to reflect on what I think is the implication of 
what Marx is offering his readers. Alienation can be considered a condition that 
fundamentally describes a state of duality at multiple levels of being. It is a separation of 
an originally undivided self, one with nature, into isolated domains of life which in reality 
cannot be separated without individual and societal disharmony. In terms of our interest 
in the effects of alienation on the human condition, specifically people’s mental health, if 
we accept the proposition that the world is an inter-dependant and intra-dependant 
whole, as Ollman contends with his notion of ‘internal relations’, then we could say that 
any fissures or divisions that unnaturally isolate one thing from another is contrary to 
reality, and therefore bound to create distress in some form. Thus, when we consider our 
social self, alienation occurs when there are undemocratic and unequal splits in the way 
society is constituted, that is, between owners of capital and employees. If we next 
consider our natural self, when there are splits between the individual and their labour, 
both in terms of the products they make and the way in which they produce them, 
alienation constitutes a separation from nature. When the worker is treated, both by a 
materialist science and by capitalist employers, as a machine, individuals experience a 
self/other dualism wherein they take themselves to be an isolated, separate self as 
opposed to the ‘other’, one organism against another. At a deeper level, materialist 
conceptions of the person split the individual into a mind and a body, which are often in 
discord as a result, and which, as Klotz points out above, become privatized and 
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disconnected. Finally, the separate mental self itself is split into various antagonisms 
(emotion v. reason, conscious v. unconscious, etc.) which further perpetuate the 
alienated condition. Moreover, all these aspects of the self create more ‘resources’ to be 
mined as commodities by capitalists, who are forever inventing new but concocted 
needs to be fulfilled. Thus, the separate self, at whatever level it is conceived, is the 
embodiment of the alienated condition, its being, at one or all levels, dissociated from 
the ‘other’, with the result that its isolation leads to distress in one form or another. The 
remedy to such pain, therefore, is the unalienated state, which, as I will elucidate later, is 
accomplished by both transforming systemic structures within society and by recognizing 
and actualizing the experience of consciousness as the essential nature of all things. 
The effect of these transitions is the unification of mind to matter within both individuals 
and the natural world, and the unification of individuals to the societies and places they 
inhabit. For example, Young (1975) makes the comment in regards to the emancipation 
of the senses that 
[a]t a more abstract level, Marx held that man creates himself as a rich, 
social individual by means of the human enjoyment of all the senses. The 
more modes of sensuous contact with things of nature, things of life, and 
things of man, the greater the degree of facticity of being. The greater the 
social nature of the sensual contact, the greater the degree of human 
being; to love, but to love as a social experience; to enjoy, but to enjoy as 
a social, rather than commercial or as a purely private experience. Marx 
provided a theoretical and practical alternate to an ideology which 
sanctioned experience devoid of its social meaning. By so doing, Marx 
sought to restore to a modern generation, as did Freud, the human 
dimension of sensuality. (Young, 1975, p. 32) 
All this is true in my view, but it also further requires an appreciation of the 
vehicle through which social life is created, which I contend is an intellectual and 
experiential grounding in the experience of consciousness itself, the fundamental source 
of the unity that is ultimately desired in an unalienated state. I say more about this 
argument in Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
Marx complained that capitalist workplaces were places where an individual does 
“not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his 
mind...the worker’s activity is not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another, it is the 
loss of his self [emphasis added]’’ (Marx, 2016, Estranged Labor, para. 20). If we accept 
that modern workplaces are sites for the development and perpetuation of alienation 
between individuals and society, between individuals and their various relationship 
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arrangements, and within the psychological and bodily experience of individuals 
themselves, then the potential for the appearance of mental health issues can certainly 
be expected. How, then, is alienation actually experienced in the lives of people? How 
does it manifest, particularly in the workplace?    
1.11.  The Experience of Alienation 
We might begin by theorizing in what specific ways alienation manifests in the 
experience of persons that could result in the development of the possibility of mental 
health issues.   
1.11.1.  Seeman’s Explication of Alienation 
In 1959 Melvin Seeman, a sociologist, wrote a seminal paper which attempted to 
define the experience of alienation from various points of view, but focusing in particular 
on the social-psychological aspects of the phenomena (Seeman, 1959). Seeman 
distinguished five ways of understanding alienation with a particular interest in making 
the concept open to the possibility of empirical testing and analysis (Yuill, 2011). He did 
this by aligning his definitions of each of alienation‘s aspects with learning theory, 
particularly that of J. B. Rotter who developed theories based on social learning, and 
taking care to account for environmental context. Seeman’s first aspect of alienation was 
a sense of powerlessness and is perhaps the closest to the traditional general Marxist 
understanding of the actual powerlessness experienced in the capitalist workplace due 
to the control of the means of production and appropriation of the product itself from the 
worker. Powerlessness here is conceived as a frustration of the expected outcome or 
reinforcement in connection to the individual’s behaviours (Seeman, 1959). Seeman is 
careful to make the point that powerlessness may involve a number of contingencies 
which mitigate a person’s felt experience. Nevertheless, he notes that generally the 
experience of powerlessness aligns well with behaviourist psychological theory which 
distinguishes between internal and external loci of control and reinforcement so that “the 
congruence in these formulations leaves the way open for the development of a closer 
bond between two languages of analysis - that of learning theory and that of alienation - 
that have long histories in psychology and sociology” (Seeman, 1959, p. 785). 
Powerlessness has been postulated, as mentioned previously, to be causal in the 
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appearance of clinical depression in persons, with emotional stress playing a primary 
role (Seligman, 1972).   
Seeman’s second aspect of alienation is meaninglessness, which he defines in 
Manheimian terms. It refers to the inability of a worker to understand the meaning of 
various options or alternatives presented to him, when “the individual is unclear as to 
what he ought to believe - when the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision-
making are not met” (Seeman, 1959, p. 786). As a consequence, as societies become 
more complex and rational in their construction and maintenance, a circumstance 
certainly reflected in modern workplaces in particular, there is an inability to be confident 
in choosing between differing explanatory offerings. Again, this may be experienced as 
the kind of hopelessness and meaninglessness that has been connected to depression, 
and for which there is very good evidence (Westgate, 1996).   
A third understanding of alienation as proposed by Seeman was normlessness 
which he equates with Durkheim’s concept of anomie traditionally understood to indicate 
“a situation in which the social norms regulating individual conduct have broken down or 
are no longer effective as rules for behavior” (Seeman, 1959, p. 787). A society, or 
workplace for that matter, that expresses anomie is one in which there is a fundamental 
lack of trust and a general dissolution of public values into individually justified private 
interests. This concept is closely connected to both powerlessness and 
meaninglessness, and all of them may be similarly applied to individual or societal 
realms. In this regard, and as an illustrative example, Dew and Taupo (2009) draw a 
connection between presenteeism, wherein workers stay at work even when injured or 
ill, and workplace injustice, which reflects a sense of uncertainty within modern 
workplaces and the lack of a moral and just regulatory force.   
Isolation is the fourth of Seeman’s understandings of alienation which he sees as 
“those who, like the intellectual, assign low reward value to goals or beliefs that are 
typically highly valued in the given society” (Seeman, 1959, pp. 788-789). This is not 
merely a difference in sociability or the ability to make and keep friends; rather, it is more 
in line with an isolation from societal goals, values, and standards. As might be 
expected, there is a disturbing connection between loneliness and certain psychological 
distresses. In a review of the literature, Mushtaq, Shoib, Shah, & Mushtaq (2014) found 
a relationship between loneliness and a variety of health issues including depression, 
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Alzheimer’s disease, alcoholism, stress disorders, personality disorders, suicide, child 
abuse, and sleep disfunction.   
The fifth concept of alienation as presented by Seeman is that of self-
estrangement. This again appears very similar to Marx’s concept of alienation from 
species-being. As Seeman points out, it is the Marxist psychoanalyst Erich Fromm who 
makes use of this sense of alienation in his own writings. Seeman has difficulty 
conceptualizing what estrangement of the self is exactly and decides that “to be self-
alienated, in the final analysis, means to be something less than one might ideally be if 
the circumstances in society were otherwise - to be insecure, given to appearances, 
conformist” (Seeman, 1959, p. 790). Seeman believes he comes closest to Marx’s 
meaning when he suggests that alienation in this form is akin to a lack of pride in work, a 
hurried and harried sense of doing things to get done with them, just because they need 
to be done, and without the joy, satisfaction, or sense of playfulness that accompanies 
truly creative and non-estranged work. Yet, despite Seeman’s goal of operationalizing 
his concepts for the purposes of opening up empirical research possibilities, and doing 
so using the language of learning theory (which tends to ignore inner states of being), it 
is nevertheless clear that self-estrangement may also be problematized in terms of 
various intra-psychic, emotional, rational, and spiritual rifts within an individual, a 
pervasive existential sense of being de-centered, ungrounded, and incomplete in some 
fashion (Brien, 2009).   
Some have criticized Seeman’s sociological approach to alienation as refusing to 
acknowledge troublesome relations of production and of thus being essentially 
ahistorical (Musto, 2011). These kinds of critiques are also directed toward other writers 
who have written variously about alienation, like Jean-Paul Sartre, Erich Fromm, and 
others, and who similarly have been accused of ignoring the social and historical 
conditions of the phenomenon (Bartlett & Shodell, 1963; Horton, 1964; Musto, 2011). 
Musto (2011) says of Fromm, for example, that he  
likewise always put the main emphasis on subjectivity, and his concept of 
alienation, which he summarized as “a mode of experience in which the 
individual experiences himself as alien,” remained too narrowly focused on 
the individual. Moreover, his account of Marx’s concept based itself only on 
the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and showed a deep lack 
of understanding of the specificity and centrality of alienated labour in 
Marx’s thought. This lacuna prevented Fromm from giving due weight to 
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objective alienation (that of the worker in the labour process and in relation 
to the labour product) and led him to advance positions that appear 
disingenuous in their neglect of the underlying structural relations. (Musto, 
2010, p. 86)  
Still, the extent to which Fromm may have emphasized the psychological aspects 
of alienation over relations of production as the source of the experience is perhaps to 
be expected as he was a psychoanalyst. Nevertheless, if we understand alienation as a 
bridging concept (Heinz, 1991) between alienating workplace conditions and the 
experience of alienation in the lives of persons, including the inevitable mental health 
issues, then it is my view that such psycho-social understandings are to be welcomed, 
particularly if the case is to be made for the way in which such conditions overtly affect 
mental health under current economies.  
1.11.2.  Species-being, Human Nature, and Consciousness in Marx 
There has been much debate regarding Marx’s understanding of human nature 
(Geras, 2016). Early in his writing he uses the peculiar term ‘species-being’ to refer to 
the unique qualities of humankind as differentiated from animals, and how these affect 
their engagement with the world. Marx clearly appears to attribute consciousness only to 
humans, making it the distinguishing factor between human and animal activity in the 
world, and further evidenced by the quality of freedom. He writes: 
The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity. It does not 
distinguish itself from it. It is its life-activity. Man makes his life-activity itself 
the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-
activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious 
life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just 
because of this that he is a species being. Or it is only because he is a 
species being that he is a Conscious Being, i.e., that his own life is an object 
for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. (Marx, 2016, 
Estranged Labor, para. 29)  
Clearly, Marx’s view of human nature would have some impact on his theory of 
alienation. Some writers believe Marx held to an historicist view of human nature (Allen 
& O’Boyle, 2011), taking Marx’s famous saying that humans are none other than the 
ensemble of social relations to heart, and arguing that there is no such thing as an 
enduring human nature per se but instead that humans manifest themselves dependent 
on the historical and socio-economic conditions of the time (Byron, 2016). For these 
writers, Marx conceives of human nature as itself the totality of relationships people have 
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with nature and with others. There is no notion of an isolated, separate self-nature inside 
the person apart from these relationships. The person can only be a human person 
within the network of connections to other humans, to nature, and to meaningful work 
(Andrew & Ollman, 1973). As a corollary to this view, I might mention that some writers, 
like Louis Althusser, believe that the mature Marx discarded all notions of a human 
essence developed in his youth and that it is to the later works of Marx that we must turn 
to appreciate his more sophisticated views of the matter. Consequently, Althusser and 
his followers also dismissed Marx’s writings on alienation as an early concept that he 
later abandoned (Archibald, 2009).      
Alternatively, there is the trans-historical view which holds that Marx did have a 
notion of a human essence that transcended history (Geras, 2016). I agree with Geras 
(2016) that Marx did think human beings had a human nature, and that although it was 
conditioned or manifested within the ensemble of social relations, it was not social 
relations themselves. Byron (2016) comments that although this position has been held 
by a number of other writers it has not been particularly well explicated in the literature. 
Some of these trans-historical positions seem somewhat ambiguous. For example, 
Petrovic (1963) sees alienation as an estrangement from human possibilities, which 
presumably would be trans-historical, but shaped by historical contexts. Allen & Boyle 
(2011) state that potentialities distinguish us from other creatures, the greatest of which 
is the ability to remodel ourselves and society. Byron (2016) makes a more concrete 
distinction between essentialism and essence, both of which are required to understand 
human nature. Essentialism is that aspect of humans, true across all human history, 
which allows them to freely and consciously produce objects to serve not only 
themselves but others, with essence being their adaptation to their material 
circumstances, which are regionally unique and historically changing. It is their 
imaginative and creative labouring capacities and their need to labour (Byron, 2016). 
Ideally, such conscious, self-directed activity not only fulfills the needs of the individual 
and others but it also brings a sense of satisfaction and joy, and is the basis for a healthy 
and happy life (Raekstad, 2015). At the same time, human beings, through creative 
labour and the production of objects, not only bring out something distinctive for the 
benefit of the society in which they live, but by doing so affirm their own uniqueness and 
individuality. Individuality and social relationships are not opposites but instead 
complimentary and nurturing aspects of a singular process.  
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Conversely, it is the thwarting and coercion of free and conscious labouring that 
results in alienation in the worker, for not only is the product of their labour appropriated 
by the employer, a theft of creativity and individual expression, but the way in which the 
product is manufactured (whatever it may be) itself represents a loss of freedom. 
Working now only to exchange the commodity of their labour power for wages (having to 
endure the ignominy of surrendering the surplus value they themselves created to 
another), there is a consequent lack of growth in human qualities and a degradation of 
human relationships. 
I agree with Byron (2016) that some form of essentialism makes the most sense 
of Marx’s theory of alienation:    
Marx is not seeing people as a mere social product devoid of trans-
historical qualities (i.e., he is not seeing humanity as a historicist Marxist 
would). If people were strictly social products, then there would be nothing 
enduring or stable to rebuff political economy against, because socio-
political-economic relations would reflect the fluid nature of human beings. 
If one’s essence is just a reflection of their social being, then there is 
nothing for their essence to be alienated from. Enduring (i.e., trans-
historical) human nature is thus a necessary condition for alienation. (p. 
388)  
Nevertheless, as I have stated, the nature of this ‘human nature’ proposed by these 
writers seems oddly vague and unconvincing. ‘Possibilities’, ‘potentialities,’ and Byron’s 
‘human’s capacity to labour’ that distinguishes humans from animals are surely merely 
descriptions of the activity of something more essential.17    
In my opinion, Erich Fromm comes closer to addressing the nature of human 
essence when he describes human evolution beyond the needs and requirements of the 
animal levels due to the appearance of self-consciousness, and the resultant need to 
find meaning and purpose. A person’s needs and drives are not merely connected to 
physiological requirements, but now also to the human condition itself (Matthews, 2019). 
Fromm (1955) writes that 
                                                
17 Still, I see potential in some of these attempts at identifying essence. It is instructive that the notion of possibilities as 
being the true nature of a human being is the way in which some writers describe consciousness. Discussing the philosophy 
of Alfred North Whitehead, biologist Rupert Sheldrake (2012) points out that every experiential moment involves 
prehensions that select aspects of the past and choose possibilities which determine potential futures. Potentiality and 
possibility are the nature of mind itself. 
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inasmuch as man is human, the satisfaction of these instinctual needs is 
not sufficient to make him happy; they are not even sufficient to make him 
sane. The archimedic point of the specifically human dynamism lies in this 
uniqueness of the human situation; the understanding of man’s psyche 
must be based on the analysis of man’s needs stemming from the 
conditions of his existence. (pp. 31-32) 
Fromm describes five aspects of the human condition (transcending the animal 
needs), which represent for him the essence of human nature, and which must be 
fulfilled for optimum mental health, irrespective of time and place. These include 
relatedness, creativity, rootedness and a sense of belonging, a sense of identity, and an 
orientation or framework through which people make sense of the world (Fromm, 1955). 
Fromm believed that under capitalist modes of production all these conditions of 
existence, the essence of being human, are undermined to a greater or lesser degree, 
and that as a consequence various forms of psychological distress result (Matthews, 
2019). We have seen how each of these conditions are thwarted to some extent within 
the actual working life of modern people. The systemic glorification of individuality, the 
creation of class society through the division of labour, and the subsequent 
commodification of people and their lives, deprive them of meaning and purpose, and 
foster disconnection with themselves and others. Creativity is extinguished in favour of 
the pursuit of constructed needs and desires. Identity is abstracted from the bodily and 
spiritual connections that we naturally have with nature, with false identities replacing 
them that are driven by dissatisfaction and feelings of unworthiness. Nature is viewed as 
a dead resource good only for the promotion of capital flow and people become 
disconnected from it, from others, and from themselves. 
While I agree with Fromm in many respects, I want to go beyond his five 
conditions of existence to argue (an argument explicated more fully in Chapter Four of 
this dissertation) that ultimately the essence or intrinsic nature of a human being, and 
indeed of all ‘things’, is consciousness itself and that a fundamental source of alienation 
that percolates up into all levels of human experience is an ignorance and concealment 
of the experience of consciousness per se. There are many philosophical traditions that 
espouse the idea of a natural, intrinsic, and pristine state of consciousness existing as 
the essence of reality. In this regard, I am personally most familiar with the Buddhist 
notion of Buddha-nature and the Advaita Vedantist’s Brahman. These are not the 
experience of some extraordinary state: in Zen Buddhism Buddha nature is known as 
‘ordinary mind’ because it is always present with us, accessible and available to all. And 
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although it is a priori to the contents of experience, it nevertheless generates our 
subjective realizations of intention, value, creativity, choice and, indeed, potentialities 
and possibilities. Nevertheless, it is hidden by the belief in a separate self, an ego, a 
construction of identity based on consciousness of existence (what Fromm calls self-
consciousness) and which takes itself to be what it is not, an isolated and self-sufficient 
entity. While I agree with Fromm (1955) that meaning-making, identity formation, and the 
other conditions of existence can be an existential response to the presence of the egoic 
emergent self-consciousness, with its fear of death and other varieties of mental distress 
that may emerge from it, I also think that these same aspects of the human condition 
can arise in connection to the realization of the fact of consciousness itself, resulting in 
vastly different, life-affirming, and liberating ways of being. Furthermore, the obscuration 
of the ubiquity of consciousness within the natural world, especially through our society’s 
adoption of a capitalism that promotes the egoic imperatives of separation, individuality, 
and an ideology of mechanism and determinism, may in fact be the ultimate source of 
estrangement from nature and from others (again, this theme is developed in Chapter 
Four). This deadening philosophical materialism generates a bankrupt moral 
materialism. Here I use the latter word, materialism, in the sense of a value system.  
Materialist values and goals are concerned with wealth, possessions, image, and status, 
and they tend to conflict with more humanistic, or even spiritual, values of concern with 
the well-being of others, and perhaps one’s own personal and spiritual growth (Kasser, 
2016). On the one hand, one can be a materialist in the Marxist sense and not embrace 
materialist values. Capitalism and neoliberalism, on the other hand, emphatically 
encourage the development of materialist values, even in the guise of spiritual values. In 
other words, it is a spiritual alienation that is the source of much of modernity’s problems 
in living, much of it perpetuated by capitalism’s adoption of an impoverished, spiritless 
materialism. In this sense, mental distress is capitalism’s premier product.  
1.12.   Alienation and Mental Health 
The concept of alienation is a lens through which to see and understand the 
individual and social effects of working conditions that separate workers from what they 
produce and the circumstances under which they produce it. By estranging workers from 
the creativity and potential for expression through work, along with the associated sense 
of purpose and meaning that may come from it, alienation sets up the conditions for both 
physical and mental health issues, “wasting not only blood and flesh, but also nerves 
54 
and brains” (Marx, 2018, Vol. 3, Chapter 5, Section 2, para. 2). Seeman (1983) makes 
the point that not only does the sense of powerlessness and despair from alienation 
affect health in multiple ways but it may also even affect recuperation from disease, one 
result of which, ironically, is the construction of ‘helping’ industries and techniques to get 
people back to work (see Chapter Three of this dissertation). Furthermore, doubly 
ironically, schooling and other educational institutions, that is, institutions set up to 
enculturate citizens into the given society’s ways of life, are set up to getting people into 
work in the first place. Hence, alienation that affects physical and mental health afflicts 
all learners, from children to adults, in all educational institutions, including home, just as 
much as in workplaces. Alienation has become a normalized way of life for all, outside 
and inside the workforce. We are seeing most acutely now, during the current COVID-19 
pandemic, the interconnected societal phenomenon of alienation as we witness the rise 
of mental health problems, not just amongst workers but also amongst school children 
and students in post-secondary institutions (Deighton et al., 2019). 
The proposition that alienating conditions generate mental health distress for 
workers is reflected in a broad range of work-related areas which, to give a few 
examples, show that 30% of short- and long-term disability claims made in Canada are 
due to mental health issues;18 only 13% of employees worldwide are engaged at work;19 
37% of people do not believe their work makes any contribution to the world (Graeber, 
2018); income inequality leads to lower social cohesion, and to lowered health status 
(Coburn, 2000; Muntaner & Lynch, 1999; Scambler & Higgs, 2001; Wilkinson, Pickett, & 
Reich, 2009); and that lack of control at work leads to adverse health outcomes, like 
depression or anxiety (Marmot & Bell, 2010).20  
However, there is very little in the literature which specifically makes the 
connection between alienation and mental health in particular (Crinson & Yuill, 2008). 
For example, within the field of counselling psychology, which has traditionally 
advocated for the importance of the inter-connection between mind, body, and 
environments, there are no references to alienation theory (Roberts, 2015). This is 
unusual (although as we shall in Chapter Three, not surprising) as Marx’s approach to 
                                                
18 Mental Health Commission of Canada: https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/what-we-do/workplace 
19 https://news.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-employees-engaged-work.aspx 
20 See Johann Hari’s “Big Think” talk on this topic (and his interesting solution to lack of control at work): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0tgMubFqd8 
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human beings, illustrated by his conception of alienation, was fundamentally integral and 
holistic. His theory provided practical and potentially empirically supported examples of 
how people’s workplace relations might impact on their health. Rejecting the idealism of 
Hegel, he placed human beings “back into a living sensuous historical and material 
world” (Crinson & Yuill, 2011, p. 129). Furthermore, Marx was careful not to espouse 
simple reductionisms, neither downplaying the role of individuals in favour of society, nor 
conversely, privileging individuals over society. As a result, Marx’s notion of alienation is 
able to provide a contextual theory for the development of mental health issues in 
individuals depending on historical and socio-economic circumstances. As I have 
discussed, alienation is not merely the existence of conditions under which capitalism 
functions; it is concurrently a profoundly socio-psychological phenomena, with potential 
effects in any area of a person’s life. A person’s activity in any domain of life, whether it 
is family, religion, politics, or leisure, becomes as deformed, and as potentially 
unhealthy, as their working life (Ollman, 1977). Practically speaking, alienation emerges 
from and encourages a systemically imposed self-obsessed individualism, along with a 
severing of real human relationships. These are inter-connected and have far-reaching 
negative effects not only within and between human beings, but also in our interactions 
with, and care and appreciation of, the natural world. 
Clearly, then, alienation can have impacts on the mental health of individuals 
within all spheres of life. Individually and relationally, people become fragmented 
because the workplace robs them of their creative expressions of labour, leaving them 
with no control or power, and treats them like robotized appendages of machines. Under 
these conditions of life, it is unsurprising that alienation may lead to a multitude of mental 
health concerns affecting all other areas of life. In turn, these areas of life which include 
our private lives at all levels - our characters, our interests, our inadequacies, and even 
our search for meaning - are themselves commodified and sold back to us in the 
marketplace (Roberts, 2015).  
1.13.   Chapter Summary 
This chapter I have attempted to explore the notion of alienation as it was 
originally conceptualized by Karl Marx. Alienation is primarily the result of the conditions 
of labour relations within capitalist workplaces. Marx thought, along with Hegel and 
others, that labour was an ‘essential’ human activity, vital to what it means to be a 
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human being in the world, and that it was an essential means to creatively express our 
essence objectively, for our own sake and, just as importantly, for the sake of others. 
Alienation is a state that arises historically within capitalist workplaces when the objects 
and value produced by one class of individuals, the workers, are appropriated by 
another class, the employers, transforming what should be a creative and self-fulfilling 
endeavour into one which is oppositional and hostile to the worker. Thus, “economic 
forces have dissolved communal bonds with the result that individuals are atomised, and 
economic forces take on a life of their own and obey their own objective laws” (Sayers, 
2011, p. 82). Consequently, I have argued that since social relationships are essential to 
the formation of fully flourishing and functioning human individuals, alienation not only 
adversely affects the individual on a deep personal level, but also eradicates their 
authentic relationships with others, both at work and outside of the workplace. Marx did 
not develop an actual psychology of alienation (Rubinštejn & Blakeley, 1987), but it is 
clear in his use of terms and phrases like ‘idiocy’, ‘cretinism’, ‘ruins his mind’, ‘unhappy’, 
‘denies himself’ and others, that there is a unmistakable psychological component to his 
thought around its effects. Despite flawed criticism that they ignore the socio-historical 
contexts and causes of alienation, other non-Marxist and neo-Marxist thinkers have 
offered accounts of the actual lived experiences of alienation in the lives of people. This 
chapter looked at Seeman’s and Fromm’s analyses in particular. I argued that if there 
exists the presence of Seeman’s conditions, or if, on the other hand, Fromm’s conditions 
were not met to a greater or lesser extent, then there is a good probability that mental 
health issues, as we understand them today, would arise. Indeed, since work and the 
workplace are the dominant domains for living in the modern world, affecting almost 
every area of our lives and relationships, then it would be negligent to fail to explore the 
capitalist workplace as a primary source of psychological distress. I have attempted to 
demonstrate from the broad conceptual framework that Marx provides how alienation 
manifests in people’s lives and adversely impacts them in various ways both individually 
and relationally. 
Finally, I have suggested that not only must workplace arrangements, and by 
extension, all learning environments, be transformed if there is to be a movement toward 
an ‘unalienated’ state (whatever that might be) but that there must be a new appreciation 
of the fundamental role that consciousness itself plays in the attainment of self-realized 
and unalienated states of being. There is both an individual component to change and a 
57 
societal component, and the one cannot be reduced to the other despite their intimate 
interconnection. Considering my position that the self and the source of the activities of 
the self are the experience of consciousness itself, I agree with Sayers (2011) when he 
comments that 
Marxism often presents itself as a purely social philosophy. The self is 
portrayed as a merely social creation. Marxists often seem to imply that 
social change alone will be sufficient to transform and realise the self – as 
though ‘after the revolution’ all conflicts between self and society will 
automatically be resolved without any action on the part of the individual 
being required. This is untenable, as the existential account quite rightly 
insists (Sartre, 1960). In short, there is an individual, subjective dimension 
to alienation and its overcoming. Will and choice are necessary. But they 
are not sufficient. The self must also be able to express itself, to realise its 
will and objectify itself. In doing so it comes up against existing objective 
conditions, and these may either facilitate its expression or hinder it. In this 
way there is an objective dimension to alienation, and its overcoming 
requires the existence of specific objective social conditions. (p. 8) 
Recognizing that the experience of alienation in the workplace is a prominent 
factor for the development of mental distress, it is incumbent upon helping professions, 
like counselling psychology and social services agencies, to engage with the workplace 
and the inequality that exists there if they truly desire to address social justice within their 
practices. As I will discuss in the next chapter, these professions have worked hard to 
find ways to oppose discrimination of marginalized persons and to problematize race 
and gender issues within society; however, they have ignored class, which is based on 
systemic inequality within capitalist workplaces and social institutions. They do this at 
their peril, however. This is not to imply that systemic changes in the workplace resulting 
in democratic forms of ownership and distribution would instantaneously eradicate the 
intersectional issues of, for example, sexism and racism, but it is to re-introduce the 
necessity of a class critique in order to fully tackle such discriminatory practices (Greene, 
2011). Thus, all helping professions, including schooling and counselling psychology, 
must provide a critique of capitalism if they are serious about social justice, and the 
alleviation of discriminatory practices and psychological distress in all its forms. My 
intention in the following chapter is to use counselling psychology - my own professional 
field - as a close-at-hand example to illustrate the lack of serious critique of capitalism, 
as shown in the field’s uptake of the issues of social justice. In Chapter Two I will first 
explore a history and account of counselling psychology’s engagement with social 
justice issues, with a particular view to clarifying what social justice means to the 
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profession and in what ways concepts of justice need to expand to effectively achieve 
the profession’s objectives in this regard. I will then suggest that although the profession 
has correctly engaged with issues of racism, sexism, ageism, and other discriminatory 
practices, there has been a lack of articulation of the necessary philosophical 
assumptions that inform these concerns. In light of the appearance of alienation within 
workplaces due to capitalist relations of production and the classes formed as a result, I 
suggest that a complete analysis of social justice concerns requires an inquiry into class. 
I propose that this would provide the counselling profession with its philosophical basis 
for social justice work, comparing this briefly with the neoliberalism that seems to, in 
actuality, be the unspoken philosophical grounding of most psychological practices. 
Again, just as a reminder to the reader, I would maintain that the analysis I will be giving 
for the counselling field in the next chapter broadly applies equally to all helping and 
teaching professions. 

















“We live in capitalism. Its power seems inescapable. So did the divine right of kings. Any 
human power can be resisted and changed by human beings. Resistance and change 
often begin in art, and very often in our art, the art of words.” 













Chapter 2: Counselling Psychology and Social Justice 
2.1.     Chapter Introduction 
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that all of the modern helping 
professions, from doctors, to teachers, to educators of all varieties, increasingly employ 
relationship and technical skills drawn from psychology to assist those seeking their 
help. The field of counselling psychology, therefore, provides a fertile exemplar for an 
exploration of the ways in which the helping professions in general have engaged with 
issues involving social justice. Counselling psychology has a richly expansive and trans-
disciplinary history and character, drawing from many different branches of the 
psychology family of disciplines (Bedi et al., 2011). Moreover, although it originated in 
the United States, counselling psychology has a particularly unique history in Canada, 
connecting to both the professional psychology traditions of the United States and to the 
educational counselling focus of Canada (Bedi et al., 2011; Sinacore et al., 2011; 
Sinacore, 2011). It is instructive that Canadian doctoral counselling psychology 
programs are located within faculties of education (Bedi et al., 2011). Canadian 
practitioners of counselling share a specific and important set of skills and competencies 
that differentiate it from other related disciplines like clinical psychology or experimental 
psychology and, in many ways, from the counselling psychology practices of the United 
States. Two of the most significant differences has been its historic emphasis on positive 
psychology, that is, on highlighting client strengths and resources, and on the 
importance of cultural diversity when considering client concerns (Haverkamp, 
Robertson, Cairns, & Bedi, 2011). Despite its strong ties to U.S. trends, counselling 
psychology in Canada reflects the country’s unique multicultural make-up and the 
complex diversity therein. Indeed, the profession’s emphasis on diversity and 
multiculturalism reflects some of the stated ideals of the Canadian nation state itself. 
Canada has developed, rightly or wrongly, an international reputation for toleration, 
diversity, and compassion both toward its own citizens but also to those arriving to 
Canada (Ginsberg & Sinacore, 2015). In fact, it has been noted that Canadian ethnic 
diversity is expanding due to an increase of immigration to Canada as well as an 
Aboriginal population that is growing at a faster rate than the total population (Young & 
Lalande, 2011). Through policy setting and legislation, Canada is recognised as 
promoting cultural pluralism and restoring the rights of Aboriginal peoples (Collins & 
Arthur, 2010). Some examples of leading Canadian legislation driving forward policies 
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that establish, protect, and promote diversity, equality, women’s rights, and social justice 
have been: the Bill of Rights, later replaced in 1982 by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms; the Multicultural Policy of 1971, replaced by the Official Multicultural Act 
of 1988 which emphasized civic participation, and the advancement of justice on behalf 
of all ethnic groups; the Employment Equity Act of 1986 which attempted to remedy 
systemic discrimination against women and minorities; the Official Languages Act of 
1969; the Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework; and the 1976 Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms (Ginsberg & Sinacore, 2015).  
Nevertheless, despite these advances in legislative policy promoting the 
establishment of a just society, Canada still suffers from problematic and disturbing 
abuses of power, injustice, and inequality. These include our quite high rates of poverty, 
impacting in particular single mothers and their children, among first-world nations; 
inequalities in wealth distribution, reflecting the situation in global terms (Kottasová, 
2018); an ever increasing rate of homelessness (Ginsberg & Sinacore, 2015); and 
continued discrimination and abuses of Indigenous rights particularly related to violations 
of land rights. It is, therefore, within this mix of common concerns found globally, and the 
distinctiveness of particular Canadian cultural, societal, and economic contexts, with 
both its successes and failures, that counselling psychology has developed in Canada, 
all the while advocating for social justice within its domains of practice. In this chapter I 
will discuss counselling psychology’s historic and current relationship to the practices of 
social justice, and explore areas where the profession could expand its present 
understanding of its role by arguing that a responsible social justice stance must 
problematize the alienation found in unequal, oppressive, and undemocratic workplace 
arrangements. I also explore Thompson & Shermis’s (2004) critique that the inclusion of 
an engagement with social justice issues appears to lack an explicit philosophical base. I 
introduce the observation that, in fact, the profession is rooted philosophically in 
capitalism and neoliberalism both historically and in practice, although this is to a large 
extent obscured. I begin with a description of counselling psychology’s understanding of 
itself as a practice and then move on to examine its engagement with social justice.21   
                                                
21 I shift between the U.S. and Canada to provide examples of the development of social justice initiatives, while being 
mindful of differences. Unfortunately, peer-reviewed publication outlets for counselling psychologists in Canada are limited, 
and as a result most authors publish in the United States or internationally, which tends to hide the presence and vitality of 
Canadian counselling psychology (Sinacore, 2011). Nevertheless, these difficulties do not affect the principal direction of 
my argument. 
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2.2. Definition of Counselling Psychology 
The increasing diversity in the Canadian population brings a variety of distinct 
cultures to Canada and the counselling profession must provide culturally appropriate 
services to meet diverse needs. The different varieties of cultural expression found 
within Western countries requires the attention of counselling practitioners, especially as 
contextual factors are known to be crucial to understanding client problems and as our 
appreciation of the multifaceted personal and individual expression of culture are 
acknowledged (Collins & Arthur, 2010).  
As mentioned previously, there are two key elements that have distinguished 
Canadian counselling psychology from other forms of psychology and, indeed, from 
practices found in the United States. These elements are its focus on positive 
psychology and the promotion of diversity (Young & Lalande, 2011), and thus any 
definition of counselling psychology has attempted to reflect and promote these values. 
A formal definition of what counselling psychology entails was finally given in 2009 by 
the Section of Counselling Psychology of the Canadian Psychological Association and it 
is worthwhile quoting most of it: 
Counselling psychology is a broad specialization within professional 
psychology concerned with using psychological principles to enhance and 
promote the positive growth, well being, and mental health of individuals, 
families, groups, and the broader community. Counselling psychologists 
bring a collaborative, developmental, multicultural, and wellness 
perspective to their research and practice…In addition to remediation, 
counselling psychologists engage in prevention, psychoeducation and 
advocacy…Counselling psychology adheres to an integrated set of core 
values: (a) counselling psychologists view individuals as agents of their 
own change and regard an individual’s pre-existing strengths and 
resourcefulness and the therapeutic relationship as central mechanisms of 
change; (b) the counselling psychology approach to assessment, 
diagnosis, and case conceptualisation is holistic and client-centred; and it 
directs attention to social context and culture when  considering internal 
factors, individual differences, and familial/systemic influences; and (c) the 
counselling process is pursued with sensitivity to diverse sociocultural 
factors unique to each individual…[C]ounselling psychologists conduct 
research in a wide range of areas, including those of the counselling 
relationship and other psychotherapeutic processes, the multicultural 
dimensions of psychology, and the roles of work and mental health in 
optimal functioning. Canadian counselling psychologists are especially 
concerned with culturally appropriate methods suitable for investigating 
both emic and etic perspectives on human behaviour, and promote the use 
of research methods drawn from diverse epistemological perspectives, 
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including innovative developments in qualitative and quantitative research. 
(Canadian Psychological Association, 2009) 
Within this definition counselling psychology is, on the one hand, conceptualized as 
promoting wellness, psycho-education, illness prevention, and remediation of client 
distresses (Kennedy & Arthur, 2014), all reflections of its ‘positive’ psychological 
approach. Additionally, on the other hand, these areas of concern are contextualized 
within social and cultural spheres with a recognition that barriers within these domains 
may prevent healthy individual functioning, however defined. This aspect of the definition 
anticipates, while not specifically identifying, an engagement with social justice within 
counselling’s sphere of practice.  
            To further emphasize social context, a special issue of the journal Canadian 
Psychology published in 2011, indicated that Canadian counselling psychology is 
especially sensitive to diversity, social justice, and advocacy, as well as a commitment to 
human development across the life span, while focusing on wellness and prevention 
(Sinacore, 2011). Certainly, in conceptual and theoretical terms at least, the profession 
has been concerned with engaging with major societal issues and changes, and with 
addressing the needs of individuals whose lives are affected by those changes (Collins 
& Arthur, 2010; Sinacore, 2011).      
2.3. Social Context as an Invitation to Social Justice Perspectives 
Recognizing that currently one in five Canadians experience severe 
psychological distress, with one in ten people struggling with an actual mental disorder, 
there is substantial evidence that inequalities in the social and economic position of 
different groups within a population determine the health status of those groups to the 
extent that the greater the inequity the poorer the health of the population. 
Consequently, attention needs to focus on the social grounding of health to prevent 
mental health issues within populations (Ginsberg & Sinacore, 2015). Such an analysis 
shifts the scope of counselling practice from a rudimentary, perhaps even neutral, 
awareness of, and sensitivity to, social and cultural contexts to an active encouragement 
of a more purposeful engagement with the inequities within society that impact people’s 
health, and promotes a more definitive positioning of social justice within the profession 
as a primary focus of a counsellor’s scope of practice. To this end, for example, the 
Mental Health Commission of Canada produced a strategy document Toward Recovery 
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& Well Being: A Framework for a Mental Health Strategy for Canada (2009) designed to 
answer the lack of services provided to Indigenous peoples, immigrants, the poor, 
sexual and religious minorities, differently abled people, and people who experience 
social violence, and to acknowledge that mental health must be conceptualized within 
cultural contexts (Ginsberg & Sinacore, 2015). Here engagement with social justice 
within the profession is seen as an attempt to recognize the role that environmental 
conditions play in the development of mental distress within marginalized individuals and 
groups and to focus on social contexts to properly discern the cause, prevention, and 
solution to distress. Specifically, these perspectives not only acknowledge the social 
determinants of distress but also advocate for activity that seeks to end, or at least 
reduce, the indignity and stress of poverty, in addition to other major social sources of 
stress like discrimination, exploitation, and prejudices (Albee, 2000). 
2.4. Counselling Psychology, Politics, and Scope of Practice 
The place of social justice within the domain of practice for counselling 
psychologists has been given more attention in recent years, both in Canada and in the 
United States (Chang, Crethar, & Ratts, 2010; Ratts, 2011). These discourses have 
been influenced by voices within and outside the counselling psychology field, especially 
from the communitarian psychology, feminist psychology, and critical pedagogy 
approaches (Palmer & Parish, 2008).22 Predictably, there have also been a range of 
opinions regarding the meaning of social justice within the field, with the result that there 
has been no definitive direction on how it might be implemented within a counsellor’s 
scope of practice. Moreover, it is apparent that in some quarters there is still some 
hesitation to acknowledge its importance as a key core value within the discipline. As 
described previously, Canadian counselling has always considered issues of equality 
and equity within its purview. Nevertheless, recent appeals for a more prominent role for 
social justice concerns (Sinacore, 2011) has stimulated debate and some opposition 
(Kennedy & Arthur, 2014). Since counselling psychology is concerned with the well-
being of individuals and groups within specific cultural and social environments, it is 
generally recognized that counselling psychologists have a professional responsibility to 
                                                
22 Naturally, community psychology has offered rich perspectives on the social context of psychological issues (Bostock & 
Smail, 1999; Fox, 2008; Prilleltensky, 1997; Prilleltensky, 2003; Smail, 1994; Smail, 2001). For a comprehensive summary 
of feminist approaches see: Brown, L. S., & Ballou, M. (Eds.). (1994). Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist 
Reappraisals. New York: The Guilford Press. 
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address systemic and social change by engaging with practices that actively oppose the 
oppression of individuals or groups.   
However, there are those who think that taking on the mantle of social justice is 
beyond the appropriate mandate for a counsellor. Furthermore, there are ongoing 
questions regarding how a practice focused on social justice would be conducted, what 
models would be appropriate, and whether there exists any relevant research that 
supports the implementation of a social justice approach in the lives of clients (Kennedy 
& Arthur, 2014). Indeed, an example of this hesitation to position the profession within a 
social justice framework can be found in the definition of counselling psychology given 
above; for, although social justice is implied in its call to advocate on behalf of clients 
and to consider social and cultural contexts of a person’s complaints, the term ‘social 
justice’ itself is not specifically used. There are passing references to ‘familial/systemic’ 
contexts, to ‘socio-cultural considerations’, and to ‘advocacy’, but there is no explicit call 
for social justice, and what that may look like. This can be considered a ‘pushing aside’ 
or ‘forgetting’, an omission that only encourages the sense that social justice is still not a 
central value for Canadian practitioners (Kennedy & Arthur, 2014). Young and Lalande 
(2011) explain, in a somewhat circular and ambiguous manner, that although it is 
important to address client concerns within the context of consideration given to social 
understanding and equality, “the challenge for counselling psychology is not to get mired 
in the political arguments of the left or the right that may come with the social justice 
territory” but that instead “counselling psychology in Canada has to find the conceptual 
and methodological grounding for the principles of liberty and equality that undergird 
social justice” (Young & Lalande, 2011, p. 252). Kennedy and Arthur (2012) state plainly, 
however, what is implicit in this critique: that it is those on the political left who advocate 
for the primacy of social justice and that often the values of the left conflict with the 
values of more conservative practitioners. Accordingly,  
advocating for increased funding to support homeless individuals may not 
fit with psychologists’ conservative political positions. Further, advocating 
for marriage equality for all members of society may not be compatible with 
some psychologists’ religious beliefs about sexual/affectional orientation. 
Thus, questions have been raised about whether counselling psychologists 
should instead be left to engage in social action in whatever ways are 
compatible with their own politics and values. (Kennedy & Arthur, 2014, p. 
195)       
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It is, of course, crucial to acknowledge and respect the diversity of opinion regarding 
philosophical and moral differences within the counselling profession, differences which 
will probably not be resolved any time soon (Lichtenberg, 2017).  
            Nevertheless, if we recognize that persons’ lives and experiences are socially 
mediated and inter-connected, then I argue that it is professionally negligent to ignore 
social, contextual, and environmental factors that cause distress in their lives due to a 
reluctance to engage with areas which might challenge personal conservative values. 
Furthermore, counselling psychology is inherently political and, therefore, to refuse to 
engage with social justice issues, or to practice from a more individualistic or 
conservative position, is still a political act. Therefore, I agree with Parker (2007) when 
he points out that not only is the field of psychology in general a privileged domain where 
class, gender, and racial representation by definition predisposes the profession to a 
conservative position, but that the structural requirements for obtaining tenure and 
funding, along with the obligations to publish in order to maintain and further career 
paths, all conspire to avoid controversy and especially views which are seen to 
represent left-wing political positions. In this way, contextual and environmental factors 
are ignored in favour of a more individualized psychology. 
One way in which social justice has been enacted within counselling has been to 
emphasize multiculturalism, with the intent of not only raising awareness and knowledge 
around diversity, but to specifically encourage the development of multicultural 
competencies and skills among counselling practitioners. 
2.5. Multiculturalism: The Fourth Wave Approaches to Social Justice 
As noted earlier, Canada’s counselling psychology practices have a historic 
connection to those of the United States, and each country has emphasized the 
importance of addressing multiculturalism as a vital consideration in recognizing the role 
of social justice in pedagogy and practice. The multicultural movement within counselling 
psychology has been designated the ‘fourth-wave’ in psychology (after the 
psychoanalytic, behavioural, and humanistic/existential waves), driven by a recognition 
of the growing multicultural, multiracial, and multilingual society in which we live (Sue, 
Arrendondo, & McDavis, 1992).  
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There were a number of pressing reasons why historically, particularly in the 
United States, multicultural competencies were beginning to be seen as important for the 
mental health professional. These included: 1) increasing diversification based on 
immigration; the increasing aging population; and higher birth rates for Asian and Latino 
cultural groups; 2) research models often concentrated inordinately on deficit models for 
analysis which stigmatized marginalized groups; 3) counsellor training had been mono-
cultural, with students very often receiving at best one course in multiculturalism 
(Arredondo, 1999). Furthermore, the training that was given to students was based on 
very narrow and particular ways of seeing the world, namely, White patriarchal culture 
(Katz, 1985; Strickland, 2000). It was increasingly recognized that models taught to 
students were monocultural and individualistic, with ‘normal’ behaviour described in the 
image of their creators, and with those behaviours identified outside these norms 
labelled deficient in some way (Arredondo, 1999). 
2.6. A Brief History of Multiculturalism 
The emphasis on multicultural considerations as representative of social justice 
concerns and how these could be reflected in counsellor practice began in the United 
States (influencing the development of counselling approaches in Canada also) during 
the Civil Rights era of the 1950s and 1960s (Arredondo & Perez, 2003). The need to 
develop and articulate multicultural competencies both in research and in graduate 
training programs grew in the 1970s onward (Sue et al., 1992), specifically addressing, 
among other issues, the scientific racism espoused by some psychologists (an example 
of which was the propagation of the IQ test23 within psychology and then into the culture) 
and the rampant discrimination against minorities.  
Based on the work of Derald Wing Sue, Patricia Arredondo, and Rod McDavis 
(Arredondo, 1999) documents were constructed in 1992 and 1996 which outlined the 
case for the need of multiculturalism within the profession, and the necessity for the 
development of appropriate multicultural competencies. It was argued that all 
counselling is cross-cultural; that it occurs within the parameters of institutional and 
societal biases and norms; that the counselling relationship is most often between a 
                                                
23 Kendi (2019) argues that, for example, standardized testing used to measure aptitude and intelligence is inherently 
discriminatory and degrading, and falsely perpetuates the racist notion of black intellectual inferiority via the so-called 
“academic-achievement gap”. 
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White counsellor and a client of ethnic racial minority status; that often these clients are 
the most marginalized and those to whom the counsellor is least qualified to assist; and, 
finally, that counselling is a culture-bound profession (Arredondo, 1999). Although there 
were objections to the narrow meaning of the term multicultural because it tended to only 
emphasize race and ethnicity (Collins & Arthur, 2010), for those advocating 
multiculturalism, however, the movement was inclusive of all aspects of personal and 
cultural identity (Arredondo, 1999). It aligned directly with opposition to all social and 
individual oppression, thus establishing itself inside a social justice agenda since, from 
the multicultural perspective, social justice is concerned with fairness and equity in 
resources, rights, and treatment for individuals and groups of people, marginalized and 
disempowered due to their immigration, racial, ethnic, age, socioeconomic, religious 
heritage, physical ability, or sexual orientation status (Constantine, Hage, Kindaichi, & 
Bryant, 2007). For Sue and his colleagues, the term multicultural was both expansive 
and, at the same time, inclusive. That is, they felt that although there was a recognition 
that multiculturalism could be understood to address only racial and ethnic groups 
identified as oppressed (e.g. African Americans, American Indians, Asian Americans, 
and Hispanics and Latinos), the term could equally cover race, class, religion, sex, age, 
and would address the concerns of other special populations (Sue et al., 1992). While 
the endeavour to make the definition of multiculturalism as inclusive as possible resulted 
in somewhat broad characterizations that recognized the differences between groups 
without comparing them as better or worse than each other, and that acknowledged the 
validity of their difference perspectives on life (Pieterse et. al., 2009), these attempts, 
nevertheless, lacked specificity. Still, in response to objections that such all-embracing 
definitions robbed the name of its power and would ironically encourage a corresponding 
inattentiveness to multicultural issues, Sue et. al., (1992) insisted that the ‘universal’ and 
‘focused’ perspectives on multiculturalism were not mutually exclusive and that 
recognizing the cross-cultural nature of all counselling does not preclude a focus on 
specific ethnic minority issues. At the same time, they emphasized the necessity for the 
acquisition of appropriate competencies and skills applicable to minority clients.  
Accordingly, one of the first responses to the importance of addressing the needs 
of a multicultural community was the push for multicultural competencies among 
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practitioners.24 The definition of multicultural competency has been, and is still, 
concerned specifically with the way in which counsellors can engage effectively with 
diverse clients (Vera & Speight, 2003). Sue et. al. (1992) suggested three dimensions 
with which a counsellor must engage for the development of appropriate cultural 
competence: counsellor beliefs and attitudes, knowledge, and skills. Specifically, an 
awareness of one’s beliefs and attitudes means understanding one’s own perspective on 
matters of race, ethnicity, and culture and how one’s own group membership, and the 
privileges that may come from this, impact on discrimination and oppression. Knowledge 
refers to being cognizant of the worldviews of others, and their histories and stories of 
oppression, as well as their valued ways of experiencing the world. Skills refers to the 
ability to use traditional and non-traditional practices that are relevant to the population 
that would best bring about healing (Constantine et al., 2007; Sue et al., 1992).  
It was not until 2002 that the American Psychological Association finally adopted 
a report, originally proposed by Derald Wing Sue in 1982, that outlined the standards for 
the knowledge and skills required of a qualified multicultural counsellor (Arredondo & 
Perez, 2003). This report known as the Multicultural Guidelines on Education and 
Training, Research, Practice and Organizational Development for Psychologists, along 
with other simultaneous initiatives within various divisions of the American Counseling 
Association, represented major steps forward in the promulgation of multicultural 
competencies within the counselling field (Arredondo & Perez, 2003). These 
competencies were seen by their authors as being firmly grounded within a social justice 
agenda because they make the case that socio-cultural context, environmental stressors 
of oppression, and historical forces all affect the health of racial and ethnic groups 
(Arredondo & Perez, 2003; Ivey & Collins, 2003).     
2.7.    The Fifth Wave 
Despite the important benefits of the multicultural movement in the formation, 
research, and teaching of counselling psychology, there have been other critical voices 
which have advocated for an even broader conception of social justice as it may relate to 
the profession (Vera & Speight, 2003). Although multiculturalism is fundamentally 
                                                
24 For examples of models, approaches, and competencies see: Arredondo, 1999; Atkinson, Thompson, & Grant, 1993; 
Burnes & Manese, 2008; Crethar, Rivera, & Nash, 2008; Ivey & Collins, 2003; LLera, Saleem, Roffman, & Dass-Brailsford, 
2009; Quin, 2009. 
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concerned with social justice and has attempted to include more expansive views of 
what social justice might entail, a consideration of how social justice is defined opens up 
other areas of engagement.  
Bell (2016), claims that social justice should be considered as both a goal, which 
is defined as the full and equitable participation of all groups within a society, and as a 
process, a democratic and participatory means by which change is accomplished, while 
relying on agency and collaboration to achieve such ends. She further goes on to 
describe the vision of the world that is socially just as a place wherein 
the distribution of resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable, and 
all members are physically and psychologically safe and secure, 
recognized, and treated with respect. We envision a world in which 
individuals are both self-determining (able to develop their full capacities) 
and interdependent (capable of interacting democratically with others). 
Social justice involves social actors who have a sense of their own agency 
as well as a sense of social responsibility toward and with others, their 
society, the environment, and the broader world in which we live. These 
are conditions we not only wish for ourselves but for all people in our 
interdependent global community. (p. 1) 
This conception of social justice emphasizes the fair and equitable distribution of 
resources, with a focus on those who are disadvantaged as the primary concern, but 
leaves open the question of who is disadvantaged, and in what ways, and how this might 
be challenged. I have argued so far that workers within the structures of capitalist society 
are by definition living under conditions that are unjust since not only are they unable to 
be self-determining but they do not function within institutions or in relationships that are 
democratic and reflective of agency or social responsibility. In other words, I agree with 
Sue et al. (1992) that it is necessary to identify specific cultural groups and forms of 
discrimination or oppression, while at the same time recognizing cultural considerations 
more broadly; yet I propose that these considerations are plainly situated within the 
capitalist mode of production itself, and that an appreciation of racism or sexism, for 
example, cannot be separated from an analysis of the division of labour within society. I 
will expand on this point later on. 
Historically, there have been many different approaches to, and definitions of, 
social justice. The Libertarian model of John Locke was based on the link between merit 
and liberty, wherein merit is the predictor of the acquisition of resources and, assuming 
there is an equal playing field for all, people would get what they deserve (Vera & 
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Speight, 2003). Thus, inequities could certainly still arise but they should not be a 
concern to society as long as opportunities were equal. Liberal reformist approaches to 
social justice, influenced principally by Rousseau, rejected meritocracy and affirmed that 
inequity cannot be merely accepted in society; consequently, the role of government, 
and of public policy, is to establish, maintain, and enforce equitable laws and social 
conditions through the protection of basic rights and the promotion of liberty and freedom 
of choice for all (Vera & Speight, 2003). 
The communitarian approach to social justice proposes that it is the process of 
moving toward a fair and equitable society that is key, and not necessarily the 
distribution of resources themselves. The solution to inequities is not merely re-
apportionment of wealth, but a transformation of the practices and processes that lead to 
unfair outcomes. Since a large portion of the population fall into categories that may be 
considered marginal (i.e. people of colour, the elderly, women, unemployed persons 
etc.), it is apparent that “issues of social justice are important for the statistical majority of 
the population, not just minority groups. Such a conceptualization of justice, then, is 
logically related to issues of multiculturalism and diversity” (Vera & Speight, 2003, pp. 
260-261). This approach is the one that I find myself most attracted to; but even here, 
once again, despite the inclusiveness of the definition of those toward whom justice 
issues would apply, my view is that it must be broader still. For example, it is not just 
unemployed persons, but also employed persons, oppressed and alienated by class 
division within an unjust system, who should be the focus of social justice concerns. The 
acknowledgement of what might be characterized as a broad systemic category like 
employment would, nevertheless, have the concomitant effect of simultaneously 
addressing those more specific categories of discrimination and oppression. Again, I will 
address this more thoroughly later in this chapter. 
Since it is recognized that context matters when addressing mental health 
issues, there have been many recent arguments made that, indeed, social justice is vital 
to the practice of counselling (Chang, Crethar, & Ratts, 2010; Toporek, Kwan, & 
Williams, 2012; Vera & Speight, 2003). Contributions from critical psychology, feminist 
psychology and multicultural theorists have significantly influenced the argument that 
social justice have a more prominent role within counselling psychology (Palmer & 
Parish, 2008). As mentioned previously, multicultural awareness and the development of 
appropriate competencies has been particularly emphasized as the way forward to 
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address social justice within counselling practice. Others, however, have called for a 
broadening of how we understand social justice within the profession and have 
suggested different areas of engagement with it (Constantine et al., 2007; Goodman et 
al., 2004; Ivey & Collins, 2003; Kennedy & Arthur, 2014; Palmer & Parish, 2008; Vera & 
Speight, 2003). The expanded conception of social justice within counselling has been 
characterized as the ‘fifth force’ within the profession, although some have downplayed 
this characterization noting that the profession has always historically engaged with 
justice issues (Ratts, 2009). Nevertheless, Goodman et al. (2004), in a seminal article 
discussing the role of social justice in counselling, define  
the social justice work of counseling psychologists as scholarship and 
professional action designed to change societal values, structures, 
policies, and practices, such that disadvantaged or marginalized groups 
gain increased access to these tools of self-determination. Drawing on an 
ecological model of social analysis, we propose that social justice work 
occurs on three different levels: the micro level, including individuals and 
families; the meso level, including communities and organizations; and the 
macro level, including social structures, ideologies, and policies. (p. 795)   
The broadening of social justice concerns into micro, meso, and macro levels has been 
reiterated by other writers using different language and schemas (see, for example, 
Prilleltensky, 2003). I believe these distinctions are useful ways to conceptualize social 
justice work. However, it is important to also see each level within the others, the micro 
within the macro for example, giving counsellors practicable and flexible options to effect 
change. This theme will be discussed further in Chapter Five of this dissertation.   
Although some writers have emphasized that multicultural competencies are both 
necessary and sufficient responses to the call for broader social-political change 
(Arredondo & Perez, 2003), I agree with other writers who have moved beyond 
multiculturalism per se to focus on wider institutional oppression (Smith, Baluch, 
Bernabei, Robohm, & Sheehy, 2003). Accordingly, social justice has been 
conceptualized as a concern for the inequitable institutional, social, and political 
‘upstream’ decisions, involving, for example, discrimination, unfair policies and practices 
around access to food and housing, and inadequate response to the needs of poor or 
disabled persons, all of which leads to the ‘downstream’ consequence of suffering in one 
form or another (Ali & Sichel, 2014). Consequently, this approach hopes to expose the 
pathologies of institutions and policies that perpetuate oppression and suffering in 
individuals, communities, and groups through engagement with social structures and 
73 
ideologies. Others have expanded the call for a broader view of social justice’s role in 
counselling by focusing on principles of distributive justice, defined as equitable 
distribution of power and resources, with an emphasis on collaboration, and democratic 
and equal power and voice (Baluch, Pieterse, & Bolden, 2004).                                          
These more expansive propositions of the extent counselling’s mandate should 
address the sources of mental health concerns within social and cultural contexts have 
sometimes been drawn from the emancipatory communitarian psychological literature, 
most notably advocated by Isaac Prilleltensky (see, for example, Prilleltensky, 1997 & 
Prilleltensky, 2003). This approach proposes radical practices that are compassionate, 
involving both social obligation and mutual determination. Notably, ‘emancipatory’ refers 
to the necessity of liberation for all oppressed groups (Blustein, McWhirter, & Perry, 
2005). The implementation of social justice within counselling with an emphasis on 
advocacy and more proactive, preventative models of intervention dramatically 
transcends the use of traditional, individualistic approaches to client problems to 
embrace roles that include advocacy, outreach, prevention programming and 
psychoeducational interventions, community outreach, consulting, facilitating indigenous 
support networks, and public policy (Palmer & Parish, 2008).   
Correspondingly, more expansive counsellor competencies have been 
suggested. Many have recognized that a more reflective understanding of social justice 
should mirror the broad concerns of society itself (Baluch et al., 2004). These concerns 
include exploring how the profession of counselling psychology can address issues of 
equitable distribution of power and resources, collaboration, democratic decision making 
processes, and encouragement of equality in power and voice and, in general, 
meaningfully consider expansive systemic inequities within both the profession of 
counselling and society (Baluch et al., 2004). Some scholars have suggested ways to 
address this in practical terms, most of which reflect more detailed expansions of Sue et 
al.’s focus on beliefs and attitudes, knowledge, and skills (see, for example, Constantine 
et al.’s (2007) nine proposed competencies).  
Going beyond the emphasis solely on multiculturalism, then, many theorists are 
now locating the parameters of social justice in counselling within a broad sociocultural 
framework and thus seek to oppose all forms of oppression, recognizing that these both 
cause and perpetuate psychological distress (Smith et al., 2003). So far, I have tried to 
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show the development of the focus and concerns of the social justice movement within 
the counselling profession and the way in which they have expanded, especially in 
recent years, to include a broad range of groupings and categories. Nevertheless, in the 
following sections I hope to explain why even these enlarged conceptions of social 
justice are insufficient. I propose that they lack a good philosophical foundation (at the 
very least these are not explicitly explicated) and that they fail to specifically critique the 
workplace, the one domain of persons’ lives that is central to the creation and 
perpetuation of oppression, inequality, and undemocratic ways of being, since it is the 
organization of people’s working lives which leads to alienation and the development of 
mental distress. 
2.8. Critiques of Social Justice Conceptions 
The approach of Goodman et al. (2004) emphasizes a broader focus on larger 
systemic changes in addressing mental health concerns. This conception is far more 
holistic in approach, not only in how mental health is contextualized but also in the 
manner in which mental health issues are tackled. They emphasize six main practical 
responses to this more comprehensive understanding of the role of social justice within 
the profession which include constant self-examination, power sharing, ‘giving voice’, 
consciousness raising, building on strengths, and giving clients the necessary tools for 
change (Goodman et al., 2004).   
Nevertheless, even as these theories of how to conceptualize social justice, the 
competencies and practices required to engage with it, and how issues of social justice 
might be taught to graduate students in counselling psychology are useful and important, 
I contend they are noticeably disconnected from a wider philosophical foundation. As 
Thompson & Shermis (2004) argue, theories of social justice do not materialize 
spontaneously but instead are rooted in an underlying philosophical base. The 
philosophical base is missing in most conceptions of those who advocate for the 
importance of social justice within counselling psychology. The importance of this cannot 
be overstated. Indeed, as will be argued in Chapter Three, a failure to explicitly articulate 
a foundational philosophical basis for social justice work in any of the helping 
professions may in fact assist in perpetuating the very systems that the professions are 
ostensibly criticizing and attempting to correct. As theory is required to provide direction, 
rationality, and order to the practices of counselling psychologists, it is a meaningful 
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philosophical perspective that illumines and guides theory (Thompson & Shermis, 2004). 
Philosophical frameworks may be religious, political, humanistic, or reflect stances that 
emphasize pragmatism or utilitarianism, for example, but they should be clearly stated. 
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson (1999) explain that  
indeed, it is not possible to have theory without philosophy, for at least two 
reasons. First, as Gӧdel proved in the field of mathematics, it is not possible 
to have a symbolic system that is not based on analytic assumptions and 
postulates that go beyond the reach of that symbolic system. You must 
start with postulates or assumptions, and, thus, theory is never enough. 
Second, in order to assess theoretical systems, there must be some rules 
of evidence or criteria for truth that allow to say that one statement or set 
of statements is better or truer than another. But these rules of evidence 
are necessarily preanalytic - they enable analysis, they are not the result 
of analysis. We can ignore philosophy only by mindlessly and implicitly 
assuming a philosophy, but it seems much better to own up to our 
assumptions consciously. (p. 16) 
Philosophical assumptions may potentially generate theories of change, both individually 
and collectively, that challenge and upset power structures that are traditionally resistant 
to change or transformation. Let me now return to the material I covered in the previous 
chapter and consider it in terms of the current topic of discussion.  
2.9.    Alienation as a Manifestation of Capitalist Production and Class 
Division 
I would argue that the notion of alienation, as outlined in Chapter One, provides a 
comprehensive philosophical foundation for an explication of theories and descriptions of 
social justice within counselling psychology. Indeed, alienation, particularly as generated 
within workplace environments or within institutions that train people for work (like 
schools, colleges, universities, technical schools, etc.), is the ultimate outcome within 
such settings in modern society because their organization is intrinsically oppressive and 
undemocratic. Marx’s concept of alienation as originating from capitalist modes of 
production, and fueled by neoliberal sensibilities within the society at large, provides an 
expansive and theoretically pragmatic understanding of the ways in which mental 
distress may arise, while also hinting at solutions. Alienation for Marx, especially as 
outlined in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, manifests within both 
the intra- and inter-psychic realms as a split between the person and the realization of 
their fullest creative potential, and as a rupture between the person and others, 
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respectively. Whereas Marx saw human beings as ideally intimately connected to 
nature, a part of nature, and functioning holistically within nature, alienation is the 
rendering of this fundamental unity into two, with accompanying adverse psychological, 
physical, and social repercussions. The most indubitable example of this breach occurs 
within the capitalist mode of production wherein persons experience separation from 
their work environment, the product they produce, and, consequently, from themselves 
and others. The effect of these breaches are the stresses, anxieties, depressions, and 
more broadly, family and relationship issues that make up the majority of the work that 
counsellors encounter. Alienation occurs because the capitalist mode of production, 
based on class division, is in itself unjust: it is unequal, unequitable, discriminatory, 
oppressive, and fundamentally undemocratic. For example, in the often cited Oxfam 
briefing report of 201625 it was reported that the richest 1% of the world's population has 
accumulated more wealth than the rest of the global population combined, and that a 
mere 62 of the richest individuals in the world own as much as the poorest half of the 
global population, or some 3.6 billion people. In other words, the modern capitalist 
economies of the world function for the benefit of an increasingly small number of 
owners while the working classes are seeing less and less benefit and are increasingly 
living under precarious circumstances. A social justice critique, to be truly emancipatory, 
must consider class. I suggest that class division, created by workplace relations, 
represents the neglected sphere that has hidden within the calls for systemic change by 
recent analyses within counselling, but which, nevertheless, following trends in other 
scholarly thinking, has been dismissed as irrelevant or passé. Class’s intersectionality 
with race provides a good example of why opposition to racism, an otherwise advocated 
perspective within counselling theory, must simultaneously consider class. I turn to this 
issue in the next section. 
2.9.1. Class Division and Racism 
Class divisions are based on the difference between those who create products 
and those who appropriate the wealth (the surplus) generated by those products. Class 
for Marx is not only a matter of where an individual is situated within a particular mode of 
production (Eagleton, 2018), but an indictment against the exploitation of unpaid labour 




within the workplace (Resnick & Wolff, 2013). Although it is useful to speak about class, 
in many circumstances, as merely the distinction between owners and workers, it is 
important to note that these classes are not the only ones in today’s society. Indeed, 
contrary to popular belief, Marx himself recognized the existence of other social classes 
that could determine the movement of society, although he did think there were two main 
classes (Allen & Boyle, 2011). I am advocating a more nuanced understanding of class, 
one given by Resnick & Wolff (2013) who argue that class should be thought of as a 
verb rather than as a noun and that it “refers specifically to this economic process of 
producing and appropriating surplus or, as Marx puts it, unpaid labor” (p. 158). This 
conception of class does not necessarily entail who owns the means of production, 
whether it is the state or private individuals, or collections of individuals, nor does it focus 
on reified groupings of people. Class is a process that interacts in multiple ways with 
other non-class processes, with individuals functioning and creating identity and position 
within society through a multiplicity of both class and non-class processes, each 
determining and being determined by the others (Resnick & Wolff, 2013).  
These class processes, analysed through a perspective on the effects of capital 
accumulation globally (Kandall, 1996), are the driving forces behind other forms of 
discrimination like sexism and racism (Reed, 2013), which have rightfully been a 
prominent concern for helping professions and for the counselling profession specifically. 
With respect to racism, for example, I call attention to the fact that the poorest half of the 
world’s population come from countries that were the victims of historical plunder by 
colonial and imperialist powers that originated and perpetuated the slave trade and the 
theft of vast resources, leading both to the impoverishment of those countries and to the 
concurrent growth of capitalist power and wealth in the West (Kendi, 2019). Capital 
exploitation, both historical and present-day, is a hand-maiden of racism so that 
“capitalism is essentially racist; racism is essentially capitalist. They were birthed 
together from the same unnatural causes…” (Kendi, 2019, p. 163). Class is, as Eagleton 
(2018) says, “the wrong which keeps so many other kinds of wrong in business…[and] 
has a significance far beyond its own sphere” (p. 166). 
The class division that lays at the heart of the capitalist mode of production can 
be seen to be, at the very least, if not the cause of racism and sexism, indispensable to 
its perpetuation. The class process is inextricably woven together with non-class 
processes, each nurturing the other, and together creating the economic, environmental, 
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discriminatory, and other harms experienced within our society (Resnick & Wolf, 2013; 
Schmitt, 1988).26 Whereas it is imperative not to reduce race and gender to class 
(Bakhir, 2001), it is equally important not to conflate them for in doing so one ignores the 
issue of power relations (Navarro, 2004). The working class are all those, no matter what 
their occupation or, for that matter, their earnings, who sell their labour power to capital, 
caught within capital’s all-pervasive authority and subjection, and are, as a result, 
stripped of any meaningful power or control (Eagleton, 2018). It is in the removal of 
power from people into the hands of a small elite that has historically generated racism 
and racist ideas up until modern times. Racism cannot be properly addressed without 
addressing capitalism and vice versa. Kendi (2019) argues that “the problem of race has 
always been at its core the problem of power, not the problem of immorality or 
ignorance”. He goes on to say that  
race and racism are power constructs of the modern world. For roughly two 
hundred thousand years, before race and racism were constructed in the 
fifteenth century, humans saw color but did not group the colors into 
continental races, did not commonly attach negative and positive 
characteristics to those colors and rank the races to justify racial inequity, 
to reinforce race power and policy. Racism is not even six hundred years 
old. [Thus] in order to truly be antiracist, you also have to truly be anti-
capitalist…and in order to truly be anti-capitalist, you have to be antiracist, 
because they’re interrelated. (Interview with Democracy Now, 2019) 
Particularly in recent years, many of the most expansive proposals for social 
justice within the profession of counselling psychology have appealed for opposition and 
transformation of systems, policies, and practices that oppress persons. These 
conceptions reflect the kind of just society, which Bell (2016) describes in the definition 
above, that emphasizes self-determination, development of full capacities, and the ability 
to interact in a democratic fashion, all of which result in individuals who are engaged in 
positive ways with themselves, each other, and the world. It is clear from the literature 
that this has meant addressing the inequities suffered by marginalized groups, which 
manifests as various everyday personal and institutional forms of racism, sexism, 
ageism, and other forms of discriminatory practices.27 Yet, class division, as primarily 
                                                
26 See Willhelm (1980) for an account of some of the limitations orthodox Marxian theory has in relating racism to classism. 
27 Bannerji (2011) critiques the concept of intersectionality because it unnaturally separates three strands of social life (i.e. 
race, gender, & class) as actually experienced by persons and then attempts to put them back together in an aggregate 
manner. This has led to the obscuration of class in most recent analyses in favour of an emphasis on cultural discourse 
which leads to an impoverished ‘identity’ politics. Bannerji’s analysis highlights both the inadequacies of social justice 
movements in general and, in our case, counselling’s engagement with social justice specifically, with its emphasis on 
multiculturalism as as the extent of its social concern. 
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manifested in workplace arrangements, is generally ignored despite its importance as a 
vehicle for racist, sexist, and other discriminatory practices. A comprehensive and 
effective social analysis must recognize that “class cannot be genderless or cultureless, 
nor can culture be genderless and classless” (Bannerji, 2011, p. 51).   
Class is also ignored despite being a potentially fruitful foundation upon which 
radical opposition could occur, a possibility that the dominant classes know only too well. 
In this respect I agree with Martha Giminez’s (2001) analysis that very often employers 
are able to wield their power so that they re-identify class related grievances as ‘raced’ 
or ‘gendered’, or both. Class becomes obscured even although it may be fundamental to 
a proper analysis of workplace dynamics and the functioning of power. Without 
simplistically reducing gender or racial oppression to class, class nevertheless is the 
power that often remains unnamed but which is the essence of the intersectionality of 
social relations (Giminez, 2001). Class, therefore, is not just another location of 
discriminatory practices by persons or institutions. Indeed, whereas sexism and racism 
are always evil, class, from a Marxist perspective, is the site of both oppression and 
emancipation, a possible gateway to the possibilities of social change (Gimenez, 2001).   
It is therefore the acknowledgement of class division forged within capitalist 
relations of production within the workplace, and the inevitable alienation that results, 
that must, I argue, form the basis of counselling psychology’s grounding in social justice. 
When the literature calls for addressing systemic change, it is not generally advocating 
for the abolishment of capitalism, but rather for changes to institutions, policies, and 
practices which are seen to be discriminatory or inequitable in some manner. This 
critique is not to diminish such practices or concerns. Indeed, alienation theory gives 
more incentive for engaging with anti-discriminatory oppositions that bring about a better 
society. However, sole focus on these approaches alone can be likened to reformist 
movements within politics: although necessary and important, they do not address the 





2.9.2.  Modern Class Division and the Rise of Inequality     
Discussion of class division has re-emerged within academic and popular 
writings, especially after the economic crash of 2008 when it became difficult to ignore.28  
Prior to this time, class had for the most part disappeared from various analyses simply 
because it seemed that after World War II there had been an improved living standard of 
the so-called lower- and middle-classes. Indeed, during the years between World War II 
and the 1970s there was not only a great increase in productivity within the Western 
nations but wages also rose concurrently (Blakeley, 2019). However, since the 1970s 
wages have become stagnant while productivity has continued to increase, all of which 
has resulted in an increase of inequality (Economic Policy Institute, 2019; Oxfam Briefing 
Paper, 2019; World Inequality Report, 2018) .29 The reasons for this shift are multiple 
and complex. Some general trends have been identified, however. There were definitive 
changes occurring on both sides of the labor market (Wolff, 2012), starting especially in 
the 1970s. First, the demand for labour decreased due to the advent of computers 
across the manufacturing and service industries, an indication of a broader importance 
of technology within economies. Geopolitics and technology provided the opportunities 
for business to function from beyond borders (White, 2015), resulting in the phenomena 
of globalization. Second, the demand for labor decreased due to this increasing 
globalization and the result was the movement of industry, and hence jobs, to locations 
around the world where labour was far cheaper. Private sector jobs followed the trend of 
manufacturing jobs during the 1970s and 1980s, so that competitive advantages and 
increased profits were obtained by replacing higher-wage domestic workers with 
cheaper foreign workers (Wolff, 2012). Third, during this period of time women started to 
abandon the traditional roles society had dictated for them, usually involving unpaid 
labour in the home, and started to seek out full-time paid employment, which caused a 
huge influx in the supply of labour within the market. Finally, in the United States at least, 
                                                
28 Since the economic crash of 2008 many have realized that class relations are alive and well. See: Blakeley, G. (2019, 
September 29). We were told capitalism had won. But now workers can take back control. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/29/no-alternative-capitalism-workers-take-back-control-class-
politics 
29 The latest data available indicates that almost 50% of all global wages are earned by just 10% of workers whereas the 





there was an increase in immigration, particularly from Latin America, which again 
increased the labour market with workers, thus giving capitalists a source of cheap 
labour (Wolff, 2012). Other factors for the stagnation of wages was, and continues to be, 
the systematic underinvestment in education, pools of skilled labour, a vibrant network of 
suppliers, and strong infrastructure. At the same time, there was a decline in collective 
bargaining and a drop in union involvement (White, 2015). 
The consequences of these massive shifts in the labour market not only 
impacted on the rising disparity between worker wages and increased productivity, 
resulting in massive profits for successful owners of business, but they also affected 
business’s connections to communities. Technological innovation and computer 
advancement meant that capital knew no borders, thus weakening the traditional 
connections between local workers, their places of employment, and their communities. 
These socio-economic developments led to businesses in many cases abandoning the 
traditional sense of civic responsibility they might once have held, disengaging with the 
everyday lives of their employees, and withdrawing from local investment (Wolff, 2012). 
Alienation from community and the various forms of loneliness, social anxiety, and 
isolation that can arise as a result is, nevertheless, a prominent feature of capitalism and 
the neoliberal philosophy that fuels it (Sugarman, 2015). 
2.10.   Capitalism and Neoliberalism 
These breaches in community and in relationships at all levels of society are a 
predictable result of capitalist economic practices but are also sustained by the political-
ideological philosophy of neoliberalism which now dominates our modern era. 
Essentially, neoliberalism promotes an unregulated free market system where self-
interest is best, and markets are the preferred route to fulfilling the self’s interests. 
Ideally, the neoliberal state should be small; competition, inequality, and financial 
speculation signify the defining elements of the system. A competitive individuality is the 
essence of the sense of self of persons within such a society (Mason, 2015). Neoliberal 
ideas originated with Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises during the 1930s who 
effectively managed to conflate liberal democracy with the communism and fascism they 
both abhorred (Monbiot, 2017). Originally considered marginal, Hayek’s views grew in 
influence so that by 1960 Hayek had discarded notions such as political freedom, 
universal rights, human equality and the redistribution of wealth. Ideas such as these 
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confined the freedoms of the rich and powerful, interfering with wealth creation, thus 
hampering the trickle-down effects to others. Hayek believed that for freedom to exist the 
majority of people should not be in charge of the society and its politics (Monbiot, 2017). 
It was the capitalist class, with all their riches and resources, that were considered the 
vanguards and protectors of the good society, and thus it was precisely through 
inequality, actively promoted and endorsed by the capitalist elite, that such a society 
would flourish. As a result, this meant that Hayek and his ever more popular neoliberal 
ideas opposed progressive taxation, free universal health care, the conservation and 
protection of natural resources, and endorsed the destruction of unions while supporting 
the spread of monopolies (Monbiot, 2017).   
While Keynesian economics had dominated after the Second World War for a 
period of about 25 years, it was eventually replaced by neoliberalism after a stagnation 
occurred in the 1970s (Foster, 2019). By now neoliberalism was particularly connected 
to the rise of monopoly-finance capital; whereas the state’s conventional role had been 
to oversee and protect social reproduction in all its forms, its role under neoliberalism 
was instead to encourage capitalist reproduction (Foster, 2019). These doctrines and 
practices became especially prominent as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan came 
to power during the 1970s and 1980s (Blakeley, 2019). Thatcher, for example, was a 
Hayek devotee and introduced large tax cuts for the rich, the destruction of trade unions, 
along with widespread deregulation, privatisation, and outsourcing of public services. 
She had intended to go so far as to dismantle the welfare state, privatize universal 
healthcare, and charge education fees, but was thwarted by her own party (Monbiot, 
2017). 
With the decimation of social securities and the transformation of the state into a 
conduit for free competition, monopoly power along with vast inequalities, have only 
increased (Foster, 2019). The impact of austerity politics, especially after the financial 
crash of 2008, has had devastating effects on the lives of the working classes, while 
making the capitalist class even richer than ever before (Blakeley, 2019). For example, a 
report from 2013 by the economist Emmanuel Saez (Saez, 2013) indicates that in the 
United States from 2009 to 2012, the years immediately after the financial crash of 2008 
onward, there was an overall increase in the average real income of families, but that 
when the figures were broken down the gains were quite unequal, indicating that top 1% 
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incomes were close to full recovery while the bottom 99% incomes had barely begun to 
recover.  
But apart from its objective political and economic effects in terms of the 
perpetuation of inequalities, neoliberalism constructs a certain particular sense of self 
and formulates a narrative of how that self should act in society, barely challenged by 
conventional institutions, including the psychological professions (Sugarman, 2015). 
Neoliberalism offers not merely a set of political ideas and economic relations, but also a 
narrative of personal identity and behaviour as competitors within the market. We are 
encouraged, and indeed trained, to view the world in terms of commodity exchange, with 
our success in this domain creating hierarchies of winners and losers. The market 
therefore becomes the measure of efficiency, the freer the better, and so all forms of 
regulation, planning, taxation, and collective movements like unions are viewed as 
impediments to the success and liberty of individuals within market society (Monbiot, 
2017). 
Thus, neoliberalism not only reverses the traditional relationship between the 
state and the market, affecting the objective position of people within society, but it also 
permeates their subjectivity so that people see themselves as not only consumers but 
the ‘consumed’, marketable products consisting of acquired skills “to be managed, 
maintained, developed, and treated as ventures in which to invest” (Sugarman, 2015, p. 
104). Since the development of such an identity is an individual enterprise, shaped by 
individual choices, and unsupported by social supports formerly provided by the state 
and by community, the likelihood of what might be perceived as personal failure is all the 
more probable. The workplace, whatever form it takes, is an ideal and primary domain 
for both the development and the enactment of these neoliberal subjectivities, and is, 
therefore, an inevitable source for the emergence of alienation due to competition 
between individuals, and the inequities and inequalities that arise as a result. Within the 
capitalist workplace, equality is not a value that is prioritized; rather, it is equality of 
opportunity as actualized within market relations.   
I pause here to consider again Baluch et al.’s (2004) assertion that counsellors 
must address themselves to the systemic inequities in both the profession and society in 
a meaningful fashion if they are to engage with social justice issues. Although I agree 
with the intent of this argument, it remains to be seen whether this can be done within 
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the domain of the profession itself because of its entanglement, both historically and in 
practice, with neoliberalism. I rather suspect that, since the philosophical basis for 
counselling’s engagement with social justice is rarely made explicit, and that an analysis 
of alienation as defined by workplace relations is almost completely absent from 
discussions of mental health distress, neoliberalism is, in fact, the unspoken author of 
both these omissions. Despite the profession’s good intentions, neoliberalism lurks as its 
philosophical background, preventing outright critiques of the undemocratic ways in 
which we live most of our lives. I explore this idea more in the next chapter, but first I 
would like to briefly describe what a democratic workplace might look like, one in which I 
believe the conditions for the development of problematic mental health issues would be 
greatly reduced.  
2.11.   Democratization of the Workplace 
If counselling psychology is committed to social justice and to addressing 
inequality in social systems, it must address itself to the basic and fundamental 
inequality that exists in our places of work, influencing workers, unemployed people, 
those precariously employed, and those working for no pay (Swidler, 2018). As Richard 
Wolff, the Marxist economist, points out, we like to believe that we live in a society that is 
democratic and equal, and yet it is not because the workplace is not (with a few rare 
exceptions) a democratic domain. Most people work, for example, eight hours a day, five 
days a week for the best portions of their lives. In order to become employed, and then 
to remain employed, workers must agree to give up their usual democratic rights. They 
have no input into what they do or how they do it, as this is determined solely by the 
employer. They have no voice in decisions that are made within the business, the 
direction it might be taking, or its prospects for the future. The surplus value they create 
is not shared equally but instead goes to the owners. The employee has no say on the 
impact of their work within their local and wider communities, nor on its potential impact 
on issues that are pressing for our planet, like the current climate crisis (Wolff, 2012).   
Remembering Bell’s (2016) description of a socially just community as a place 
where people have a “sense of their own agency as well as a sense of social 
responsibility toward and with others, their society, the environment, and the broader 
world in which we live,” I argue that it is readily apparent that the modern day workplace, 
in most of its current forms, contravenes this standard. Whether we are looking at private 
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capitalisms (run by private individuals) or state capitalisms (like those found in the former 
Soviet Union) the inherently undemocratic systems of production within workplaces to a 
great extent frames the economic, political, and cultural relationships of the society, 
creating in turn their dynamics, tensions, and inequalities (Wolff, 2012). Inability to 
participate in workplace decision-making serves only to institutionalize lack of agency 
and powerlessness, and cultivates cultures of alienation, with the accompanying 
development of mental distress.  
The helping professions must become advocates for the democratization of the 
workplace which involves the establishment of workers’ self-directed enterprises (Wolff, 
2012). These types of work arrangements involve a radical departure from capitalist 
modes of production in that the production, appropriation, and distribution of the surplus 
is a co-operative and equal enterprise wherein the producers and the appropriators of 
the surplus are the same people (Wolff, 2012). To the extent that capitalism’s means of 
arranging the workplace is exploitative and undemocratic, the establishment of self-
directed enterprises would nurture freedom and equality, with each worker having a full 
voice in the operation of the business. Such enterprises would have immediate impacts 
for people both individually and communally: workers would decide for themselves how 
to incorporate technological change, thereby addressing the long-standing problem of 
redundancy due to technological advances; workers could be given opportunities to 
rotate through a number of different job functions, thus helping to discourage burnout, 
disengagement, and boredom; and the practice of functioning democratically within the 
workplace would impact on the engagement with community and national issues and 
their politics, with the expectation that changes at the micro-level of work has 
ramifications for how politics is performed at the macro-level (Wolff, 2012).  
Yet, consistent with Marx’s philosophical affinity for the relationship of human 
beings with nature through labour, perhaps the most significant promise of workers’ self-
directed enterprises is their impact on environmental issues. As Wolff (2012) points out: 
First and foremost, workers live, play, and raise families in and around their 
sites of work. For them the costs of environmental degradation are a much 
more important and immediate consideration than for a small group of 
outside capitalist directors who have enough wealth to avoid living or 
working in places vulnerable to environmental degradation and its effects. 
The bottom-line objectives of private and state capitalists would be 
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subordinated to environmental considerations in WSDEs’ decisions. (How 
WSDE’s Work, para. 27) 
The shift in environmental responsibility with the implementation of workers’ self-directed 
enterprises has, once again, radical impacts not only for the natural world, but also for 
racism, sexism, and other discriminatory practices under capitalist systems that subject 
poor people and others to the externalities of their profit-driven operations.30  
Consequently, I contend that the helping professions must turn their attention to the 
workplace, and its relations of production, if they are to impactfully fulfill their 
commitment to social justice within their domains of practice.31   
2.12.   Chapter Summary 
Counselling psychology has made great efforts to align itself with, and advocate 
for, social justice and democracy at all levels of individuals’ engagement with society. In 
this chapter I have tried to review some of the history of these pursuits by showing how 
this particular profession has attempted to embrace widening definitions of the notion of 
social justice. Due to the pervasive nature of work in our society, I have suggested that 
the workplace is a necessary site for analysis if the profession is truly committed to 
social justice issues because it is here that class relations are established, intersecting 
with many other forms of discriminatory practices, and where alienation is experienced. 
However, there has been a lack of critique within the counselling profession of capitalist 
modes of production despite evidence that they lead to inequality and alienation, both of 
which foster mental health concerns. Counselling psychologists can not only assist in 
challenging inequitable and unjust policies, practices, and procedures that may 
propagate injustice throughout all levels of society, but also advocate for changing the 
very basis of the way in which people work within society. Following Kendi’s (2019) 
equivalence of anti-racist and anti-capitalist stances, I propose that counselling 
professionals, to be anti-racist and anti-oppressist, must similarly be anti-capitalist. 
                                                
30 A 2015 study of 30 years of demographic data in the U.S. indicated that polluting industrial facilities were more likely to 
be placed in minority and low-income communities, with the researchers concluding that racial discrimination and 
sociopolitical factors are the best way to account for these inequities (Mohai, P., & Saha, R., 2015). 
31 Both in the U.S. and the U.K. there are currently policy proposals which make suggestions in the direction of workers’ 
self-directed enterprises. See: https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy/ in the U.S. and 
https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Alternative-Models-of-Ownership.pdf in the U.K. 
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Nevertheless, despite the calls for the adoption of an orientation that focuses on 
social justice issues, especially in light of the mounting empirical evidence supporting 
causal links between mental health and social inequities (Neilson, 2015), counselling 
psychology, following in step with other branches of psychology, has nevertheless 
historically depended on intra-psychic, individualistic clinical models to address the 
variety of problems that are presented to practitioners. These models locate the causes 
and location of concerns within persons and the help offered consequently comprises 
various assorted techniques of individual self-surveillance and self-mastery. Many of 
these approaches are biologically focused, patterning themselves after the disease 
models of medicine, without necessarily giving any real and meaningful consideration to 
social context, despite the academic acknowledgement that these contexts are important 
to address.   
Historically, much of the critique of intra-psychic approaches has come from 
writers outside counselling psychology per se, like Paulo Friere who spoke about critical 
consciousness as a way of approaching social, political, and economic factors that 
shape people’s lives (Ratts, 2009). Others have criticized the adoption of individualistic 
and biologically based models of distress as simply mistaken, and that because patterns 
of any type of behaviour, including so-called disturbed behaviour, are learned within 
social contexts, one-to-one psychotherapy is a futile pursuit (Albee, 1998). As a result, 
there has been a recognition that unless counsellors make an impact on the 
neighbourhoods, schools, media, culture, and within the wider religious, political, and 
social institutions of society, there can be little real effect in the lives of individuals 
(Goodman et al., 2004). The question becomes whether modern counselling practices 











“Neoliberalism isn't an economic program - it's a political program designed to produce 
hopelessness and kill any future alternatives”. 
David Graeber 
 
“The cheerleaders for neoliberalism work hard to normalize dominant institutions and 
relations of power through a vocabulary and public pedagogy that create market-driven 
subjects, modes of consciousness, and ways of understanding the world that promote 
accommodation, quietism and passivity”. 
Henry Giroux 
 
“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is 
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The 
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same 
time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas 
of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it”. 







Chapter 3: Counselling's Complicity with Capitalism? 
3.1. Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, my exemplification of professional fields not adequately or 
seriously addressing foundational systemic inequities by looking at how such problem is 
handled or not handled continues to be the field of counselling psychology.  In this 
sense, the reader may safely substitute ‘counselling psychology’ for any helping 
profession, including educational institutions, as they read on. 
Recognizing the ubiquity of work within our society, I propose that the challenge 
for helping professions like counselling psychology in their professed agenda of 
addressing foundational systemic inequities is to problematize and critique capitalist 
modes of production within society and to challenge the philosophical underpinnings of 
the neoliberal agenda. The question is whether these professions are up to the task of 
doing so; as I will outline in this chapter, there is good reason to think that, historically 
and philosophically, and once again using counselling psychology as a familiar example, 
they are poor candidates in this regard. Nevertheless, counselling psychology’s 
credibility in this area must, I suggest, depend upon grounding itself as a critic of 
capitalism if it is truly resolved to engage effectively with social justice. As mentioned in 
the last chapter, the hesitancy to make such a critique may well arise from a certain 
political conservatism, with many who feel that if we, as both citizens and helpers, 
merely adjust the edges of the capitalist system, by introducing more fairness and 
equality within certain unjust policies or practices, for example, then this will be sufficient 
to attain the goals of social justice. Although these alterations should be made, the 
philosophical basis for doing so tends to remain unspoken, and although they certainly 
appear to move the conversation in the direction of more democracy and equality in 
people’s lives, they do not address the fundamental societal differences of power 
embodied in class division that generates unjust systems in the first place. This is not 
only a concern confined to the helping professions like counselling. For example, within 
the current climate movement, there are many voices who realize that tweaking the 
current system will not work (Malm, 2018). Working the edges of the climate crisis will 
not impede capitalism’s fundamental philosophical belief in unlimited progress in a world 
of limited resources. Unless capitalism is fundamentally challenged, climate change will 
continue to wreak devastating, deadly havoc on the earth. This is why activist and author 
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Naomi Klein can candidly frame “climate change as a battle between capitalism and the 
planet” (Klein, 2014, Introduction, Really Bad Timing, para. 24). Similarly, within the 
world of political discourse, it is often suggested by social democrats that if we could 
only reign in what has been variously called crony capitalism, predatory capitalism, 
consumer capitalism, and other such characterizations of capitalism, through proper 
regulation, fair taxation, increased government spending, or better access to services 
(among other suggestions), then justice and equality would prevail. Yet the problem has 
always been capitalism itself (Blakeley, 2019; Wolff, 2012), no matter what the qualifier 
is. Despite many of these proposals being implemented by various governments at 
different times, capitalism has still lurched from crisis to crisis as is its wont, with the 
current climate crisis representing its ultimate, life threatening failure. 
We might analogously say that mental health issues are a battle between 
capitalism and communities of people. It is essential that counselling unequivocally align 
itself with a critique of the way in which our societies are shaped by work, and the 
relationships constructed within workplaces, to address the inevitable alienation that 
undoubtedly fosters many mental health problems. In order for the helping professions to 
meaningfully engage with a sincere effort to address system change in relation to social 
justice, they are obligated to be radical in this regard (radical in terms of getting to the 
root of the problem), and determined to expose a system that perpetuates individualism, 
consumerism, and the exploitation of people for the benefit of a few. At the same time, 
they must advocate for societies that are based on democracy, fairness, equality, and 
equity. For, just as the current climate crisis is a manifestation of the greed of capitalist 
modes of organizing societies through a hyper-individualism, treating persons like 
machines and living environments like dead commodities, all in the interest of producing 
surplus value, so too the mental health crises are a not-unexpected symptom of such 
philosophies and practices. In the previous chapter, I explored the notion that 
counselling psychology lacks a philosophical foundation for engagement with social 
justice, and that alienation theory is a suitable candidate for this position; nevertheless, 
in this chapter I suggest that the philosophical basis for counselling’s praxis is in fact not 
missing at all, but merely unarticulated and obscured, and that, similar to other helping 
occupations, counselling is, upon closer consideration, a profession deeply grounded 
within capitalist practices and the philosophical sensibilities of neoliberalism. I shall 
explore these claims further in this chapter with an examination of some of the cultural, 
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philosophical, and practical ways in which many conventional counselling practices are  
embedded within these systems that ultimately serve to perpetuate the status quo.  
3.2. Counselling as an Individualist Praxis 
The development of counselling psychology, along with the rest of the so-called 
‘psych’ disciplines, is largely connected to the same ideas of the nature of personhood 
and the role persons play within society that also defined the philosophical assumptions 
of capitalism and the spread of materialism as a world-view. Along with Descartes’ 
mechanistic perspective of the individual and Darwin’s biological evolutionary 
materialism, the individualistic philosophies that grew out of the Protestant Revolution 
within religion (Weber, 1976), with their emphasis on personal salvation, fuelled by 
Calvin’s insistence on the importance of hard work, all ultimately contributed to the 
development of capitalism as an economic and political reality, with neoliberalism later 
becoming its philosophical accomplice (Fromm, 1994). Disciplines like counselling 
psychology are deeply rooted within these philosophical traditions, traditions which are 
essentially materialist, biologically based, individualistic, and focused on standards of 
‘normalcy’ defined by people’s ability to work hard and contribute to society. 
Furthermore, the very notion of ‘development’ within the realm of psychology reflected a 
cultural emphasis on a naturally occurring biological evolution that moved from primitive 
to sophisticated stages, thus accompanying the colonial agenda that saw the White 
European values of individuality and separation from the natural world as naturally 
superior to ‘primitive’ notions of the interconnection of community within an animated 
world (Watkins & Shulman, 2008).  
On the whole, counselling psychology has depended on various disease and 
disorder models of mental distress when evaluating persons, most of which emphasize 
an ahistorical and decontextualized version of the self, separate from the society in 
which it is embedded. Crudely stated, the ultimate goal of much of clinical practice is to 
‘fix’ the individual so that they can return to life as good workers and consumers. Recent 
figures show why this is so crucial for employers, and to the economy. The Mental 
Health Commission of Canada (2012), for example, reports that mental health issues 
account for 30% of short- and long-term disability claims in Canada at a cost in excess 
of $50 billion annually, twice the amount paid for non-mental health issues. 500,000 
Canadians miss work every week due to mental health complaints. In the United States, 
92 
wellness programs are a $6 billion industry (Ajunwa, 2017) despite questions around 
their efficacy (Berinato, 2015). Nevertheless, counselling practitioners often work with 
insurance companies, employer wellness programs, and employee assistance 
programs, and others, whose function is primarily to get the employee back into the 
workforce as quickly as possible, in the interests of resuming production of surplus for 
the employer. Moreover, and as a good example of capitalism’s penchant for generating 
even more opportunities for capital exploitation, wellness programs can invite privacy 
invasion and discriminatory employment practices, or can become data collecting tools 
sold to, and used by, third-party businesses for the purposes of advertising and selling 
products (Ajunwa, 2017). It is in these ways that counselling psychology aligns itself with 
the very systems that are causing human distress in persons in the first place. Carl 
Ratner (2018) describes psychological life under capitalism as ‘pathological normalcy’. 
He believes that neoliberal institutions encourage an individualism that opposes 
community and social cohesion, promoting anti-social thinking and behaviours, which in 
turn lead to a social callousness and cruelty. This is reflected in the pervasiveness of 
violence at all levels of society, including the exploitation of workers. Such stressors of 
normalcy create abnormal psychology, and yet psychologies merely contribute to the 
continuation of cycles of despair. Since misery and alienation can be monetized, it 
becomes possible to bring mental health into economic systems of prediction and 
control. Counselling psychology plays its role in assisting people to re-invigorate 
themselves to return to work. In this way, important political-economic questions 
regarding democracy and power are avoided through the lens of psychology which re-
locates social concerns within individual persons (Davies, 2015).  
Not only does the profession collaborate with capitalist interests in the circular 
business of supporting business, but they do so by constructing views of the individual in 
terms of the separate self (dualistically separate from the ‘other,’ a deadened world) that 
is regarded as not good enough or worthy enough in some way and that, therefore, 
becomes a site for the mining of surplus value.  
3.2.1. Individualism as an Empty Self 
Philip Cushman (1995) introduces the idea of the ‘empty self’ as the definitive 
form of being a human in modern times under capitalism:   
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The empty self is a way of being human; it is characterized by a pervasive 
sense of personal emptiness and is committed to the values of self-
liberation through consumption. The empty self is the perfect complement 
to an economy that must stave off economic stagnation by arranging for 
the continual purchase and consumption of surplus goods. Psychotherapy 
is the profession responsible for treating the unfortunate personal effects 
of the empty self without disrupting the economic arrangements of 
consumerism. Psychotherapy is permeated by the philosophy of self-
contained individualism, exists within the framework of consumerism, 
speaks the language of self-liberation, and thereby unknowingly 
reproduces some of the ills it is responsible for healing. (p. 6)  
The empty self, a modern post-war phenomenon, manifests itself in a multitude of ways, 
inhabiting every level of social intercourse. Within psychology one can see the focus on 
narcissism and borderline states and in the difficulties of establishing and maintaining 
intimate personal relationships (Rose, 1996). More generally, the empty self manifests in 
the rampant consumerism of modern neoliberal culture. Since wages have stagnated 
within the last 30 years or so, with the capitalist class becoming more and more wealthy, 
there has been an alarming increase in the use of credit to encourage continual 
spending, causing working families to incur more and more debt (Wolff, 2012). This has 
led to the extreme class divisions we see today, especially visible after the crash of 2008 
(Blakeley, 2019), and with the inequality inherent in class divisions, the rise in mental 
health issues (Wilkinson, 2009). Yet the psychologies, with their focus on individualism 
and materialism, and their failure to substantively address the social causes of human 
distress, especially as cultivated in our relations of work, continue to perpetuate unjust 
systems through their historical individualist understanding of the self and society, and 
through their everyday practices.   
3.2.2. Hegemony of Professionalization  
There are various ways to understand how psychology has been able to become 
such a dominant discourse for understanding modern life, and has become a significant 
feature of most helping professions’ understanding of the people they serve. Nikolas 
Rose (1998) suggests that it is psychology’s claim of professionalization that accounts 
for its current influence in so many domains of life experience, including that of the 
workplace. Analysis of professionalization reveals “the ways in which professionals 
legitimate their social powers through their claim to possess esoteric knowledge and 
technical capacities not available to others” (p. 84). They accomplish this by aligning 
their interests with other dominant social groups like politicians and business people. By 
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articulating a certain special kind of knowledge, advocating for specialized techniques 
that make problems intelligible to others, and transforming regulatory practices to reflect 
the truth of such endeavours, the psychological industry legitimizes itself as a serious 
and unquestioned authority, an essential expert voice in the struggle against mental 
distress (Rose, 1998). Not only do counsellors extend a discipline of self-surveillance 
and interminable improvement on persons with distress, problematizing aspects of 
everyday living under capitalism as pathologies suitable for the expert gaze, but the tools 
of psychological practices are adopted by many of the related helping professions (i.e. 
social workers, doctors, care workers, etc.) for the same ends and, more importantly, by 
the culture at large, but especially by the workplace. The colonization of the subjectivities 
of persons through the methods, performances, and procedures of psychology and the 
expert position of the helper takes shape in the person of the individual client “whose 
individuality is no longer ineffable, unique, and beyond knowledge, but can be known 
mapped, calibrated, evaluated, quantified, predicted, and managed” (Rose, 1998, p. 88). 
This critique extends to the analysis of the workplace and the alienation that it produces 
in and amongst workers. In these contexts, it is not merely the individual who is subject 
to the disciplinarian effects of psychology but also the spaces and relationships within 
the workplaces themselves (Rose, 1998). The psychologization of personalities, 
attitudes, initiative, engagement, satisfaction, and other measurements allows for 
calculation and management.  
Even more insidiously, the psychologization of the workplace invites 
opportunities for an accounting of risk, the complement of accountancy and 
management. This involves the documentation of aspects of peoples’ lives that are not 
in themselves problematic - family background, life-style choices, housing - but which 
become data for the prediction and control of persons in the future, thus opening new 
fields of purview for the psychological experts (Rose, 1998).  
3.2.3. The Individual as Deficient and the Expertise of the Counsellor 
Counselling psychology, for all its interest in positivity and emphasis on health, 
nevertheless adopts languages of deficiency in relation to those seeking assistance. 
Such language is often borrowed from the disease models of general medicine: patient, 
client, clinic, clinician, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, treatment plan, and other such 
words and phrases all bring to mind the notions of disorder and expert knowledge, with 
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the person seeking help as ‘object’, a mere thing to be repaired like a machine (Maddux, 
2005). The word client, commonly used for those seeking counselling, is derived from a 
late Middle English word which originated in the Latin cluens meaning ‘heeding’, from 
cluere ‘to hear or obey’. The word was originally used for persons under the protection 
and patronage of another. It, therefore, has a denotation of passivity, lack of agency, and 
of obedience to another. The other, of course, is the expert counsellor whose application 
of knowledge will have a curative effect, much as the administration of medicine by a 
doctor will cure a physical disease. The dominance of the medical model within many 
counselling practices helps in reproducing capitalist cultural norms by emphasizing the 
existence of classes of people who know and those who do not, those who work hard to 
maintain healthy norms and those who are incapable, insufficient, or too ignorant to 
know better. This reflects the meritocratic and plutocratic systems of political governance 
within current society, and counselling, despite calls to challenge unjust systemic 
inadequacies, essentially contributes to maintaining and propagating them through its 
practices.   
Indeed, psychology’s contribution to the furtherance of neoliberal narratives is 
often hidden and difficult to isolate. The application of power often does not rely on the 
usual conventional methods of prohibition, oppression, restriction, and regulation, but 
rather on a type of self-surveillance that shapes identity formation according to norms 
set by the society and its professional disciplines, like counselling psychology (White, 
2011). Aspects of the self and of experience are colonized and psychologized, made to 
be found deficient in comparison to neoliberal norms, with persons encouraged to 
discipline themselves to meet the expected societal standards. By redefining and 
transforming their naturally rich inner life into objects, mere commodities that function to 
advance the continued production of surplus value within workplace settings, people are 
persuaded to consume individualistic psychological labels and tricks, all of which are 
designed to grow, assist, transform, and improve the deficient self in the interests of 
further commodification and capital flow.  
The materialization and commodification of the psyche has been accomplished in 
different ways in psychology. For example, with the introduction of the intelligence test, 
Galton’s normal curve, developmental scales, and personality assessments, it became 
possible for the experts to objectify and quantify more and more of the human 
experience (Rose, 1998). With the decreasing influence and authority of religious and 
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moral imperatives that had once grown alongside the development of capitalism and its 
neoliberal philosophies, psychological discourse became the new way to instill the 
appropriate practices and disciplines required to live in society, with experts of 
subjectivity translating the existential questions of life into technical frameworks that 
provided comparable solutions to effectively manage perceived disfunction (Rose, 
1978). Counsellors often play the mediatory role between the objectives of the 
workplace and the life pursuits of the employee, “teaching the arts of self-realization that 
will enhance employees as individuals as well as workers” (Rose, 1978, p. 161). Thus, 
the goals of the employee are aligned with the goals of the workplace so that the (self) 
fulfillment of one is exactly the fulfillment of the other. 
3.2.4. Psychology and the Connection of the Individual to Labour 
From its very origin capitalism sought out psychological strategies for increasing 
surplus value from its workers. Early industry recognized the utility in psychological 
methods to make certain that manual labour was performed with optimal proficiency for 
the maximization of profit (Parker, 2007). Industrial psychology was deeply connected to 
the work of the industrialist Frederick Taylor (1856 - 1915) whose method was to 
atomize work process into compartmented, analysable parts so that a worker could be 
timed on how long it took them to accomplish a task. On this basis, methods were then 
developed to possibly improve on these functions, increasing the productivity of workers 
within less and less time. Similar to the behaviouristic models of human psychology 
popular at the time, Taylor based his analysis on prediction and control at the level of 
business operations (Parker, 2007). This method allows, therefore, for study of future 
opportunities as reflected in the performance plans, five-year plans, and similar 
projection methods of today’s modern business models (Parker, 2007). Such 
psychological approaches view the mind as a mechanistic and hierarchical machine, 
with the reliability of rationality at the top, and emotions, considered servient and 
capricious, well down at the bottom. These fundamentally patriarchal models reflected 
the way in which workplaces were themselves set up, always under the control and 
direction of the ‘rational’ and sensible manager or supervisor.32 A good example of 
Taylorism at work were the factories owned by Henry Ford, the famous American car 
                                                
32 See Chapter Two for a description of alienation of both the senses and the emotions under capitalist relations of 
production. 
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manufacturer. His application of the principles of Taylorism, in fact, became known as 
Fordism, and his methods strongly influenced capitalist business practices in the United 
States in particular (Komlosy, 2018).  
As pointed out in the last chapter, classism cannot be properly separated from 
racism and Ford’s business practices are a cogent example of this connection. For 
example, Parker (2007) notes that  
[o]nly when workers could speak good English and show a good enough 
knowledge of local dress codes, cultural mores and attitudes to work would 
they receive full pay. There has always been a close link between 
capitalism and racism, and the employment of ‘aliens’ in the new industries 
during the early development of capitalism also inspired employers to use 
divide-and-rule tactics to separate workers from each other. This is why 
alienation always includes peculiar racial fantasies about those who are 
‘other’ to Western selves. (p. 60) 
It was not just a matter of changing work environments that would improve productivity. 
In fact, psychology began to make the case that it was personal and individual factors 
that would make the difference in increasing surplus value for the employer. The so-
called Hawthorne studies conducted at the Western Electric Company manufacturing 
plant near Chicago between 1924 and 1933 (Olson, Verley, Santos, & Salas, 2004) 
provide a good example of the way in which it was increasingly believed that employee 
attitude and ‘mind-set’ influenced productivity. These studies involved putting attention 
on relationships and emotional experience, in addition to rationality, as a predictor of 
productivity. As a result, today not only has rationality been commodified and used to 
influence productivity but so too have emotions (Hochschild, 2011; Zembylas & Fendler, 
2007). For workers in various kinds of service industries this commodification turns into a 
type of performance, a form of ‘deep-acting’ which only functions to further alienate the 
person from their authentic feelings and experience of themselves (Parker, 2007).  
Both counselling psychology and education have been greatly influenced by 
Taylorism and industrial psychology. As discussed in the last chapter, counselling 
psychology in the United States originated within psychology proper, whereas in Canada 
counselling was rooted both in the professional psychology of the United States and also 
in the educational psychology of the universities. What has been termed the learning 
outcomes movement, for example, an educational practice now more in vogue but with a 
long history within all levels of educational institutions, is really just an extension of 
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Taylor’s ideas and principles (Stoller, 2015). It is based on Taylor’s notion that a well-run 
industrial system must establish ‘tasks’, or well-defined, quantifiable ends, so that 
individual and collective progress could be measured. These tasks originated with 
management with no consideration given to the various needs or requirements of the 
workers, and it was expected that workers strictly conform to the narrow tasks assigned 
without deviation (Stoller, 2015). Similarly, these principles offer to modern education 
administrators certainty, repeatability, and predictability, reflecting the dualistic ontology 
of a division between body and mind, and self from the world, particularly in the way that 
“education is that thing done to students which results in them ‘knowing’ the subject 
matter” (Stoller, 2015, p. 327). So, not only was Taylorism, and the psychologies of the 
time that supported it, essential to the increased growth of modern business but it was 
also highly influential within educational administration and practice. It was historically 
within this societal and institutional mix that counselling psychology was developed.   
Similar to the learning outcomes movement within education, counselling theory 
and practice often enthusiastically endorses these same kinds of teleological, 
technocratic constructs within its praxis. Especially when dealing with third-party 
interests, there are usually requirements to provide reports which outline diagnoses, 
treatment plans, goals, and progress. These practices not only create hierarchies of 
knowledge, requiring theories which position persons as deficient in character, skills, or 
capacity, but they also privilege ‘insider’ expert knowledge by those who are perceived 
to somehow know better. 
3.3. Reproduction of Class Division within Counselling Practices  
The great American pragmatist and philosopher of education John Dewey clearly 
saw the implications of technocratic influences on all aspects of organized social life, 
including schooling. He critiqued Taylor’s ideal (capitalist) system as a system akin to 
slavery33 so that “the skills and attitudes necessary to support this ideal system are 
determined and articulated by a set of expert managers - an aristocratic class [emphasis 
added]” (Stoller, 2015, p. 327). This is as true in counselling theory and practice as well 
as it is within education. By reproducing the role of the expert within counselling practice, 
                                                
33 David Graeber (2006) makes a direct connection between slavery and capitalism, since capacity to work is the basis of 
both forms of labour. This comparison is even more persuasive when one considers the inability of most people to afford 
much more than necessities and lodging with their wages, without going into debt for anything extra. 
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which is, in essence, the reproduction of the class division found within society as a 
whole, counsellors are complicit in replicating the structures of the dominant capitalist 
culture and, as a consequence, inviting and normalizing the conditions of alienation.  
As mentioned previously, counselling psychology is a product of educational 
institutions which have been heavily influenced pedagogically by Taylorism (Mather & 
Seifert, 2011; Stoller, 2015) and countenanced by the notion that expert groups of 
people are best positioned to direct the actions of others. Fundamentally, it reflects 
societal norms wherein it is accepted that expert elites are the most capable to run 
society and its institutions, including the workplace, a reflection not of democracy and 
the principles of equality, but of a pernicious form of oligarchy.34 Under these 
circumstances, then, it was not surprising that counselling psychology adopted 
theoretical models which perpetuated both the institutions of oligarchic power but also 
the methods and practices which assist in reinforcing capitalist power relations and 
neoliberal philosophy. This occurred within a complex interface of individualistic, 
materialistic, and mechanistic philosophies that arose from around the time of 
Descartes,35 all of which colluded with Calvinistic ‘work ethic’ doctrines, propelling 
capitalism to its position in the world, and giving the ‘psych’ arts in general their 
philosophical character. Thus, the business, teaching, and propagation of psychology 
within Western capitalist (I cannot comment on how Eastern psychologies have 
impacted the development of economies in the East) society became a mutual and inter-
dependent reflection of the same economic and social relations found within the society 
itself, quite deliberately espousing a similar individualism through acontextual and 
ahistorical explanations of human distress and suffering. Moreover, the techniques of 
‘cure’ emphasized change regimens and strategies (‘treatment plans’) that perpetuated 
endless cycles of psychological inadequacy, dependency on experts, and incessant 
consumption in its users. In this way, psychological practices reflect the wider society, 
which in turn is transformed by psychological ways of viewing the world, relationships, 
and the individual. Society’s individualism is fed by psychology’s insistence that mental 
                                                
34 See my comments on democracy in Footnote 5. 
35 For a rare refutation of the charge that Descartes was an individualist of the mental see Ferraiolo, Owens, & Heil (1996) 
and for a response see Moya (1997). 
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distress is a private affair reflecting personal weakness or defectiveness, only solvable 
through compliance to industry sponsored cures (Rosenthal et. al., 2016). 
It is within these hegemonies of so-called individuality and personal choice that 
attention is diverted away from the real causes of human mental distress located in 
unjust and alienated social relations, most notably within those of the modern Western 
workplace where we spend most of our lives, and instead towards individual culpability 
and brokenness. Moreover, these problems are best handled by an elite class of 
professionals, counselling psychologists and other helping professionals, who have 
access to special expert knowledge that will solve our issues, if dutifully applied and 
practiced. In practical and realistic terms, however, most of these practices are ways of 
self-surveillance and self-discipline (to use Foucault’s terms) in order to encourage 
persons to continue to produce surplus value for the capitalist classes. I agree with 
Rosenthal (2016) when he asserts that it is not bad choices, poor parenting, wonky brain 
chemistry, faulty genetics, or accidents that are the best predictors of distress, but rather 
one’s position within the social hierarchy. 
3.4. Couples and Family Counselling Maintain Capitalist Relations of 
Power 
Social hierarchy is significantly determined by class position as established and 
shaped within the workplace relationships of a society. Of course, the dynamics of these 
relationships are complex; nevertheless, even if one were to suggest, as a good systems 
theorist of one type or another might, that perhaps family systems (Nichols, 2010) 
instead are the cause of human distress (as opposed to mere individual failings), it 
would still be difficult to separate that analysis from the pervasive social divisions of 
working life within neoliberal society (Fish, 1993).36 Historically, the modern family 
structure also appeared within the increasing influence of capitalistic modes of 
production. People moved from villages and towns, where more communal, expansive 
forms of family life had existed to provide emotional, material, and social support, to live 
in big cities in order to secure employment within the industrial factories and businesses 
and where, consequently, the marriage partner became the sole source of any needed 
                                                
36 See Parker & McDowell (2017) for a consideration of how to integrate family therapy within a consideration of broader 
social structures and power relations. 
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supports (Rosenthal, 2016). The idea of romantic love was constructed around the same 
time as these transitions. Coonz (2006), for example, notes that  
[t]he new sentimentalization of married love in the Victoria period was a 
radical social experiment. The Victorians were the first people in history to 
try to make marriage the pivotal experience in people’s lives and married 
love the principal focus of their emotions, obligations, and dissatisfactions. 
Despite the stilted language of the era, Victorian marriage harbored all the 
hopes for romantic love, intimacy, personal fulfillment, and mutual 
happiness that were to be expected more openly and urgently during the 
early twentieth century. (Coontz, 2006, pp. 177-178)   
This description reveals the social movement away from communal expressions of 
family life (and thus a more social sense of self) to an individualistic, isolationistic, and 
almost utilitarian conceptualization of the family unit, based on the individual’s internal 
feeling of romantic love.  
Counselling psychology, like all of the psychologies and psychiatry, has been a 
supporter of the ‘traditional’ family, along with its gender roles, in order to serve the 
needs of capitalist workplaces (Parker, 2007). However, adherence to strict gender roles 
can be the cause of many of the problems which present in the counsellor’s office. The 
cultivation of romantic notions of what a male or a female should be like within a 
relationship often leads to conflict, anxiety, loneliness within the relationship, in addition 
to other challenges. As Rosenthal (2016) bluntly summarizes the matter: 
Behind the myth of the happy family are two people who are socialized to 
be opposites, crammed in a box, subjected to falling living standards, rising 
debt and social insecurity. They are expected to raise children, who have 
lots of needs, and to do this with no outside support. Add bouts of 
unemployment, injury, or illness. Add some dependent relatives. Then 
make it difficult for these people to leave. Insist that they solve their own 
problems, and if they cannot, then it must be their fault or their partner’s 
fault. This is a recipe for disaster, as unrelenting stresses build to the point 
of explosion. (Myth Personal Life, Shame, para. 3)  
Just as the modern family functions to reproduce class consciousness and 
certain prescribed expectations regarding life course, it also creates gender roles which 
often cause intractable conflicts between persons. Prior to the last century, monogamy 
and its ethical accomplice, fidelity, were manifestations of lineage and property rights, 
and the presence of love within such relationships was irrelevant (Perel, 2017). As 
conventional ideas changed with the dawn of capitalism, love would become the main 
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channel for marriage, instead of social prestige or entitlement, but with the same 
requirements for fidelity. As a result, responsibility for any problems that might occur 
within the contemporary relationship are borne by the individuals within it and the 
solution to those problems are worked on individually or, from a family systems 
perspective, between the partners. When, therefore, the energy of romantic love has 
fallen away after a number of years, the rigid standardization of gender roles couched 
within the stresses of workaday life are causative of much relational distress. Capitalism 
insists on the modern family unit for its own ends - the production of workers - and 
counselling psychology obliges it in this regard. The family unit must therefore be saved 
at all cost and the counsellor has, as expert, the exclusive tools to assist in 
accomplishing this goal. 
Whether a counsellor meets with individuals, couples, or families, the practices 
are often such that they perpetuate individualistic understandings of mental distress, with 
no real or meaningful consideration given to contextual factors in the development of 
issues. One way in which this manifests is in the attempt to ‘diagnose’ individuals’ 
complaints according to systems of categorization aligned with medical models of 
disease. A significant resource for this approach is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(5th ed.) (DSM-V) 37 produced by the American Psychiatric Association, and it is 
instructive to consider this document as a prominent example of the way in which 
individualism, materialist biological notions of disorders, capitalism, and the propagation 
of the technocrat with their expert knowledge, all conspire together to advance capitalist 
interests while simultaneously obscuring the social determinants of distress people 
experience within modern society. 
3.5. DSM-V and the Repair of the Separate Self 
My intent on reviewing the DSM-V in the following discussion is to show how the 
classification of mental distress exemplifies the argument of this chapter, that is, that 
counselling practices, based on materialistic and individualistic conceptions of the self 
and its relationship to society, is in fact a collaborator in the capitalist and neoliberal 
project. Admittedly, in my experience many counsellors do not use diagnostic systems 
                                                
37See American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). 
Washington, D.C: Author.   
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like the DSM-V.38 However, the pervasiveness of its categories within the psyche of the 
culture often manifests in the ways people present their problems, conceptualize their 
issues (particularly in this age of Google and voluminous self-help materials), and in their 
expectation for ‘cure’ (how many times have I heard people say “He’s so OCD” or 
“Depression is a chemical imbalance”?). The DSM-V very often shapes conversations 
and narratives around mental distress, despite counselling’s more progressive attempts 
to focus on the strengths and resources of the individual rather than on their 
shortcomings. Indeed, in many instances, clients are sent for counselling after being 
given a diagnosis (and prescribed some medication) by a general practitioner or a 
psychiatrist, most of the latter group of professionals no longer having interest in 
‘counselling’ clients. Furthermore, insurance companies, wellness programs, and cases 
involving legal matters very often demand from counsellors specific diagnostic 
categories, and treatment plans based on them, requiring the nomenclature of the DSM-
V, or systems of categorization like it. 
The classification of mental disorders or diseases is not a new phenomenon, and 
it has a rich and oftentimes appalling history. Despite common perceptions that these 
classificatory systems are objective and scientific, based on strong empirical evidence, 
they have always been socially constructed and historically grounded. A good example 
is that “during slavery days, experts argued that Black people were psychologically 
suited for a life of slavery, so there must be something wrong with those who rebelled. In 
1851, the diagnosis of Drapetomania (runaway fever) was applied to slaves who kept 
trying to escape” (Rosenthal, 2016, Mental Illness, Cuts, para. 5). This ‘disease’ 
disappeared for obvious reasons but nevertheless its very existence is instructive of the 
close ties historically between psychological hegemony, race, and capitalism. 
Initially, the first articulations of the DSM, both the DSM-I and DSM-II, were 
rooted in psychoanalytic theory, but eventually its writers moved away from 
psychoanalytic conceptions in attempts to provide a more atheoretical and bio-psycho-
social orientation (Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013). Yet, these attempts were unsuccessful 
                                                
38 The publication of the DSM-V did not go unopposed. The British Psychological Society, for example, citing concerns that 
“clients and the general public are negatively affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and 
normal responses to their experiences” and that “the putative diagnoses presented in DSM-V are clearly based largely on 
social norms, with 'symptoms' that all rely on subjective judgements, with little confirmatory physical 'signs' or evidence of 
biological causation” among other issues, wrote to the American Psychiatric Association regarding these matters prior to 
the DSM-V’s publication in 2013. See: https://dxrevisionwatch.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/dsm-5-2011-bps-response.pdf 
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and whatever one thought of the previous psychoanalytically influenced earlier forms of 
the manual, the later versions (DSM-III and DSM- IV) lost their narrative slant to become 
a more symptom-documentary approach (Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013). The manual 
sought to align itself with the disease models of the physical sciences, a reflection of 
psychiatry’s long-standing desire to be seen as a legitimate and empirically-based 
science on level with the physical sciences, and with medicine in particular.   
Moreover, the dubious movement toward a disease-based, and therefore 
acontextual, model of mental problems had some even more insidious ramifications. 
Since the disease model of human illness in general is connected to the dispensing of 
medications, the categorization of mental problems as ‘illness’ became fertile ground for 
the colonization of people’s concerns by the pharmaceutical industry. Not only did the 
pharmacological industry marry itself to the discourse around what drugs are available to 
‘cure’ mental problems, but the industry became active in defining what is normal and 
what is not normal, and thus what constitutes mental disorder. The extent of this has 
been more than egregious. Particularly in the last few years there has been increasing 
recognition and criticism of the role that pharmaceutical companies have had in the 
decision making processes regarding the definition of mental problems in the West, and 
the manner in which they impact jurisprudence, insurance claims, mental health 
research, and treatment (Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013). 
3.5.1.  Toward Disease and Disorder Models of Human Distress 
The disease model of human mental distress is a reflection of the psychiatric 
(and subsequently, the psychological) community’s need to be seen as a legitimate 
medical sub-specialty. Psychology in general, and to some extent (although more 
predominantly in the United States) counselling psychology in particular, gladly adopted 
the organic explanation of mental problems, along with the medical languaging that 
accompanied it (Albee, 2000). This was for three main reasons. First, several of the 
major theories of psychology, and thus of psychopathology, were rooted in biologically 
based understandings of the psyche. Second, there was a need for psychology in all its 
various forms, and to a greater or lesser extent, to appear scientific in order to establish 
its legitimacy. This became as true for psychology as it had been for psychiatry, which 
gradually abandoned its focus on talk therapy in favour of prescribing medications 
(Humphreys, 1996). Third, the reality of everyday practice for counsellors is that it is 
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entrenched within delivery systems that demand medical-type explanations of mental 
distress (Wampold, Ahn, & Coleman, 2001). As noted previously, even the language of 
much of counselling psychology reflects the medicalization and pathologizing of human 
distress. This is the language of what Maddux (2005) calls ‘the illness ideology’. Thus we 
can find terms like symptom, disorder, pathology, illness, diagnosis, treatment, doctor, 
patient, clinic, clinical, and clinician within the texts, journals, educational facilities, and 
places of work of counsellors (Maddux, 2005). In this regard, it is important to note that 
adopting a medical model does not necessarily imply biological explanations of distress 
nor the use of medications to alleviate that distress. The medical model is as much a 
matter of praxis and methodology more than anything else. Specifically, like the medical 
model, it contains five components: the presentation of a complaint to the therapist, the 
labeling of the complaint with psychological nomenclature, the theoretical basis for 
effecting change, implementation of specific methods connected to the theory, and, 
finally, the attribution of any improvement to the methods employed. It is the specificity of 
the last component that gives authority to the methods used rather than to contextual 
factors (Wampold et al., 2001).  
Despite the work of many psychologists to provide alternative models of human 
suffering, these are generally not recognized by third-party payers who inevitably insist 
on diagnoses, prognoses, and treatment plans. As a result, as Albee (2000) points out, 
the inclination of the mental health practitioner to align with biologically-based 
explanations of mental distress has political consequences, perpetuating systems that 
treat individuals as deficit-based and responsible for their own distress. He comments 
that 
[t]here are major political differences between a medical/organic/brain-
defect model to explain mental disorders and a social-learning, stress-
related model. The former is supported by the ruling class because it does 
not require social change and major readjustments to the status quo. The 
social model, on the other hand, seeks to end or to reduce poverty with all 
its associated stresses, as well as discrimination, exploitation, and 
prejudices as other major sources of stress leading to emotional problems. 
By aligning itself with the conservative view of causation, clinical 
psychology has joined the forces that perpetuate social injustice. (p. 248) 
Although there are no reliable biological markers for any known mental ‘illness’, 
including schizophrenia, psychiatry has endorsed and popularized the notion that mental 
problems are biologically based. This form of reductionism has been seen in the oft-
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quoted assertion, for example, frequently heard within public discourse, that depression 
is caused by a chemical imbalance in the brain, despite the fact that there is no evidence 
for such a claim (Deacon & Baird, 2009). Yet, this faux-belief is enough for psychiatrists, 
bolstered by the check-mark accounting of symptoms, to prescribe a drug like Prozac for 
the diagnosis of major depression. These practices clearly discount contextual, 
historical, and social determinants of the source of concerns, with the result that 
systemic issues are not challenged (Davies, 2015). Other examples exist. Cosgrove and 
Wheeler (2013) describe how the inclusion of menstrual distress in women as a mood 
disorder, called Post Menstrual Distress Disorder in the DSM-V, “undermines an 
appreciation for the role that stress, sexual abuse, and violence play in women’s 
experiences of emotional distress” and that in categorizing PMDD as a mood disorder it 
“has marginalized the role of relational and other contextual factors in women’s 
experiences of emotional distress” (Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013, p. 100). 
3.5.2. Conflicts of Interest: Capitalism at Work 
Cosgove and Wheeler (2013) have documented the conflicts of interest that are 
apparent in the constitution of the committee members that were on the DSM-IV team. It 
was found that the American Psychiatric Association (APA) receives considerable drug 
industry funding and that, for example, all the members of the 2006 DSM panels on 
Schizophrenia and Psychotic Disorders and Mood Disorders, problems normally treated 
with medication, had some type of financial ties to the pharmacological industry 
(Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013). 
Despite attempts by the APA to appear transparent in these matters by 
advocating for a mandatory disclosure policy, with the expected result that those with 
industry ties would not put themselves forward on the committee, there was, in fact, a 
21% increase of those with such relationships between the construction of the DSM-IV 
and the DSM-V so that 69% of the membership reported having connections to the 
pharmaceutical industry (Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013). These problems are not merely a 
matter of particular individuals’ lack of ethical or personal scruples; rather objectivism 
becomes an institutional problem. Hence, institutional corruption can be contrasted to 
individual corruption through a recognition that the former produces an ‘improper 
dependence’ that subverts the organization’s goals and reduces public trust, all in the 
interests of profit-seeking over truth-seeking (Cosgrove & Wheeler, 2013). 
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The consequence of the institutional corruption particularized in the collusion 
between psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical industry is the creation of new ‘diseases’ 
and ‘disorders’, a colonization and commodification of the human psyche in the interests 
of making profits. For example, despite the research (and the universal experience of 
many) indicating that people may develop culturally appropriate sadness or depression 
after many different varieties of losses, the DSM-V now diagnoses such symptoms as a 
mental disorder after only a two-week period (Horwitz, 2015). What were once 
considered problems of living, which include not only the natural and normal responses 
to life like anxiety or sadness, but also the challenges that accompany any life journey, 
like indecision or lack of clarity of purpose, have become diseases requiring medication, 
sold, of course, for exorbitant profits by the industry. Persons’ distress, as well as any 
perceived ‘stuckness,’ have become sites for mining wealth, conduits for the 
accumulation and flow of capital, with the resultant enrichment of a small minority. By 
propagating a disease model of mental issues, and with the increasing encroachment of 
such classifications into both ordinary life problems and existential concerns, structural 
and systemic contributing factors of people’s issues are ignored or considered irrelevant. 
Since mental issues are decontextualized, medicalized, and stripped of any social or 
environmental factors, any unjust systemic circumstances are not dealt with, or 
trivialized. This means that the alienation felt by workers, revealed in varying forms of 
mental distress and the attempts to alleviate it, is viewed by the hegemonic powers as 
individual, isolated, and personal responses having nothing to do with the unjust and 
undemocratic work arrangements of capitalism (Roberts, 2015).   
3.5.3. DSM-V Ignores Culture 
The DSM-V, in its attempt to provide an objective and scientific account of the 
presence of mental disorder, does not take into account contextual factors at all. As a 
consequence, there has been much criticism of this absence from many different circles 
within and outside psychology, but especially from feminist and multicultural writers. The 
DSM-V is a document that reflects the elite privilege of White, educated men who have 
based their categories on long-standing Western dualisms between mind and body, the 
separation of emotions from cognition and rationality, and all of these from the body itself 
(Wampold et al., 2001). This approach, while ignoring the influence of relationships 
embodied within cultural and societal practices, are themselves deeply entrenched 
within culture-bound systems that reflect materialist, individualist, and capitalist 
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understandings of persons. Systems of categorization of human distress into symptoms 
and syndromes are not representative of an ‘objective’, empirically-based reality but are 
instead ways of establishing hierarchies of power that assist in maintaining the 
movement of capital. Mental disorders and their categorization in manuals like the DSM-
V cannot be thought of as actual facts regarding the psyche but rather as social artifacts 
constructed with the same intentions that race, gender, and class are created, which is 
to establish and maintain the ideology and power of certain particular individuals within 
society (Maddux, 2005), a kind of cultural colonialism of the mind.  
3.6. Counselling as a Reflection of Capitalist and Alienated Society 
The practice of counselling psychology, originating in an era which saw the rise 
of capitalism within society and of a scientific materialism that de-emphasized 
community but instead focused on the isolated individual, should be viewed, from my 
perspective, as a highly politicized endeavour. My own assessment is that attempting to 
couch the project in scientific, and therefore ostensibly objective, terms, counselling 
psychology’s methods and practices reflect and perpetuate the capitalist status quo. 
Psychology is not politically neutral, although it is perceived to be so by many students 
of the discipline and certainly by the general public (Roberts, 2015). Like psychiatry and 
psychology before it, counselling psychology has fought to be recognized as a 
legitimately scientific practice and to establish its own professional identity (Richardson, 
1993). Primarily, it has distinguished itself from these other professions by focusing on 
the health and wellness aspects of human experience, the strengths and resources of 
clients, and on ‘positive’ psychology (Bedi et al., 2011). Although these attempts are 
superficially encouraging, they are, like the traditional psychologies, nevertheless 
fundamentally based on some unique, and politically charged, assumptions (Davies, 
2015). The primary assumption is that the locus of psychological attention must be on 
the individual to the relative exclusion of social forces (Roberts, 2015). This flows directly 
from capitalist and neoliberal doctrines of the primacy of the individual self above all 
else, situating any problems as defects of character. For example, as briefly mentioned 
previously, one can see the deep connection between political philosophy and 
psychology reflected in the words of Margaret Thatcher from 1978, in an interview with 
the Catholic Herald, where she proclaims that poverty is really nothing other than a flaw 
in fundamental character, a personality defect (Catholic Herald, 22 December, 1978). 
This statement can be compared to the views of Martin Seligman, considered the major 
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force behind the official positive psychology movement, who, when asked what he 
thought is contributing to the rise of depression within our society, remarked that it was a 
pervasive victimology which encourages a culture of helplessness when circumstances 
are not favourable, instead of the recognition that the issue could be one of poor 
character and bad decisions (Seligman, 2009).   
The second assumption that follows from the first is that the business of 
psychological research is to discover laws of nature, forever true and present, that bear 
on human beings at all times and places (Roberts, 2015). The results of such 
assumptions is that psychological constructs like the self, personality, attitudes, 
intelligence, and mental illness, to name a few, are isolated from their historical and 
socio-cultural contexts and treated as independent facts about the world. Consequently, 
psychology effectively obscures the ideological systemic forces that are in reality 
problematic by interiorizing them within the bodies of individual persons (Roberts, 2015). 
Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the individual to subject themselves to the scrutiny 
of expert observers whose job is to provide solutions with their specialized knowledge. 
These solutions ultimately require personal, individual responsibility for change, thus 
removing all accountability for change from the unjust system within which the person 
lives (Sugarman, 2015). Despite the fact that capitalist workplaces generate alienation in 
its many different forms, psychology does not look to these sites to address the problem. 
On the contrary, the person is expected to ‘change’ or ‘grow’, or in some way 
accumulate new coping skills, that will help them to accommodate to the workplace, thus 
removing all culpability from the workplace itself. 
Moreover, resistance, non-conformity, or anti-social tendencies on the part of 
persons within the workplace are pathologized as personal foibles instead of a natural 
human reaction to conditions that are oppressive, discriminatory, or simply unjust 
(Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013). Our ancient emotional networks that evolved within 
communities of co-operation, not of competition, and which naturally respond to 
inequities, are dismissed or punished, and must therefore be supressed (Glantz & 
Bernhard, 2018). Disengagement is seen by the business world as a kind of corporate 
virus which must be stamped out at all cost, not by addressing systemic issues, but by 
colonizing the minds and bodies of individual employees. Roberts (2015) points out that 
“in effect psychology contributes to the privatising of responsibility in a world where 
transnational corporations behave with no responsibility. In the midst of the mess which 
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envelops us, good adjustment is mapped out by psychologists as happiness not protest” 
(p. 24). This is fundamentally a political project. Psychology is designed to supress any 
outrage or natural human emotion that expresses distress at the current system, and by 
using an individualistic reductionism, under the guise and authority of natural science, 
silence any voices that might threaten the accumulation of surplus value by the capitalist 
classes. 
3.7. Toward an Authentic Empty Self 
Cushman’s (1995) ‘empty self’ is a powerful metaphor for the current condition of 
persons within our society, representing as it does a kind of dark and shadowy realm of 
never-ending consumption in the quest for peace and happiness, a reflection of the 
individualism fostered by the neoliberal agenda. The Buddhists call this the Realm of the 
Hungry Ghosts, a state of being wherein urges and desires are never quite met, cravings 
for new objects are insatiable, and where there is no end to it all and therefore no real 
rest or satisfaction. We have seen how relationship and connections with others and the 
natural world are, through alienation and commodity fetishism, reduced to mere 
appearances and instead transferred over to the accumulation of objects in the pursuit of 
fulfillment. Capitalism not only extracts surplus value from the bodies of people but, 
through the alienation that arises from disconnections with life activity, it also mines the 
emotional and psychological lives of people, with the psychologies as its accomplice. 
Yet these shadow ways of being in the world, including the manifestation of the 
empty self, are the obverse of the true empty self, what the Buddhist traditions call the 
Dharmakaya, the Buddha nature or essential self, which itself is often described as 
sunyata or emptiness. Other Eastern traditions know this essential self as 
consciousness (Wilber, 1979). In the Vedanta traditions of India, the supreme nature 
found in all things (and ultimately, as all things) is called Brahman, and though 
indescribable, is nevertheless the source of the qualities of sat-chit-ananda: being, 
consciousness, and bliss. It may be worth noting that bliss can best be translated as 
happiness or, even better, peace (Spira & Russell, 2016). This essential self is empty 
because it has no discernable objective qualities. It is by definition the Subject and so 
any qualities, being themselves objective, cannot define the subject. This consciousness 
is much like the space which holds all things within its embrace but is itself not a thing. 
No-thing, or empty. 
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Thus, underneath the false social self that characterizes 21st century capitalist 
society, a kind of false self that in fact denies the social in any truly engaged human 
sense, and beneath the empty self of the individual driven by the accumulation of 
commodities to satisfy its longing for connection, there lies a true empty self. Since this 
self is described as happiness, or peace, it is an antithesis to the internalized 
commodified self, perpetually driven by desire and dissatisfaction. A connection with the 
true empty self provides an almost immediate transformative escape from the clutches of 
the neoliberal agenda on all levels. This self, which I name as consciousness itself and 
which cannot be mined as a commodity because it is not an object, provides a gateway, 
concurrent with system change, to a radical shift in both the individual and society. It is 
within these two realms, the inner and the outer, that the helping professions must focus 
in order to fulfill their commitments to personal and social justice. 
Although this proposal may sound as though I am returning to a panentheistic 
Hegelianism, or even to a pure idealistic notion of the place of consciousness as the 
world, it should rather be seen as a re-introduction of consciousness to its proper place 
within materiality, and vice versa. This is more in line with Spinoza, but it need not 
involve religious concepts. I argue in the next chapter that panpsychism not only offers 
an account of consciousness in the world but that it also provides a basis for new ways 
of seeing the world and constructing notions of social justice.   
3.8. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that counselling psychology, like many of the 
psychological professions along with educational institutions, has developed its practices 
concurrent with, and indeed grounded in, the practices of capitalism, neoliberalism, 
philosophical materialism, and individualism. These forces conspire to produce a view of 
the world that minimizes community and promotes an atomized understanding of the 
individual; encourages competition over co-operation; creates classes through the 
division of labour in workplaces based on the old feudalism, despite the appeal to 
increased democracy in society; and views individuals as commodified machines from 
which to mine labour for the production of goods, in order to sell those same 
commodities back to people in the fulfillment of constructed needs. Despite a legitimate 
critique that counselling psychology’s engagement with social justice lacks a 
philosophical foundation (Thompson & Shermis, 2004), I suggest that the reason for the 
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lack of an explicit elucidation in this regard is the profession’s alliance with neoliberalism 
and capitalism which serves to obscure its complicity in perpetuating the very 
psychological concerns it purports to relieve. Social justice issues, like opposition to 
discrimination and the accentuation of multiculturalism, have been welcome areas of 
concern within the profession; yet, they will not be properly addressed until there are 
systemic changes away from the societal organizations and institutions that generate 
them. I have argued that, similar to the world of politics and climate change issues, 
reformist playing around the edges of counselling practice is insufficient for real 
alignment with social justice. I have pointed out that the way in which psychological 
practices are robustly aligned with neoliberalism can be seen in the value of the 
individual as a decontextualized site for commodification, the use of the disease model 
as an explanation of mental distress with a disinterest in environmental factors, the role 
of the counsellor as expert, and the association of the profession with practices that are 
connected to business interests. I used the utilization of the DSM-V as representative of 
some of these concerns. Not only do these practices mirror the current neoliberal 
imperative of individualism and the primacy of the so-called free market found within the 
dominant society, but they actively perpetuate the commodification of the individual at all 
levels of their being, leading to their existence as ‘empty selves’. Finally, I introduced the 
idea that the empty self can also be viewed as the shadow side of the true empty self, 
the intrinsic nature of things including humans, which I describe as consciousness. A 
turn toward consciousness serves as a gateway to emancipation from within, just as 
system change serves the same purpose from without. 
Consciousness is a gateway because it re-introduces that which fundamentally 
connects us to all. Since it lacks objective qualities - it is the subject, and not an object -
there is no-thing inherent within it to separate one from another. Being no-thing in itself 
denies the possibility of its commodification and thus it opens up a sphere of freedom 
from oppression and exploitation. An exploration of consciousness, particularly through a 
panpsychic world-view, represents an opposition to materialism per se and provides an 
alternative perspective on the world as vitally alive and precious. The world is no longer 
seen as a mere lifeless resource to exploit for profit. Human beings can also no longer 
be seen in such a way. While systemic change, as exemplified by the democratization of 
the workplace as a means to eliminating alienation and the mental health issues that 
arise from it, is the way to liberty from the outside, an understanding of consciousness 
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as the intrinsic nature of things is the path to emancipation from within. These dual- 
aspect pathways could serve as the philosophical basis for a professional praxis aligned 
with social justice.   
 
 





















“Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is 
absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else.” 
Erwin Schrödinger 
 
"I think I'll go and meet her," said Alice… 
"You can't possibly do that," said the Rose, "I should advise you to walk the other way." 
This sounded nonsense to Alice, so she said nothing, but set off at once towards the 
Red Queen. To her surprise, she lost sight of her in a moment.  











Chapter 4: Consciousness 
4.1. Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter I move from the realm of broad systemic critique centered on the 
workplace to that which grounds the human qualities of choice, compassion, ethics, 
relationship, creativity, and imagination, all of which are required to propel society toward 
democracy and justice. As mentioned in Chapter One of this dissertation, it requires 
agency and intention, grounded within subjectivity, to challenge alienating conditions. 
These dimensions of being are found within the experience of consciousness. If there is 
anything that we might say is real and definitive about our experience in the world it is 
surely that of experience itself, or that we are conscious (Goff, 2017; Karman, 2011; 
Strawson, 2006). The fact of conscious experience itself is the foundation for anything 
that can be known. Even to deny the fact of consciousness (which some do, like the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett) or to explain it away as a species of illusion, one must be 
conscious to do so (Sheldrake, 2012). It is curious, then, that consciousness is so little 
discussed in psychological literature outside the field of consciousness studies.39 It may 
be that the subject matter is too difficult to grasp. David Chalmers has famously called 
the subject of consciousness ‘the hard problem’, and for good reason (Chalmers, 1995). 
Philosophers, and others, cannot agree what consciousness is, where it is located, how 
it came to be, whether it is material or something unrelated to matter, why there is 
consciousness as an evolutionary fact in the first place, when it came into being, if it ever 
did, and how it aligns with nature. The philosopher Philip Goff puts the problem in focus 
when he comments that  
[m]ind and matter don’t seem to fit in the same world; this is the essence 
of the mind-body problem. Space-filling solid stuff doesn’t seem to belong 
with invisible inner-experiencing. The neural processing of the brain is best 
known through third-person scientific investigation, while the subjective 
first-person perspective of the mind is best known through introspection. 
How are we to make sense of these seemingly incongruous things being 
unified aspects of a single reality? (pp. 1-2)   
                                                
39 As I make clear later on, I make a distinction between the experience of consciousness, experiencing itself as it were, 
and the contents of consciousness, whether this be dreams, thoughts, feelings, memories, and so on. The latter have 
certainly been topics of analysis for psychology. 
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Hence, while the sciences have been very successful in explaining phenomena 
in third-person, empirical, and quantitative ways, it has been unable to match that 
success with consciousness due to its qualitative and first-person nature (Goff, 2017). 
Yet an account of consciousness must be given if one considers oneself a materialist, 
one of the most prominent strands of the modern neoliberal worldview, and one agrees 
that consciousnesses is indeed an actual experiential phenomenon in the material 
universe (Strawson, 2006).   
As an aside, I do not intend in this chapter to wander too far into the areas of 
pantheism or panentheism, the more spiritually oriented perspectives of consciousness 
found the world over, except to draw relevant parallels to the panpsychic view I propose. 
I concentrate on a few assumptions which I believe are required for an appreciation of 
the main thrust of my argument that consciousness, and its place in the world (or is it the 
world’s place in it?), is a vital and necessary component for positioning justice concerns 
within the helping professions and, more broadly, for an ethical and contrarian position 
against the capitalist appropriation of the field. In other words, I see a re-positioning of 
consciousness as a central feature of our understanding of reality as a means by which 
the helping professions, and counselling psychology specifically, may extricate 
themselves from the clutches of capitalism to provide a truly emancipatory service for 
people in distress.   
First, as mentioned above, I would want to assert the uncontestable datum of 
consciousness itself, a fact that lies as the foundation of all our experience of the world. 
It is, therefore, a proper object40 of study and indeed must be accounted for in any 
theory of the natural world and, by implication, the psychological and social world. The 
materialism of today’s neoliberal world, which otherwise reduces nature and human 
beings to mechanistic, atomized, and determined resources, provides a primary site for 
analysis of the place of consciousness in reality. Despite materialists’ tendency to 
address it as almost an afterthought (I shall talk more about emergentism a little later), it 
is clear that consciousness “is the obligatory starting point for any theory that can 
legitimately claim to be ‘naturalistic’ because experience is itself the fundamental given 
                                                
40 Of course, consciousness is not an object at all but pure subjectivity. Discussions of consciousness are difficult even in 
linguistic terms because of its unique nature. Consequently, upon review of the literature, one can discern different ways of 
speaking about consciousness, and one cannot help but think that people are often ‘talking past’ each other when the topic 
is discussed. 
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natural fact; it is a very old point that there is nothing more certain than the existence of 
experience” (Strawson et. al, 2006, p. 4). Consciousness should be seen as a 
phenomenon that invites study on its own terms and not reduced to the biological 
explanations of third-person observational science (Goff, 2017).  
Second, in the interests of defining what I mean by consciousness, I would 
broadly agree that consciousness means that there is something that it is like to be a 
thing (Nagel, 1974), that there is an inner phenomenal life as well as an external 
noumenal one. This definition represents a simple dual-aspect monism, and although I 
am content with this precursory description for now, I will later make more of a distinction 
between levels of consciousness, rather than treating it as a single homogenous ‘thing’.   
Third, as indicated before, I propose that physicalism, or materialism (I use these 
terms interchangeably), currently fails to give an adequate account of consciousness. 
Physicalism is the notion that reality is fundamentally physical and that it can be 
explained exclusively within the methodologies of the physical sciences (Goff, 2017). 
This was probably the view of the world that Marx held (Foster, 2000), an understanding 
that the physical world preceded life, which depended on it, and that life preceded 
consciousness, which emerged from it (Collier, 2012). My argument will be that 
physicalism does not account for consciousness, nor can it, and that a new way of 
understanding of the relationship of matter to consciousness must be brought forward. 
Such a view goes beyond both the historically dualistic conceptions of mind and body, 
along with their difficulties in understanding how they might interact with one another, 
and the strict materialist monism of contemporary science, to postulating that, contrary to 
modern emergentist notions, mind is intrinsically fundamental to all matter. The 
implications of this are profound; for, if it follows that everything that is conscious is in 
fact alive, and that all matter is conscious, then, the universe is itself alive, and the 
recognition of this impacts not only the worlds of ontology and epistemology but also 
ethics and justice. I would first like to explore why emergentism does not provide a 
coherent account for the presence of consciousness and also why any materialist theory 
that proposes only physical properties in the world cannot explain the non-physical 
qualities of consciousness.  
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4.2. The Common View of Consciousness: Emergentism 
The view common today among both scientists and the lay public is that 
consciousness is an epi-phenomenon of the brain. Brains are complex physical organs 
that, when sufficiently evolved, ‘throw out’ consciousness as a kind of after-effect of 
neurological processes. This conventional view is essentially dualistic in its 
understanding,41with modern versions suggesting that consciousness may have 
appeared suddenly or gradually, but only long after the appearance of matter and only 
as matter configured itself in complex and definitive ways, as in brains (Sheldrake, 
2012). It is basically the idea that the mental emerges from the physical (Karman, 2011). 
These arguments are fundamentally based, then, on two main notions: that 
consciousness is a rare phenomenon found only in human beings and some other 
species, including higher primates and perhaps a few others, and that consciousness is 
dependent on, and a phenomenon of, the brain, which is to say that without brains there 
cannot be consciousness (Skrbina, 2007). 
The philosopher Galen Strawson (2006) summarizes the emergent point of view 
as follows: 
Experiential phenomena are emergent phenomena. Consciousness 
properties, experience properties, are emergent properties of wholly and 
utterly non-conscious, non-experiential phenomena. Physical stuff in itself, 
in its basic nature, is indeed a wholly non-conscious, non-experiential 
phenomenon. Nevertheless when parts of it combine in certain ways, 
experiential phenomena ‘emerge’. Ultimates in themselves are wholly non-
conscious, non-experiential phenomena. Nevertheless, when they 
combine in certain ways, experiential phenomena ‘emerge’. (p. 12) 
This view makes clear that consciousness is not inherent within matter itself but arises 
when material conditions are arranged in a specific manner.   
There have been a number of physicalist theorists in recent years who have 
argued against the idea of emergentism. Strawson himself is one of them. Strawson 
describes himself as a materialist and yet he has provided the most coherent case 
against the idea of emergentism (Strawson, 2006). Emergentism as it relates to the 
appearance of consciousness is usually likened to many phenomena in nature whose 
                                                
41 A strictly materialist view of consciousness is that it is identical with the brain, that the observed electrical activity between 
synapses are themselves the experience of, say, the colour red. But even scientists, and certainly most laypersons, have a 
more descriptively dualist understanding of the mind’s relationship to the brain. They are ‘closet dualists’ (Goff, 2019b). 
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existence arises from interactions between physical entities. Strawson uses the example 
of water, for example, to demonstrate that although liquidity is not a characteristic of the 
molecules that compose water, or of any elementals that form them, nevertheless 
liquidity emerges from H2O molecules when they are combined in certain ways. It is not 
there at a fundamental level, and then suddenly it appears (Strawson, 2013). 
Liquidity, in other words, consists of, and is dependent on, lower level physical 
phenomena such as shape, size, mass charge, number, position, and motion (Karman, 
2011). When these attributes are configurated in certain specific ways, liquidity 
manifests itself. The quality of liquidity is a non-experiential attribute arising from other 
more fundamental but equally non-experiential attributes. Emergentism attempts to 
apply the same analogy to consciousness but fails to do so in an intelligible way. Non-
experiential ultimates cannot give rise to experience (Karman, 2012). Any emergence 
from other properties cannot be ‘brute’ (Strawson, 2006), which is to say that it cannot 
be arbitrary. There must be an ‘in-virtue’ relationship so that there is everything to do 
with one phenomenon that allows it to give rise to another of the same kind (Strawson, 
2006). In the case of consciousness, it is impossible for something that is first-person 
and experiential to emerge from something that is merely dead matter and wholly 
insentient (de Quincey, 2010). Under normal circumstances, emergent phenomena are 
entirely dependent on those phenomena from which they arise; at bottom they can be 
reduced to much the same thing, as wine derived from water can be reduced to the 
same molecular parts. Yet, there is no good sense in which the experience of 
consciousness could be derived from matter that is defined as being absolutely 
unconscious. 
4.3. Consciousness as Non-physical 
Experience, or consciousness, is unlike any other phenomena that we encounter 
in the world. It is the ever-present basis of every experience that we have, whether of the 
world, our bodies, or our minds (and by this I mean the contents of our minds like 
thoughts and feelings); whereas normal physical objects come and go within our 
experience and seem themselves to change and transform, consciousness does not. 
Not only is it incomprehensible to suggest that consciousness arises from the physical, 
but it is also difficult to understand in what sense we are obliged to think it must do so 
since its qualities are distinctly different from that of the physical world. There are a 
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number of arguments within Western philosophy that suggest consciousness cannot be 
physical. 
4.3.1. The Zombie Argument 
The philosopher David Chalmers has argued that one must make a distinction 
between facts regarding conscious experience and facts relating to physical entities, and 
thus if physical facts do not necessarily lead to facts regarding consciousness then we 
can assume that consciousness is something different than the mere physical (Karman, 
2011). The zombie argument is based on an earlier form proposed by René Descartes, 
and is a variety of the ‘conceivability argument’, an assertion that links conceivability to 
possibility (Goff, 2017). The Cartesian conceivability argument makes the claim that: a) it 
is conceivable that mind could exist apart from a brain or body; b) anything that can be 
conceived is possible; c) it is therefore possible that a mind might exist apart from a 
brain or body. Since it is possible that mind may exist apart from the brain or body, then 
one may then conclude that the mind is not identical to the brain or body (Goff, 2017). 
The zombie version of this argument outlined by Chalmers suggests that because there 
could conceivably be a world where beings exist in every way similar to humans but 
lacking consciousness, it is possible that such beings might exist. These ‘zombies’ would 
act and speak exactly as we do but they would lack conscious experience, which is to 
say that there would be nothing like for them to be themselves (as per Nagel, 1974). If 
this were true then we would have to conclude that consciousness does not necessarily 
derive from physical matter or complexity and that it is, therefore, of a different 
‘substance’ than matter. This is because if the physical facts of the fully developed 
human brain constitutively grounds the reality of consciousness, then it must follow that, 
when those physical facts are realized (as in brains), consciousness must be present. 
Consequently, if it is true that there is the possibility of a zombie world, then 
consciousness cannot be said to be grounded in the physical facts, and so a pure 
physicalism must be false (Goff, 2017). 
This argument essentially states that since a zombie world is not only 
conceivable but also possible then consciousness need not follow based on the exact 
same physical facts of the experiential world that we know (Karman, 2011). It can only 
be concluded, then, that consciousness is in essence different than physical properties 
and relationships within brains or bodies. 
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4.3.2. The Black and White Mary Argument 
The black and white Mary argument is a contemporary version of an older 
argument in philosophy known as the knowledge argument. It is a reply to the common 
objection that while we do not at present understand how the brain generates 
consciousness, we will in the future indeed be able to give such an account once a more 
complete knowledge of the physical facts are known. Mary is described as a brilliant 
scientist whose specialty is colour vision. She knows everything there is to possibly 
know about colour: she understands the physiology of sight, the neurobiology of the 
brain, all the chemical and biological processes that are involved with the formation of 
colour, and so on. There is nothing that Mary does not know about the production of 
colour vision. There is one important and interesting detail about Mary, however; she 
has lived her entire life within the confines of a black and white room, and so has never 
herself experienced colour. Everything for her is perceived in black, white, or shades of 
grey. One day Mary leaves her room and for the first time she sees the rich colour of a 
beautiful red rose. In this moment Mary has a new experience and therefore new 
knowledge. Despite her complete knowledge of the physiology of what occurs when a 
person sees red, Mary has not had experience of red. This experience demonstrates, 
according to the argument, that although Mary might know all the physical facts, she has 
an experience that is beyond what the physical sciences can describe. It is concluded 
from this, then, that physicalism must be false (Goff, 2018).  
This argument once again demonstrates that consciousness cannot be thought 
of as physical, or, in this case, derived from physical explanations of the world, and that 
although there are physical goings-on that correlate with the experience of a conscious 
state, the latter state is not dependant on physical processes to exist. It also serves as a 
counter-argument to those who claim that in the future, once we know everything about 
what happens in brains, we shall simultaneously know what consciousness is. 
4.3.3. Language Argument 
Strawson’s language argument, as described by Karman (2012), states that 
science is designed to describe the world of matter and that conceivably science will one 
day be able to describe all material properties and relationships to the smallest detail 
because the universe is made of nothing other than matter. It is the scientific project that 
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it knows the world objectively through its claims which are fundamentally linguistic in 
nature. However, Strawson points out that linguistic agreement does not mean that there 
is a comparable experience of the object, and that indeed we can never know if my taste 
of jam is the same as yours. Experiences of objects are not testable objectively, but only 
comparable through verbal report (Karman, 2012). They are by nature indescribable 
and, furthermore, since they are primary, they cannot be subdivided into smaller 
components, the usual methodology of science to understand and describe material 
phenomena. The conclusion is, then, that since subjective experience, and so 
subjectivity in general, cannot be captured objectively, which is the method of science, 
consciousness cannot be physical (Karman, 2012). I might suggest that, even though 
the experiential content of consciousness cannot be precisely compared to another’s 
experience, the experiencing itself is the same in both observers and is, in fact, the most 
intimately shared experience, the one thing we can share for certain. In this case it is not 
what I experience, but that I experience.   
4.4. Alternatives to Emergentism 
If we reject the notion that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon of 
arrangements of complex physical structures like brains, what then can be proposed as 
an alternative explanation for the presence of consciousness? And if consciousness is 
not physical, but instead consists of experientiality or ‘mind-stuff’, then how do we avoid 
a strict dualism?  
I am in favour of a dual-aspect monism which suggests that if experiential 
consciousness cannot emerge from what is otherwise dead matter, despite being 
arranged in complex patterns, then consciousness must already be present within matter 
itself in some form, as an intrinsic property. It is this inherent ‘thisness’, its subjective 
intrinsicness, that establishes the uniqueness of each thing from each other (Karman, 
2012). I believe that the notion that consciousness is an inherent part of the physical 
constitution of the real is the most parsimonious and simple explanation given for its 
presence (Goff, 2017). The question may be turned back on itself: why insist on 
believing that matter is fundamentally non-experiential and that experience somehow 
emerges as if by magic from utterly non-experiential stuff? (Strawson, 2006).  
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4.5. Consciousness as Essence 
Goff (2018) points out that physics has been very good in describing the 
relationships of fields and particles one to another, but has failed to provide an account 
of their essence. It can give an account of the causal structure of materiality but is 
unable to provide an explanation of the intrinsic nature of the object of observation. 
Physics can, for example, provide us with explanations of the behaviour of an electron, 
describing it in terms of mass, velocity, and charge, but the explanations around what 
each of these properties are depend, in turn, on accounts of their functions, what the 
electron does through them, but not on what the electron itself intrinsically is. In other 
words, there is something missing within explanations of this sort because “intuitively, 
wherever there is mathematico-causal structure, there must be some underlying 
concrete reality realizing that structure. Physics leaves us completely in the dark about 
the underlying concrete reality of the physical universe” (Goff, 2017, Chapter 6, p. 3). 
I agree with Goff that the unaccounted for essence is, in fact, consciousness 
itself, an absolutely real phenomena which cannot, however, be accessed through the 
objective methods of analytical science. The empirical method has worked very well for 
science and has resulted in many successes of explanation within all the various 
disciplines. These methods we might call third-person methods. Consciousness, 
however, is a very different sort of object, simply because it is pure subject. It is not 
accessible to third-person methodologies. Conversely, it can only be accessed through 
the direct experience of the conscious subject, the first-person. There have been various 
responses to the abject failure of science to date to explain what consciousness is or 
how it comes about. Emergentism for many is unacceptable as it cannot logically 
account for the appearance of consciousness without appealing to a form of magical 
thinking. Indeed, as indicated before, some have claimed that, despite our current state 
of knowledge of the brain and its functioning, more neuro-science needs to be done 
before we can really give an account of consciousness (Goff, 2017).   
However, many philosophers and others reject the proposition that 
consciousness is yet another object of study as we might study any other object in the 
world through the scientific method. Consciousness is indeed a datum in its own right 
but access to understanding it cannot be discovered from observations and experiments, 
or an accumulation of more knowledge (Goff, 2017). In other words, a strict materialism 
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subscribes to the view that all reality can be understood in terms of the physical sciences 
but because this form of physicalism is unable to properly account for consciousness it 
must therefore be mistaken in its assumptions.  
One objection to the argument that the sciences are unable to explore the being-
ness of things is that there is nothing outside the relationships and functions that things 
display. Thus, objects in the world are their relationships, there is no essence.42 In 
philosophy this view is known as causal structuralism and it is essentially the same view 
that contemporary post-modern and post-structuralists hold, evidenced in much of the 
social constructionist literature in psychology (see, for example, Gergen, 2011). Casual 
structuralists propose that each and every property of a thing is a pure causal power; 
however, it is difficult to understand how our understanding of the nature of a causal 
power can be known without reference to properties that are not causal powers (Goff, 
2017). If we describe what an object is in terms of other causal properties, then these in 
turn require explanations which creates an infinite regress with no understanding of the 
nature of the original object of study.   
Another way to approach this is from the perspective of appearances and reality. 
There is a very real sense, of course, that it is not consciousness that is difficult to grasp 
but rather matter itself, which presents as inscrutable and, to a great degree, 
unknowable. What is the difference between the appearance of an object as opposed to 
the reality of it? The real world is substantial in that it is grounded in substantival 
properties. An object is real because it is solid, for example. Solidity has historically been 
viewed as a primary property of a material object, and a sure indicator of the reality of 
the object as opposed to some sort of illusion. An object may have colour or shape, for 
example, but if it lacked solidity we might be dealing with a mere appearance. However, 
the problem with solidity is that it cannot be established on its own terms; that is, it can 
only be known if the other objects around it are themselves solid and it is able to keep 
them out. But then the problem becomes of establishing their solidity (Mathews, 2003). 
Here again is a problem of infinite regress with the result that we can never know what 
gives any object its reality. When we consider any object “we can see its color, feel its 
impenetrability, and so on, but there is a sense in which these are surface qualities only 
                                                
42 Compare this to those writers who reject the notion that Marx held a conception of an essential human nature, and had 
instead replaced it with the ‘ensemble of social relations’ themselves. See Geras (2016) for a review of these arguments. 
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or mere appearances. The inner reality of body, the ‘thing-in-itself’, is never revealed” 
(Mathews, 2003, p. 31). The experiential effect is that matter becomes dead, a kind of 
phantasm, an appearance but at the same time nothing in itself, and, thus, the notion 
that things are present-for-themselves as subjects is rejected. Alternatively, to 
acknowledge the subjectivity of things positions consciousness as their intrinsic, 
essential nature, and, furthermore, places it as pervasive throughout matter. The 
dualism of appearance and reality are transcended within such a paradigm. This is not 
necessarily to assert that every bit of matter is itself an experiencing subject, but only 
that there is an inherent ‘inwardness’ via consciousness, a subjectival component in all 
things, which may or may not manifest as a subject proper (Mathews, 2003). It is within 
the experience of subjectivity, the inner sense of being present to ourselves as particular 
embodied beings, that fosters an assurance that we are real and “that renders the world 
at large real as opposed to mere externalized husk or insubstantial phantom” (Mathews, 
2003, p. 32).   
4.6. Panpsychism 
Panpsychism is the view that consciousness in one form or another pervades all 
matter in the universe. de Quincey (2012) defines panpsychism as 
a cosmological and ontological theory that proposes all objective bodies 
(objects) in the universe, including those we usually classify as “inanimate,” 
possess an interior, subjective reality (they are also subjects). In other 
words, there is something it feels like from within to be a body (of any kind). 
Panpsychism, thus, presents us with a view of nature consisting universally 
of materially real bodies with an interior or experiential reality. All bodies, 
therefore, are in some respects both material and psychic. (de Quincey, 
2012, Chapter 6, para. 6)   
Panpsychism says that it is consciousness that is the essence of matter, what 
matter is in its intrinsic nature. Consciousness gives matter its sentience, which grounds 
itself within subjectivity. Subjectivity is the essence of all sentient experience (de 
Quincey, 2012). Panpsychism is an ancient world-view found historically in varying forms 
within many cultures and philosophies.43 Indeed, our modern conceptions of a dead and 
merely material world are relatively new in the history of ideas. Panpsychism represents 
a radical (at least for us in the modern West) re-imagining of the relationship of mind to 
                                                
43 David Skrbina’s book ‘Panpsychism in the West’ gives a very detailed history of panpsychism and provides various 
descriptions of the many different forms of panpsychic ideas, both ancient and contemporary. 
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matter. Since the time of Descartes various forms of dualism have dominated both 
philosophical and scientific discourse. With dualism, of course, came numerous 
philosophical problems, such as how a mind can affect and interact with a physical body. 
This problem has never been sufficiently answered even today. Hence, there have been 
various attempts to circumvent this problem by means of some form of philosophic and 
scientific reductionism, that is, reducing the mind to brain states, or to forms of 
eliminativism, which attempt to argue that mind is a kind of illusion and not real as other 
phenomena are real. Apart from our intuitively common sense objections to such 
notions, there are good reasons to believe philosophically that such arguments are 
simply false (Nagel, 2012). Panpsychism offers a perspective that problematizes not the 
mind but our understanding of what matter intrinsically is. It refuses to reduce matter to 
mind (idealism), but instead maintains that matter and mind are different but inseparable 
components of the same reality. All matter has the dual aspects of both subjectivity and 
objectivity; first-personhood and third-personhood; experientiality and non-experientiality 
(Skrbina, 2009). All matter is conscious in some fashion all the way down to the ultimate 
foundational particles. Thus, panpsychism is a monistic paradigm, neither materialist nor 
idealist, but incorporating aspects of both (Goff, 2019a).44  
Yet, historically panpsychism in all its forms was not merely a theoretical 
interpretation of how the world functions. Rather, it has always invited, through its 
acknowledgement of an all-pervading experiential awareness, an engagement with the 
world in specific ways. For example, the Pythagorean religious-philosophical tradition 
was a way of life. With its ontological emphasis on patterns or form over material 
substance, it gave rise to an epistemology that regarded matter as containing spirit or 
consciousness, and so was considered sacred, a reflection of a more profound level of 
nature. Just as importantly, however, it encouraged a transformation of being in light of 
this knowledge. In comparison, Descartes’s ontology, prevalent even today, focused on 
the primacy of material substance, which lacked any inherent consciousness, and was 
rendered completely inert and lifeless. Such a perspective conjured very different ways 
of being in the world (de Quincey, 2006). This point cannot be overlooked. In contrast to 
the ways in which pantheistic and panpsychic worldviews cultivated ways of being in the 
                                                
44 There are many detailed and sophisticated forms of panpsychism. The important consideration in terms of my argument 
in this dissertation is that consciousness is viewed as inherent within all elemental physical particles and, furthermore, that 
it is not merely another additional property, like mass or charge, but that it is the intrinsic nature of those properties, that is, 
that mass and charge from the inside are forms of consciousness (Goff, 2019). 
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world that honoured it as a living, vital, and meaningful entity, generating practices, 
traditions, and social mores that reflected such understandings, the dualistic Cartesian 
notions of a dead and de-spirited earth, fortified by a novel rationalism which combined 
science with philosophy (Guerra, 2013), paved the way for a reckless capitalism whose 
substantive contribution was to enrich the capitalist classes at the expense of both the 
working classes and the earth itself. Let me take this opportunity to expand on the 
difference between these two dominant world-views and their effects. 
The panpsychic idea that the world is alive, sentient, or possessing soul or spirit, 
is an ancient one and found in all cultures and societies. Many societies considered 
nature to be the Great Mother and thus full of spirit, life, consciousness, purpose, and 
meaning. Nature was an innate impulse or power (Sheldrake, 1994) and was seen to be 
personified as Mother Nature, the source, sustainer, and ending of all life. Within Mother 
Nature existed the celestial bodies and the non-human bodies, like the rivers and 
mountains on Earth, all seen to be themselves divine and thus fully alive and conscious 
in their own ways and after their own purposes. Furthermore, Mother Earth was the 
source of universal laws, the source of nature and its aspects of time, eternity, birth, and 
death, and also the basis for moral qualities such as truth, beauty, justice, and love 
(Sheldrake,1994).  
This worldview is known as animism, and although this word has been critiqued 
as being reflective of the colonizing practices of 18th and 19th century anthropologists 
who used the term in a rather disparaging way to describe the societies they studied as 
primitive and backwards (Harvey, 2017), the term has been rescued in recent times and 
redefined in a manner that properly reflects the actual worldviews of the people both 
past and present who hold such understandings of the world (Bird‐David, 1999; Ingold, 
2006). Thus, animists are those who see the world as full of persons, with humans being 
only one variety, and that these beings live their lives in relationship with each other. The 
animist always seeks to be a good person in a world of personhood, seeking out 
nurturing and respectful relationships (Harvey, 2017). The ancient animist conception, 
therefore, not only saw the world as alive and conscious, but as necessarily full of 
relationships and connections, a world of human and non-human entities communicating 
and being in communion with each other. The recognition and honouring of personhood 
in the other-than-human creation explicitly invites a worldview that fills all things with 
intentionality, agency, and the desire to reach out to others in exchange (Harvey, 2017). 
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Most importantly, it is a worldview that forms the basis for the establishment of ethical, 
moral, and just interchanges with all things.45    
Up until medieval times in the West, the philosophy of nature was predominantly 
animistic with an understanding that soul was not a mere part of the living being but that 
beings lived and moved within soul (Sheldrake, 1994). Animals too were ensouled 
beings, the word for animal coming from the Latin ‘anima’, soul. Humans were 
connected from below not only to the animalistic aspect of soul, the repository of the 
instincts and passions, but also to higher levels of soul, the realms of reason, thinking, 
and choice (Sheldrake, 1994). Such notions of the human soul provided both an 
unambiguous connection to the rest of nature, but also defined the uniqueness of each 
aspect of the world. It also upheld the idea that each thing in itself is a microcosmic 
embodiment of the macrocosm, so that the ‘behaviour’ of the heavens had a direct effect 
on the lives of human beings (Sheldrake, 1994). The understanding that human beings 
were intimately connected in a reciprocal manner to both other creatures and to all of 
nature generated moral and ethical imperatives which structured people’s lives. 
On the other hand, dualism, a philosophical tradition that most famously informed 
the scientific paradigm of Descartes, can be traced back to Plato in the West and to 
Samkhya Hinduism around 1000 BCE in the East (Skrbina, 2009). This is the view that 
the mind/consciousness, or soul, is separate and distinct from the body, although it does 
interact with the body as long as it is alive. It was Plato in the 4th century BCE who 
proposed that the cosmos could be separated between the realm of transcendental, and 
perfect, Forms and the realm of mundane, everyday, and imperfect matter. Although his 
student Aristotle attempted to mitigate his teacher’s strict dualism, Plato’s version heavily 
influenced Western thought through the Neoplatonists and into Christianity, particularly 
that of St. Augustine. In the West, with the advent of the Copernican Revolution in the 
16th century, the belief in the cosmos as a living and sentient being began to be 
replaced with the idea that the cosmos was in fact a machine, without life or sentience, 
without purpose or meaning, and was instead constituted of lifeless matter, administered 
by laws set down by a deistic God (Sheldrake, 1994). As mentioned, this worldview 
                                                
45 Val Plumwood (1993) argues against using consciousness as the sole criterion for asserting subjectivity in matter. She 
sees consciousness, intentionality, experience/sentience, imagination, reason, goal directedness as different ways to 
imagine mind within the non-human realm. She, therefore, proposes a weak panpsychism wherein only mindlike qualities 
are found in nature, not a pure experientiality. 
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came into prominence through scientific thinkers like Descartes in the 17th century who 
advocated for a strict dualism of mind and body. Descartes’ cosmos was one of 
mathematical and mechanistic precision. Spirit, soul, or consciousness was removed 
from the cosmos, and indeed from the human body itself, where it could only interact 
with the body through the pineal gland. For Descartes human and non-human bodies 
were mere machines living in an inert universe, with life and consciousness only 
showing up in rare instances (Sheldrake, 1994).   
Isaac Newton (1643 - 1727) furthered Descartes’ dualistic project, but now within 
the world of physics. A deistic and remote God set in motion the cause and effect 
exchange of physical forces, influencing objects that were self-contained and 
individualized, and which were separated from one another through dead space, and 
which could only interact through direct contact (de Quincey, 2012). Newton’s universe 
was truly mechanical, with no allowance for creativity, freedom, or choice. All movement 
in the cosmos was determined by mechanical causal sequence, which held out the hope 
of theories that could capture the nature of everything within them. 
The continued scientific emphasis on matter and material forces and laws were 
seen in the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin in the 1800s. Utilizing the 
mechanistic and deterministic theories of the new emerging materialism, Darwin 
proposed that all animal and plant species existed as a result of natural selection, a kind 
of chance variation in mutations within species, an interplay between organism and 
environment (de Quincey, 2012), and certainly lacking any teleological properties like 
meaning or intention. As with animism, this, too, had its own moral and ethical 
ramifications. 
Some type of Cartesian dualism has been the major philosophical position within 
both philosophical circles and certainly within the popular mind of the modern Western 
world. Even today, despite materialist perspectives on the relation of the mind to the 
brain, the most crude form of which is that the mind is the brain itself, or that the mind is 
an illusory epi-phenomena of brain activity, we still easily talk of the mind’s influence on 
the body, and vice versa, as though they are two distinct ontological categories. 
Notwithstanding dualism’s profound influence in much of our thinking, the manner and 
mechanism by which the mind interacts with a brain remains one of dualisms major 
philosophical problems.   
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Moreover, the separation of mind from body presents some other important 
challenges, not the least of which are its moral and ethical ramifications. Whereas the 
older Platonic forms of dualism invited epistemologies that encouraged transformational 
change within individuals and societies, Cartesian dualism eventually aligned itself with 
the political and scientific movements of the times that emphasized the production and 
accumulation of capital. This occurred because this form of dualism, as we have seen, 
proposed a split between humans and an inert and lifeless mechanistic world. The 
consequence of this separation created a value hierarchy wherein the soul had value 
because of its eternal and divine nature, but matter had none because of its temporal 
and earthly nature. It led to the notion that the world was a site for human consumption, 
and, in fact, only had value to the extent that it was given value by humans. It also 
established the idea of the superiority of humans to all else (Skrbina, 2009).  
With agency, purpose, choice, meaning, and intention, traditionally thought to be 
attributes of the soul, all effectively removed from nature by science and philosophy, the 
conditions were ripe for the development of political and economic systems that 
incorporated these worldviews to their advantage (Loy, 2018). In fact, Descartes was 
explicit in his intentions that his insights into the nature of the world and humans’ place in 
it were to make humans the lords and possessors of the natural world (Sheldrake, 
1994), a reflection of Francis Bacon’s similar assertion that it was science’s function to 
‘put nature to the rack’ (de Quincey, 2012). Indeed, Descartes thought that mastery of 
the world by self-interested individuals was the purpose of a person’s life (Guerra, 2013). 
Thus, within these materialistic approaches to the cosmos lay the philosophical 
grounding for the development of capitalism as an economic and social system. 
Speaking of the drive of capital to produce bourgeois society, Marx comments in the 
Grundrisse that  
for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a 
matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a power for itself; and the 
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so 
as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of 
consumption or as a means of production. (Marx, Grundrisse, p. 336)   
The materialist and mechanistic understanding of nature and of the creatures 
within nature dovetailed neatly with the late 19th century drive to treat human workers as 
mechanized appendages of the means of production. This philosophical position, along 
with an increasingly materialistic science, with its progressive de-spiriting of the natural 
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world, was readily assimilated by the capitalist classes to further their expansionist quest 
for ever-increasing profits, justifying their rapacious greed based on the fact that the 
world was a dead and spiritless resource to be exploited for the benefit of themselves. 
The dismissal of ancient ideas of the ever-present, immanent deity, the idea that 
everything was alive and had soul,46 reduced the world to a machine, and a purposeless 
and meaningless one at that (de Quincey, 2010). The demotion of consciousness (or 
what we might call soul) from matter, made the commodification of persons and the 
environment more easily achieved and rationalized. As de Quincey (2010) points out, 
the world’s 
only value was its potential for exploitation by science and technology to 
serve the functions of industry, commerce, and government. In such a 
world, guided by such motivations, it should be no surprise if our collective 
actions - as nations, as governments, as businesses, even as individuals - 
turn out to be pathological. They are pathological because they take no 
account of the profound interdependence of living systems, because they 
take no account of consciousness or experience inherent in nature. 
(Introduction, Project, para. 11)  
The exorcism of consciousness was the necessary accomplice to capitalism’s growth, 
and a precursor to the appearance of many modern social ills, especially alienation and 
mental health issues. 
Having removed consciousness from the purview of serious scientific concern, or 
at the very least reducing it to a late-stage epiphenomena of brain states, the effect for 
society was the removal from the world of meaning, purpose, intentionality, and goals. 
Justice, taken in the broad sense of upholding what is morally right or good, and which 
was formerly an attribute of the indwelling and all-pervasive spirit itself, must now be 
socially-constructed since a dead and insentient world is devoid of inherent worth and 
meaning. The meaning constructed, however, was almost always anthropocentric and, 
as the 19th century came and went, was inevitably framed in terms of capital 
accumulation. Thus, with the rise of capitalism alongside materialist conceptions of the 
world and of society, it became evermore the case that meaning no longer flowed from 
metaphysical foundations but rather from “expressions of an economic philosophy based 
                                                
46 I use the terms soul, spirit, and awareness as equivalent to consciousness. This equivalency is not intended to make 
ontological statements particular to these terms (many writers do make clear distinctions between them), but only to reflect 
a general historic difference between them as a group and matter per se. It does not affect the thrust of my argument 
regarding the unique nature of consciousness. For a discussion of the uses of these terms, and others, see Skrbina (2007), 
particularly pages 15-19. 
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on a materialistic metaphysics that denies any foundation to goals, purposes, and values 
- other than biologically driven preferences or the relativity of social power plays” (de 
Quincey, 2012, Chapter 1, para. 12). Nevertheless, despite materialist’s claims to the 
contrary, teleology was never really removed from the natural world; rather, it had merely 
been replaced by capitalist ideology with its advocacy of the ‘invisible hand’ and ‘market 
forces’. 
4.7. Panpsychism as the Re-spiriting of Nature 
For the last few hundred years, most in educated Western society have taken for 
granted the prevailing worldview of materialism, both in its manifestation as a physicalist 
understanding of the cosmos, and in its practical, economic, and political manifestation 
as the capitalist mode of production (Sheldrake, 1994; Skrbina, 2009). There are three 
main proposals made by a pure physical materialism: that reality consists of one ‘thing’, 
matter; that it is objective and accessible through third-party observation and exploration; 
and that mind cannot be found in matter, that matter is utterly non-experiential (Skrbina, 
2009). However, if we acknowledge that mind or consciousness is a datum in its own 
right, that it is a real phenomenon, then materialism must give an account of it within the 
terms of the three proposals made above. The problem is that it cannot. As previously 
noted, aside from the ontological subjectivity of consciousness in comparison to the 
objectivity of the rest of the physical universe, we have no credible explanations of how 
consciousness emerges from non-conscious matter, nor for what accounts for our 
specific qualitative experience of the world it reveals. Physicalist explanations cannot 
coherently make sense of intention since the particles and forces that make up the 
material world are thought to be inherently inert and, therefore, not purposeful. 
Consciousness seems to elude the analytic abilities of objective science to capture and 
explain it (Skrbina, 2009).  
There are three other possible paradigms that present themselves, however, 
when materialism’s core assumptions are rejected. The first are various forms of 
idealism, postulating the opposite of materialism and avoiding the necessity of explaining 
how matter and mind are related, by claiming that everything is itself only consciousness 
(Henry, 2005; Ward, 2010). One may view Hegel, for example, as an idealist, and it was 
this philosophical approach that Karl Marx eventually discarded in favour of a strictly 
materialist position. Another possibility is to argue for a neutral monism which proposes 
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that both mind and matter originate from another source beyond them both.47 A third 
prospect is a dual-aspect monism, a panpsychism that suggests that reality is comprised 
of both a physical and an experiential aspect (Skrbina, 2009). This explanation is the 
most appealing to me because it is the most parsimonious, a theory that eliminates both 
the problems associated with the strict materialist view of the genesis of experientiality 
from non-experiential matter and dualism’s notoriously difficult predicament of how the 
insubstantial mind interacts with the material brain (Goff, 2017). Panpsychism in the form 
of a dual-aspect monism proposes that consciousness is naturally present within matter 
from the lowest forms right up to the highest. As a consequence, the existence of a 
conscious world invites new ways of being and relating to the world and to one another. 
Moreover, consciousness cannot be thought of as one single ‘thing’, manifesting 
only on the level of ‘there is something that it’s like to be that thing’ (Nagel, 1974). In 
human beings specifically, the term consciousness would not only entail both conscious 
awareness and what is known as the unconscious mind, but also the qualia of mind like 
intentionality, attention, awareness, and cognition. There are levels of complexity to this 
consciousness so that notions of divisions, for example, between the unconscious and 
the conscious, or aspects of experience such as emotion versus reason, are replaced by 
an understanding of a range of qualitatively different mental states on an ontological 
continuum, from deep, unaware states to profoundly meditative ones (Skrbina, 2009). 
Moreover, the recognition of experientiality in the world and also of our own access to 
multiple levels of consciousness within ourselves demands novel ways of manifesting 
justice, care, and equality that align with our understanding. If we were to have a 
candidate for the old notion of the soul, of an essence, then it would be consciousness.  
It is with panpsychism that the ensoulment of the cosmos returns and with it the 
revitalization of the world. The world becomes alive again, a living creation filled with 
intentions and meaning, a place of connection and relationship, where communication 
and communion become the same thing. 
4.8. Consciousness ‘All the Way Down’ 
When speaking of panpsychist approaches to the nature of reality, it is often said 
that there is consciousness all the way down, down, that is, to the basic ultimates of 
                                                
47 This view seems the most receptive to panentheistic ideas and to understanding consciousness as existing beyond 
matter also, a theory for which I have much affinity. 
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material existence (de Quincey, 2012). Until recently, however, the notion of 
consciousness being present in other than human beings, the higher level apes, and 
perhaps in some mammals like dogs and cats, was itself considered controversial 
(Theise & Kafatos, 2013). As pointed out previously, Descartes famously thought that 
animals were devoid of consciousness, mere automatons with no sentience, a fact that 
presumably allowed him to indulge in vivisections on live animals without much thought 
(Sheldrake, 2012). Despite an inability to know what it is like to be them, as Nagel might 
say, in recent years the empirical evidence for consciousness in non-human animals, 
and even plants, has, nevertheless, grown. Let me give some examples.       
John Marzluff, a Professor of Wildlife Science at the University of Washington, 
describes the uncanny ability of crows to relate to each other and their environments in 
ways that can only suggest the existence of a high level of consciousness. He notes that 
corvids assume characteristics that were once ascribed only to humans, 
including self-recognition, insight, revenge, tool use, mental time travel, 
deceit, murder, language, play, calculated risk taking, social learning, and 
traditions. We are different, but by degree…these animals, which we often 
take for granted and aggressively combat, really are thinking and reasoning 
in ways that are more similar to our own than many would care to admit. 
(Marzluff & Angell, 2012, p. 198)  
Crucially, however, he points out that crows and human beings have co-evolved 
and that not only have the existence and presence of crows in the lives of humans 
through the ages affected human culture, but human existence has in turn affected crow 
culture. Our own mental processes may have been deeply affected through our history 
with relating to crows because the views we have of crows in connection to death, 
thievery, planning, and so on are deeply grounded within our memory (Marzluff & Angell, 
2012).  
For many of us, the claim that crows are conscious would seem uncontested. Yet 
researchers are making interesting discoveries about behaviours in animals that may 
further challenge our limited understanding of the pervasiveness of conscious states. In 
a recent and controversial study published in the PLOS Biology, the authors found 
evidence to suggest that a small species of fish called the cleaner wrasse was able to 
pass the so-called mirror test, which has been used for decades as one of the foremost 
measures of animal intelligence. The testing demonstrated that these fish passed all 
behavioural components including “(i) social reactions towards the reflection, (ii) 
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repeated idiosyncratic behaviours towards the mirror, and (iii) frequent observation of 
their reflection” (Kohda et al., 2019, p. 1). The opposition to some of the possible 
conclusions regarding the consciousness of these animals has been considerable, most 
of which reflects a continued speciesism within the scientific community (Devlin, 2019) 
but it is the response of one of the main authors, Alex Jordan, which is relevant to this 
discussion. It was his view that the study raised issues around the welfare of fish. He 
was concerned that humans not lose their sense of empathy toward creatures that look 
different from us but that are demonstrably sentient and that our current fishing practices 
must change in light of this fact (Devlin, 2019). It is clear that in the minds of at least 
these authors the recognition of the presence of consciousness underlying states of 
feeling and pain leads them to endorse an ethic of care and, indeed, justice. 
Some scientists make the case for the existence of consciousness in plants. 
Plant physiologist Stefano Mancuso believes that plants possess intelligence, learning, 
memory, and communication, despite the obvious fact that they do not possess brains. 
Making the point that, again, due the inherent speciesism within the human scientific 
method, it is very difficult for us to comprehend the possibility that other life forms may 
have attributes once only thought to be possessed by human beings, Mancuso & Viola 
(2015) comment:  
The same kind of problems surface when intelligence is spoken of in 
reference to organisms without a brain, such as - excluding plants for the 
moment - bacteria, protozoa, and molds. Although some (bacteria and 
protozoa) are so simple as to be composed of only one cell, they too 
nevertheless display behavior that - if their size were more impressive and, 
above all, if they had a brain - we wouldn’t hesitate to term intelligent: 
amoebas solve mazes, while molds can map out a territory more efficiently 
than any software invented by human beings. However, in these organisms 
as in plants, our brain bias leads us to deny the existence of any sort of 
thinking capacity - an attitude that seems based more on traditions and 
preconceptions than on scientific reasoning. (p. 141)  
But Manusco goes further in his theorizing by asking whether plants are 
conscious. Basing his understanding of what constitutes consciousness on the definition 
of the physicist Michio Kaku, who operationalizes consciousness as the ability to build a 
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model of oneself in relation to space, time, and other organisms, Mancuso argues that 
his research indicates plants are indeed conscious.4849     
4.9.     Is Consciousness One (No-)Thing? 
It may be that just as there are different levels of consciousness within humans, 
there are spectrums of consciousness throughout nature (Karman, 2003). This would 
mean that as organisms evolve and become more complex their consciousness and 
ability to experience also becomes more complex (Theise & Kafatos, 2013). Thus, 
simple organisms may have a very weak, rarefied consciousness (Karman, 2003, p. 14), 
with more complexity resulting in increasingly sophisticated experiential forms of 
subjectivity (Strawson, 2006). 
My own view is that this understanding of consciousness has it a bit backwards. I 
think it is more likely that there is a universal fundamental consciousness that is present 
in and through the cosmos, but which is manifested in varying ways according to the 
complexity of the object or organism. Many refined and elegant understandings of 
consciousness from this perspective come from the Eastern Vedantic traditions. These 
traditions, although themselves complex and varied, present nuanced possibilities for 
viewing consciousness. One such conception is that the individual human 
consciousness, viewed, as it were, from within, is made of five koshas, or bodies, which 
are the temporary sheaths of the soul. These are the annaya kosha, or physical, material 
body, the pranamaya kosha, or energy body which imbues the physical body with life 
force, the manomaya kosha which is the mental body, comprising thoughts and 
emotions reflective of the interplay between the mind and the external world, the 
vijnanamaya kosha which is the intuitive body that reflects our spiritual experience, and 
finally anandamaya kosha, a bliss body reflective of the soul (Prakash, 1998). Although 
these various bodies may each represent evolutionary aspects of consciousness, it must 
be noted that they are not only temporary but surround the soul (that is, for our 
purposes, pure or fundamental consciousness), which is conceived to be central and 
timeless. In other words, these are all manifestations within consciousness of various 
                                                
48 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBGt5OeAQFk 
49 Research by Gagliano, Vyazovskiy, Borbély, Grimonprez and Depczynski (2016) interestingly describes the acquisition 
of learned behaviour in garden pea plants in terms normally associated with the presence of consciousness. Citing the 
plants’ ability to ‘learn’, ‘choose’, ‘locate’, and ‘remember’, their experimental results show how the presence of associative 
learning as an adaptive mechanism exists in both plants and animals. 
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states and conditions including states of mind and experience, but are not themselves 
original consciousness, the primordial ground and basis of subjectivity (Theise & 
Kafatos, 2016). 
Historically there have been similar conceptualizations in the West. Sheldrake 
(1994) outlines the hierarchical levels of Robert Fludd (1574 -1637) who proposed a 
Pure Mind which was the opening to the Divine; the active intellect, the primary vehicle 
of Mind; the Rational Spirit, containing Mind and Intellect and opening to Reason; the 
Middle Soul, containing the Rational Spirit, Mind, and Intellect; the Vital Light in the Mind, 
or the Middle Soul swimming in ethereal fluid; and, finally, the Body, receptacle of all 
things. 
Fundamental consciousness is, by these understandings, the soul, the center, a 
pure subject which, as such, cannot be described as an object. Being beyond 
description it is quality-less, and without attributes, and thus considered empty. In Indian 
Vedantic terms this is the nomenclature given to Brahman, the Supreme (Wilber, 1979). 
Rather than being, then, the most primitive state of consciousness, the first-person 
experience of consciousness is in fact the all-aware reality present in all things, each of 
which, according to their own nature and form limit pure subjectivity, depending on the 
complexity of their evolutionary development. Consciousness itself does not evolve, only 
its various contents and manifestations do.50  
If consciousness is present throughout matter and not solely the property of 
human beings and their near relatives, what are the ethical and moral consequences of 
such an understanding? Primarily, it is a view of the world which presents itself as alive 
and sentient in a wonderfully diverse multitude of ways. In such a world, we understand 
and can experientially know that we are one with all things because we come from, and 
exist within, the same undifferentiated consciousness. It is a world in which we know that 
our lives and the lives of others, including non-humans, arise and flow from, and within, 
the same fundamental subjectivity. Although there is a propensity for beings to 
                                                
50 Wilber (2000) conceives of the human self as an ‘archaeology of depth’ involving spirit at the centre followed by soul, 
centaur, ego, persona, body, and then matter. With respect to panpsychism in general, I agree with Wilber when he denies 
particular types of interiors, such as feelings or souls, to fundamental units like atoms or quarks but instead affirms the 
presence of consciousness all the way down, the type of the subjectivity depending on the complexity of the development 
of the entity in question. All these types of rational discriminations do not, however, reveal the non-dual, post-rational level, 
the level beyond all words and concepts, in which spirit is revealed and the mind-body problem is resolved. See Wilber, K. 
(2000). Integral psychology: Consciousness, spirit, psychology, therapy. Boston: Shambhala, in particular pp. 276-282. 
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individuate, a necessary requirement for socialization at all levels of existence, there is 
simultaneously a movement by individuals toward the holistic ground of experience 
which can manifest outwardly as a empathy or a desire to reach out to communicate, 
express, and spread subjectivity through the field (Mathews, 2003).  
Such a world is an alive world, a communicative world that seeks to actualize 
communion. In other words, it is a world that restores the sacred to the cosmos and 
brings us into harmony with the ways of nature. This is a world that has within its very 
being meaning and purpose and with these, values, intention, and finally, for we 
humans, justice and equality.51 For, it is a world that recognizes that all things are 
enminded, spirited, and alive, and therefore precious and invaluable. In such a world 
consciousness itself demands the exercise of justice, fairness, and equality, for all things 
are grounded in the same source, and separation is seen to be illusory. Who ‘in their 
right mind’ would bring intentional suffering to themselves? Seeing that we are 
connected to all things we become balanced and centered. We both individuate, creating 
healthy centres of self at their own levels, but also realize that our interiority is 
fundamentally free of all personal attributes, but at the same time universally connected 
to everyone and everything else (Goff, 2019b). We find our home in the world.  
Still, selves cannot change or transform in isolation; environmental conditions 
must be set up such that change can take place. If environmental conditions are 
fundamentally undemocratic and unjust then the individual self will suffer distress, not 
because of inherent pathology, but as a natural and normal response to conditions that 
are oppressive and alienating. If conditions are such that there exists fairness and 
justice, the self is then free and empowered to change accordingly. The dead and 
unconscious world of the materialists, reflected in the productive practices of modern-
day capitalism, predispose persons toward mental distress. On the other hand, an alive 
and vital world, a world that speaks and communicates, that has purposes and goals, 
values and meanings, all of which are reflected in working conditions for people that are 
equitable and democratic, will nurture far more balanced mental health. We know that 
the inordinate emphasis on independence, isolation, competitiveness, and comparison 
fostered within individualistic, capitalistic societies are a certain recipe for the 
                                                
51 See Crethar & Winterowd (2012) for a summary of the perennial nature of certain values, virtues, and dispositions that 
must be acquired to practice counselling in a socially just manner. 
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appearance of mental health issues. Alternatively, strong social bonds, connections, and 
co-operation are widely recognized as factors that increase happiness and maintain 
satisfaction (Biglan, 2015). 
Unfortunately, psychology has been not only an accomplice in the establishment 
of the autonomous individual self, separate from, and in competition with, similarly 
isolated others, but also in the growth of the neuroses and psychological problems that 
have arisen as a result of alienation within capitalist societies. 
In contrast to the complicity of a psychology that individualizes the self in the 
service of materialistic political ideologies, panpsychism reconsiders the role of 
consciousness in our lives, not as the exclusive possession of human beings, but as the 
inner nature of all matter. This perspective invites a profound intimacy with the world, 
since at the level of consciousness we are one with it, and encourages more loving and 
just ways of relating with the world on all levels (Skrbina, 2007). It is a world-view that 
predisposes us toward an unalienated life. 
4.10. Panpsychism as an Ally of Anti-capitalism 
In what way, then, does this radical change in how we see the place of 
consciousness within the cosmos affect our lives in the world? 
First, it might be useful to lay out what the panpsychist paradigm may mean in 
theoretical terms. Skrbina (2009) has proposed a holistic, relational, and dynamical view 
which challenges not only mind/body dualisms but also self/other dualisms, and which 
has clear ramifications for the way in which we see ourselves in the world, particularly 
the way we set up societies, and for the role of justice and equality within those 
societies. Just as the functioning of the brain is not limited to that one organ but is in 
relationship with, and dependent on, all the organs and processes within the body, so 
too 
each lower level of structure also has a corresponding mind-space. Each 
organ, each protein, each molecule has a mental aspect. Each feels. Each 
embodies memory and knowledge. Each experiences qualitative states, or 
qualia. Each carves out paths or trajectories in its own mind space, which 
in turn realize semantic representations or meaning. Each has a kind of 
unity of mind (though less complex and subtle than neural-like 
consciousness), reflected in its singular state space point. And each has a 
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distinctive personality, in the overall network of states that it habitually 
occupies. (Skrbina, 2009, p. 376)   
There are, then, multiple levels of mind from the lowest to the highest all corresponding 
to the various centres of physical processes found within the body. A total account of my 
body and mind includes all the systems and particles that both make me up or affect me 
which means everything must be taken into consideration at all levels to provide a full 
description of what I am, both body and mind (Skrbina, 2009).52    
These processes and inter-relationships are co-extensive with the cosmos itself, 
and, again, just as these inter-relationships extend throughout the physical cosmos they 
also include simultaneously all levels of mind throughout the mental cosmos. Drawing on 
the work of quantum physicists, Skrbina postulates that since subatomic particles in the 
body do not exist in one spot but diffuse energetically into their surroundings, there is 
therefore a ‘very small, but non-zero chance’ that a given electron may be found half 
way across the galaxy. From this perspective what ‘I am’ at a quantum level is entangled 
with everything that is in the cosmos and consequently ‘my mind’ is the mind of the 
cosmos itself so that the world is both my body and mind (Skrbina, 2009). 
These speculations are reminiscent of much of the world’s mystical literature, 
what Aldous Huxley called the perennial philosophy. Hinduism’s Net of Indra and the 
Buddhist hua-yen teachings of China (see Cleary, 1983, for a wonderful exposition of 
these teachings) are prime examples of this philosophical notion of inter- and intra-
relationship. Consider, for example, Zen teacher Robert Aitken’s exposition of the Chan 
master Chang-sha’s comment that “the entire universe is your eye; the entire universe is 
your complete body; the entire universe is your own luminance. The entire universe is 
within your own luminance. In the entire universe there is no-one who is not your own 
self”. Aitken (1996) comments that  
not only is there no one who is not myself or yourself, there is nothing at all 
that is not each of us. No leaf, no stone, no gecko that is not myself, you 
yourself. Thus the self arises - not merely interdependently with all things 
but as all things. It is all things - interbeing, to use Thich Nhat Hanh’s 
expression. (p. 92) 
                                                
52 See my previous description of the impact of our interactions with crows on our psyche. Non-human impacts on the 
shaping of our consciousness undoubtedly occur from a vast number of sources, perhaps from the totality of phenomena, 
as Skrbina suggests. 
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This, therefore, is a view of the world that fundamentally opposes the principal 
assumptions of capitalism.  
            Capitalism is a system which objectifies the world, including human beings, in 
order to commodify it for capital accumulation. This objectification depends upon an 
ideological project requiring individualism, separation, competition, and a strict material 
monism so that people and places are not appreciated as being holistically alive in the 
fullest sense, but are instead treated like robots, sources of labour power and objects for 
commodification, all of which enriches a particular class of persons to the 
impoverishment of the rest. Panpsychism offers a very different worldview because it 
recognizes consciousness in all things and so acknowledges the aliveness and vitality in 
things. But not only are all things joined by mind but, (if one adopts the form of 
panpsychism outlined above) all things are what they are because of everything else in 
the universe. This view is not dissimilar to the type of holism found in Ollman (1976) who 
argues that Marx thought in terms of internal relations, a Greek philosophy developed by 
both Spinoza and Hegel. Ollman believes that the way Marx used words and concepts 
reflect this understanding, which made some of his ideas difficult to comprehend. The 
idea that Marx advocated internal relations (Relations) is controversial because Marx did 
not overtly endorse the philosophy. Nevertheless, as Ollman (1976) points out, many of 
Marx’s comments (for example, when he declares that man ‘is nature’ or that objects 
‘reside in the nature of his being’) indicate not solely inter-connection with the external 
world but rather “some kind of union with his object; they are in fact relationally 
contained in one another, which requires that each be conceived of as a Relation” (pp. 
27-28). Such understandings encourage an expansive and inclusive sense of self 
beyond the individual and separate body/mind, and since we naturally take care of 
ourselves if we are living sanely, a natural, inherent sense of meaning, equality, and 
justice within the universe itself is once again restored and available to be engaged with. 
4.11.  Chapter Summary 
I have argued in this chapter that materialism and the current political ideologies 
based on it do not give a coherent account of the fundamental experience of 
consciousness. Centering consciousness as a legitimate datum of exploration positions 
it not only as a necessary alternative perspective on the nature of the physical world and 
reality, but also as a corrective to the rampant materialist values found within today’s 
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society. I have further argued that a parsimonious theory of consciousness can be found 
in panpsychism, which asserts the presence of consciousness throughout the material 
universe. Such an understanding challenges the view that the world is a mere machine, 
pushed and pulled by mindless cause and effect, but rather that it is alive and full of 
meaning and purpose. Consciousness is not an additional property of matter in this dual-
aspect conception of the reality of the world; it is instead what things are ‘from the inside’ 
as it were, their intrinsic nature as opposed to what they do in the world. I have proposed 
that while there are different experiences of consciousness both at the human and non-
human levels, there exists a fundamental or universal consciousness that is present 
without qualification or limit within all things, as all things. Such an understanding sees 
the cosmos as relational, intimate, connected, entangled, and participatory. It also 
challenges our view of what we consider our ‘self’, enlarging it, both in mind and body, to 
contain multitudes, as the poet Walt Whitman wrote. 
When the body and mind are seen to be inseparable from the world so that “the 
world and its animals and plants and people are found to be one’s own body - then we 
walk with everybody and everything on a common path. This is compassion, suffering 
with others” (Aitken, 1996, p. 93). My intention in this chapter has been to show how a 
panpsychic perspective that underscores the ubiquity of consciousness as the intrinsic 
nature of things not only opposes the materialism that forms the basis for capitalist 
ideology, but that it inherently grounds an ethic of care, equality, and justice. 
Contrastingly, a materialism that either denies the actual reality of consciousness or 
which treats it as a mere epi-phenomenon of complex brains has invited a world-view 
based on a mechanistic determinism, where values are relative and socially constructed 
by the capitalist ruling classes. Accordingly, values are based not on the intrinsic worth 
of a thing but instead on what use that thing has for us. As I have argued in previous 
chapters, the psychologies originated along with the scientific revolution and the 
Industrial Revolution and its practices are deeply aligned with materialism and capitalist 
ideology. Consequently, helping professions like counselling psychology have been 
unable to dissociate themselves from the perpetuation of capitalist imperatives and thus 
have not been able to describe exactly why they need to address social justice within 
their practices. I have argued that the counselling profession must provide a critique of 
capitalist modes of production if it is truly to engage with social justice issues. At the 
same time, it must offer a theory of mind which accounts for the existence and functions 
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of consciousness and which can be the basis of new ways of engaging with the world. In 
light of the discussion so far, which has emphasized systemic challenges to the current 
order in the interests of eradicating alienation and its effects, as well as advocating for a 
new way of understanding consciousness as the ground for an ethic of social justice, the 
next chapter will attempt to provide a way in which helping professions like counselling 
psychology can extract themselves from the clutches of their capitalist progenitor to 





















“I like this place and could willingly waste my time in it.” 
William Shakespeare 
 
“How fortunate are you and I 
whose home is timelessness. 
We who have wandered down 
from fragrant mountains of eternal now 
to frolic in such mysteries 
as birth and death 
a day, or maybe even less…” 









Chapter 5: Toward an Emancipatory Practice 
5.1. Chapter Introduction 
My intention in this final chapter is to explore what a professional practice might 
look like if it were to engage with social justice issues at the broad systemic level, while 
recognizing the ubiquity and centrality of consciousness within the material world, 
especially as the ground for shared values such as democracy and equality. Since what 
we are looking for are concrete examples, I turn once again to the practice field that I am 
familiar with: counselling. Hence, I shall explore ways of practising counselling that could 
have wide applications to other human services fields, including teaching. I invite my 
reader to imagine, when reading the conversational vignettes between a therapist and a 
client at the conclusion of later sections of this chapter, similar conversations to be had 
in their own fields, such as in teaching contexts, between a teacher and a student, or in 
a workplace, between a manager and an employee.  
I proceed, mindful of the systemic, social, and political forces that exist to 
diminish the importance of social justice work within helping professions. These forces 
seem especially resistant to critiques of capitalism and the introduction of alternative 
views on consciousness and its place in nature. I have argued so far that despite calls 
for systemic change as an essential area of engagement for the helping professions, 
particularly since it is here at the level of the socio-economic that mental health issues 
have been recognized to arise, there has been a paucity of attention given in the 
literature to an analysis of capitalism, class division, and the effects of alienation in the 
workplace. My wish is that this dissertation remedies this absence. I have proposed that 
it is alienation, especially as found in workplaces, along with the lifelong narratives and 
expectations constructed around our working lives, that are responsible for the plethora 
of mental health issues we see today, and with which counselling psychology and other 
helping professions must engage. The alienated condition is one that not only embodies 
the disintegration of real connection and relationship between people and nature, but 
also reflects the growing rise of inequality through class division. These inequalities 
themselves lead to mental health issues (Wilkinson et al., 2009). But alienation, as we 
have seen, also promotes a sense of disconnection from oneself, a separation from our 
true, authentic self as consciousness, resulting in artificial dualistic ruptures within all 
levels of the mind, in addition to those that occur between the mind and the body. These 
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divisions are perpetuated and maintained through a culture immersed in 
commodification and consumerism, as people live their lives working in employment that 
is unrewarding, or perceived as failing to contribute to society, or precarious and 
undependable. I have argued that although counselling psychology, as my main 
example, has rightfully embraced the importance of social justice within its mandate, it 
has really only made policy change and revision its aim, and has failed to problematize 
the systemic ground that fosters alienation and associated mental health concerns, that 
is, capitalism itself. Indeed, I have maintained that the counselling profession is not only 
historically tied to capitalism, but that it also fosters and supports the system through its 
practices, thus assisting to maintain the status quo.  
In the previous chapter, I introduced a dual-aspect monistic panpsychism to 
account for the presence and experience of consciousness. An analysis of the place of 
consciousness within materiality effectively challenges, from the inside as it were, 
current materialist world-views that philosophically support a rapacious capitalism that 
depends on notions of atomization, separation, commodification, and de-spiritment of 
the world for the purposes of accumulating capital. The recognition of the proper place of 
consciousness within an account of our material existence in the world entails both an 
engagement with the new paradigm as a source of an ethic of equality and democracy, 
and with systemic socio-political change, especially if the helping professions are sincere 
in their determination to address social justice issues. On the one hand, our workplaces, 
and their supporting social systems like schools and colleges, are modelled after 
dualistic Cartesian materialist world-views which treat people and the environment as 
machines, commodities to be mined for profit. On the other hand, an alive and sentient 
world, as represented by a panpsychic dual-aspect monism, is one which demands an 
ethic of fairness, equality, and care, and invites the re-establishment of truly connected 
human and non-human relationships. E. O. Wright (2019) makes the point that, in order 
to oppose capitalism within society in general, there must be a critique of it as not only in 
opposition to people’s material interests, an argument from class, but also as a system 
contrary to people’s values and ethics. I concur with him, especially since the 
panpsychic view of the ubiquity of consciousness centers values and ethics within the 
presence of consciousness itself; thus, a denial of the primacy of consciousness is 
associative with the obscuration of values, and their replacement with social 
constructions based on the political ideology of the times. 
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The problem with restricting analysis to only class relations in the 21st century, 
from the outside as it were, is that many professionals, self-employed persons, and other 
‘white-collar’ workers have mixed and sometimes complicated class positions, which 
obfuscates their perceived material interests. A middle manager, for example, can be 
viewed as a worker, and yet they work in the interests of the owners of the company. 
Their position is further obscured if the workers they manage are members of minority 
groups, or if they themselves belong to a minority group. The intersectionality of class, 
race, sex, or ability often serves to make it difficult for such managers to know where 
their best interests lie. Consequently, an appeal to values, which Wright (2019) equates 
with equality/fairness, democracy/freedom, and community/solidarity, is essential to, at 
the very least, identifying where one stands, opening the possibility of committing to 
social change, and to recruiting all persons to the cause of establishing more democratic 
systems. I argue that such values are grounded from the inside, in both the experiential 
existence of consciousness itself, that is, in subjectivity, and the contingent world-view 
that recognizes the Earth as conscious, alive, and full of meaning. The dual-aspect 
version of panpsychism presented here, particularly as it applies to helping practices, 
demands an engagement with both consciousness from the ‘inside’ and social 
transformation from the ‘outside’. 
5.2. Challenges to Counselling Psychology’s Role as Emancipatory 
I would like to first address some initial concerns regarding the efficacy of the 
counselling profession within a social justice framework, especially at the larger systemic 
level of analysis. If one accepts the premise that counselling psychology is grounded 
within capitalism historically, sharing its world-view of a mechanistic, materialist world 
populated by atomized and self-contained individuals, and that its practices, in fact, 
perpetuate the capitalist system, then it begs the question whether the profession can 
address social injustice through a critique of capitalism. Sometimes, even though 
counsellors appreciate the wider social determinants of their clients’ complaints, they do 
not feel sufficiently equipped to deal with their issues on the wider level (McMahon, 
Arthur, & Collins, 2008). Perhaps it may be the case that counselling psychology’s 
sphere of concern and practice can only go so far; it may indeed be effective and 
necessary in challenging discriminatory policies, for example, by opposing them on an 
organizational level, but it might not be capable of adequately resisting the very system 
that gave rise to such policies, apart from perhaps providing academic critiques. As a 
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practical matter, how is it possible for a counsellor to address systemic issues with a 
client within a 50 minute, standard counselling session, even when it is plain that the 
person’s complaints are not individualized, disordered responses to life, as might be the 
view of the counselling hegemony, but natural and normal manifestations of alienated 
human nature within capitalist systems? 
On the one hand, an argument might be made that it is important not to confuse 
liberation with therapy (Cohen, 1986).53 Essentially, this view discards social justice as a 
concern within counselling practice. One obvious reason is that mental distress may be 
caused by many different and complex sources, some of which are unrelated to social 
conditions per se. Despite the fact that the manner in which childhood distress, for 
example, actually manifests is very likely shaped by social conditions, with neoliberal 
societies not being particularly conducive to healthy, supportive, and non-problematic 
resolutions of the issue, it could still be the case that individual counselling addressing 
childhood trauma (in this example) would nevertheless be warranted and effective.   
Much like the premise of the 1999 movie “The Matrix,” capitalism and 
neoliberalism have created an alternate world-reality that appears genuine to its 
inhabitants, but is not. In it the sense of being a unique and vital individual engaged in 
authentic connection with others and with the natural world is contorted to promote 
notions of individualism, competition, and ways of relating to others through commodity 
exchange. Thinking they are free and that they are living and working within a 
democratic system, people are in fact forced to sell their labour power to make money to 
survive. Capitalism transforms and distorts the relationships that formerly connected 
societies of people and, furthermore, creates the illusion that people are independent 
and free. Underneath the outward appearance, however, the social relations of 
capitalism function to merely give the semblance of independence. More importantly, 
and especially relevant to this discussion, these social relations themselves, shaped by 
alienation and commodification, become internalized as the essence of the individual 
(Cohen, 1986). As a consequence, particularly at a time where many mental health 
issues are related to anxieties and depressions associated with disconnected and 
                                                
53 He means this in the political sense, of course, and not the spiritual sense. I suggest counselling practices should be the 
wellspring of both spiritual and political change. David Loy, a Buddhist (2018) scholar, writing of the non-duality of personal 
and societal change, argues that personal transformation should not be separate from social transformation, and, indeed, 
inform each other in a genuine spiritual path.   
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alienated lives, counselling actually does work to relieve such distress, even at these 
decontextualized and individualized levels. Recalling the arguments in this dissertation, 
particularly in Chapter Three, I agree with Cohen that counselling is situated within a 
contradictory position since “[o]n the one hand therapy mystifies the underlying social 
relations. On the other hand it is appropriate to capitalist reality. At a certain level its 
language and belief system help the individual negotiate the capitalist world” (Cohen, 
1986, p. 23). As a result, for a counsellor who holds an anti-capitalist orientation, theory 
and practice would tend to be divorced, with their interventions based solely on a 
pragmatism of ‘whatever works’. On this level, individualistic therapists and social justice 
therapists utilize the same models, the same practices, and the same explanations for 
the appearance and amelioration of mental distress (Cohen, 1986). The main difference 
between them is that the anti-capitalist social justice therapist, more aligned with 
contextual explanations philosophically, do not themselves believe the explanations for 
the theories of the practices they use. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that therapy may work from individualist 
perspectives, I worry about the authenticity of the counsellor themselves under these 
conditions and whether these inconsistencies, pretenses, and disparities between theory 
and practice lead to a kind of cognitive dissonance, affecting not only the counsellor 
personally and professionally, but also their practices and relationships. A counsellor 
may legitimately question whether therapy, despite its successes within the capitalist 
Matrix, is really doing anything other than perpetuating the neoliberal agenda, and they 
may wonder if they are providing a genuine service. One alternative that may follow from 
this dilemma, of course, is a complete rejection of neoliberal discourse around 
psychological distress. This is the position of Marxist writers like Bruce Cohen (2016), a 
sociologist, whose main critique is directed towards psychiatry and its practices (i.e. in 
the short term, for example, he advocates for the abolition of the use of ECT, and 
withdrawing the ability of psychiatrists to prescribe medication) but who also believes 
“that all the allied professions associated with dictating and controlling our behaviour 
through the psychiatric discourse must also go” (p. 207).  
Nevertheless, I would argue that, notwithstanding the veracity of much of the 
critique of the modern psychological enterprise, it is possible to construct theories and 
practices within this domain that are consistent with critiques of capitalism and 
neoliberalism, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Such approaches within 
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counselling would seek to erode capitalism from within, with the implementation of 
practices that look for the spaces and cracks within neoliberal society from which 
democratic ways may be seeded and grown (Wright, 2019). Using the analogy of an 
ecosystem to consider the multiple domains in which change could occur to transform 
capitalist society, Wright (2019) suggests that  
the strategic vision of eroding capitalism imagines introducing the most 
vigorous varieties of emancipatory species of noncapitalist economic 
activity into the ecosystem of capitalism, nurturing their development by 
protecting their niches and figuring out ways of expanding their habitats. 
The ultimate hope is that eventually these alien species can spill out of their 
narrow niches and transform the character of the ecosystem as a whole. 
(Chapter 3, Eroding Capitalism, para. 3)  
The helping professions as a whole are, I propose, ideally situated to contribute to such 
an endeavour. Of course, they do not do this through emancipatory economic activity, 
but through emancipatory identity and relationship transformational practices. This is not 
a novel idea. As we have seen, the notion that therapy, for example, could liberate 
people from within capitalist societies was advocated by Marxist humanists like Erich 
Fromm who believed that it could potentially free the individual from the strictures of the 
neoliberal imperative and reconcile the person to their true nature (Cohen, 1986). 
Although this is accomplished with some difficulty, I would argue that a new vision of the 
role of consciousness within materiality, particularly conceptions that are panpsychic in 
nature, and the ethical and democratic imperatives inherent within this view, opens up 
the possibilities for alternative theoretical perspectives on helping practices, and their 
emancipatory place in our society. 
5.3. Engaging with the Macro-levels through the Micro 
As Goodman et al. (2004) point out in their comprehensive survey of how to 
implement social justice issues into both counselling theory and practice, the dilemma 
for anti-capitalist counsellors is translating theoretical understandings to a practical level, 
and how to bring a systemic critique into the every-day practices of the therapist. It is all 
very well to ascertain that “the individual struggles experienced by so many people 
actually are rooted in oppressive social, political, and cultural forces and that these 
struggles cannot be resolved without changing the systems and structures from which 
they arise” (Goodman et al., 2004, p. 798), but how does this play out in the day-to-day 
work of a counsellor?   
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As a preface to what follows, I would like to like to emphasize the following 
proposals, which have been elucidated in previous chapters, and which provide a 
necessary reference frame for the rest of the discussion.   
First, therapy sessions can be seen to be themselves the cracks within which 
new ways of seeing the world can begin to take root and spread into individuals’ lives, 
and into their multiple relationships. As mentioned, this need not merely be restricted to 
the proliferation of ‘non-capitalist economic activity’ as a counter measure to systemic 
injustice as Wright (2019) proposes; other types of activity, too, may be recruited for the 
purpose of upending injustice. The helping encounter itself, grounded in an authentic 
relationship and assisted by appropriate practices, can change perspectives and nurture 
the growth of the luscious new environments of a truly democratic world.   
Second, I have argued that it is consciousness itself that is the intrinsic nature of 
all things, and that in human beings alienation from this reality, especially cultivated 
through workplace arrangements, constitutes the beginning of a creeping 
commodification and alienation at all levels of the human psyche, in addition to the 
alienation in multiple kinds of relationships due to oppressive work conditions. Capitalist 
social relations, which, as we have seen, are alienated ways of being by definition, usurp 
the central space of identity properly belonging to consciousness, resulting in the 
plethora of mental health issues we see today. Consequently, a therapy that repositions 
consciousness as the center and ground of the individual is required if the therapy is to 
be truly emancipatory.  
Finally, I have outlined the case for the intra- and inter-sectionality of the world 
both at a physical level and also at the level of mind, that all of matter is enminded, and 
that not only is the part found within the whole but also that the whole is found within the 
part. This idea aligns not only with Ollman’s concept of ‘internal relations’ within the 
Marxian tradition, but also with panpsychist philosophers of mind, and with the perennial 
traditions of the mystical branches of both the East and West. In practical terms this 
means that the micro-, mesa-, and macro- distinctions of Goodman et al.’s (2004) 
analysis of the desired domains of counselling’s engagement with social justice issues 
are mutually inter-dependent and, most importantly, intra-dependent so that the micro-
levels of analysis can be found within the macro-levels, and, most crucially for this 
inquiry, the macro-level is found within the micro-levels. In practical terms what might be 
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ostensibly considered individual therapy can not only influence the broader systemic 
realms in Wright’s sense of introducing oppositional emancipatory perspectives, but that 
its very practices themselves can contain the seeds of freedom from the systemic 
injustice that we strive for. 
5.4. The Helping Relationship 
I would like to begin the following discussion with a general account of why the 
helping relationship (I prefer this term to ‘therapeutic’, and it is equally applicable to 
many of the helping professions) intrinsically has a liberatory effect within counselling. 
As I have described in a number of places within this dissertation, alienation manifests 
as a distortion of relationships within the economic, environmental, social, political, and 
personal spheres. By definition, alienation removes us from real connection and intimacy 
with the other, estranging us into separate and individual parts, and turning us, at all 
levels of our being, into commodities to be mined for surplus value. The effect is both 
intentional and unintentional on the part of the capitalist classes. On the one hand, 
alienation serves to further the notion that we are separate and isolated beings, whose 
role is as competitors and consumers in a world of constructed and mostly trivial needs. 
On the other hand, alienation can be thought of as an ‘externality’, an unwanted but 
necessary side-effect of the business of capitalism, and although economically and 
socially costly, it is, nevertheless, a requirement if business is to continue to profit those 
in power. Alienation fosters commodity fetishism, an unnatural and manufactured 
replacement for real relationships between people and their world, which creates the 
empty self, a kind of internalization within the individual of the dynamics and practices of 
capitalism, a false self-narrative of perpetual unworthiness that hides their intrinsic true 
self. 
Contrary to common belief in the importance and efficacy of certain helping 
techniques and models over others to initiate client change, Miller, Duncan, & Hubble 
(1997), in an overview of the evidence on therapy’s effectiveness, report that 40% of 
therapy’s success comes from factors occurring in the person’s life outside of the 
therapy room. This means that life itself, with its changing circumstances, conspire to 
improve the perception people have of their situation for the better. Interestingly, the 
quality of the relationship accounts for 30% of therapy’s effectiveness, with only 15% 
assigned to technique, and 15% to hope, placebo, and expectation. Thus, technique or 
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models do not predominantly matter for client change. It is really relationship and 
connection that make a difference in a person’s life. Although this should be 
unsurprising, since it is well documented, for example, that the quality of relational 
attachments during a child’s early years has profound impacts on the quality of their later 
relationships (Karen, 1994), and, furthermore, that the relationship with a helper may 
assist in uncovering and repairing ruptures to these early relationships, the psychology 
profession (and the industries that are spawned from it) continues to promote the idea 
that it is techniques and models that matter, often to the disregard of strong relational 
bonds. However, this technocratic approach to counselling not only is consistent with the 
capitalist agenda of the commodification of the mechanized psyche but it also assists in 
obscuring the importance of genuine relationship as a remedy to the impoverished 
isolationism of neoliberal ideology 
When people experience a lack of real relationship in their lives, perhaps 
showing up as anxiety, fear, guilt, sorrow, lack of purpose, and so on, they often look to 
the helping professions for assistance. It is the helping relationship itself, the authentic 
connection between the helper and the person, that opens up the possibility for the 
realization of what real, vulnerable relationships would look like in their lives. An effective 
counselling session, for example, becomes a conduit for empathy, deep listening, verbal 
and non-verbal connection, interest, encouragement, validation, and support. This 
encounter seeks to know the person in their depths, just as they are, with all their joys 
and sorrows, hopes and fears, without ulterior designs, judgement, or motives. The 
relationship is genuine because there is no contrivance to commodify it, or to use it as a 
means to another end. A good helping relationship is, by definition, unalienated since it 
both seeks a way of being with another that decenters the interiorized narratives of 
neoliberal ideology, revealing the person’s true self, the center from which they can 
move in the world in a more emancipated manner, and which also highlights ways in 
which the client has already found opportunities to resist oppressive stories. Within the 
counselling relationship, the person discovers that part of themselves that exists deeper 
than the narratives of separation, individuality, competition, and constructed needs. 
Unhelpful stories of the self, based on habitual retelling from the past and projected into 
the future, can be seen from the bright reality of the present moment where real 
connection with themselves and others may be explored, leading to a sudden or gradual 
release of false and confining self-constructions. The relationship between helper and 
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person is, therefore, itself an emancipatory act, a way of inserting noncapitalist relational 
activity and ways of being directly into the lives of persons and whose effects extend to 
all areas of their lives, including the macro-levels of the political and ideological. 
5.5.     Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
While recognizing the importance of the helping relationship by its very nature to 
embody the essence of a non-commodified, non-competitive, genuine, and authentic 
relationship, especially as it might form the basis for its infusion into other areas of life, it 
is nevertheless also necessary that the conversations with clients move toward meeting 
their needs. This often involves challenging conditioned, habitual self-narratives, 
loosening their effects, and providing different perspectives that might possibly elicit 
change and growth. In light of my second consideration mentioned above, this may 
comprise introducing deeper aspects of the self, aspects that exist beyond the narrow 
confines of capitalist expressions of self. I have argued that this aspect of the self is 
consciousness, which lies as the intrinsic nature of the client, and of all things. 
Connection with this aspect of the self unites people with their own freedom, including 
their freedom from functioning as a lifelong producer and consumer of products within 
capitalist society. Any therapy that is to be emancipatory must not only be capable of 
connecting the client to this central aspect of their identity directly, but must work within 
processes that point back to it from various directions. Based on the third consideration 
noted above, a therapy working with such processes is effective not only at the micro-
level involving the individual’s psyche, but also, at the same time, at the macro-level 
involving the person’s perception of their engagement with roles within capitalist society. 
As I described in the introduction to this dissertation, I changed careers from a 
corporate job to counselling therapist work late in life. There were the usual challenges 
of time allotment and finances, but there were also nagging doubts about the switch 
itself. Was I too old? Why not stay with what I knew, where it was safe and certain? 
Would I be any good as a counsellor, and what if I wasn’t? What then? And so on. When 
the idea first occurred to me to investigate the possibilities of changing careers, I began 
to read everything I could on counselling and the models used to practice. One of the 
first books I read was Get Out of Your Mind and Into Your Life by Steven Hayes (2005). 
This book was a popular presentation of a therapy approach he had co-originated called 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, or ACT. Not only did the fortuitous discovery of 
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this book provide me with a model that I use to this day with my own clients, but the 
approach assisted me to move forward to pursue my studies and to finally change 
careers completely. I will use ACT as an example of a therapy approach that can provide 
a means to changing at both the individual and systemic levels, not because it is the only 
one, but because it is the approach with which I have the most familiarity. Furthermore, 
although the ACT model is flexible and is now used by a broad range of helping 
professions, my elucidation of the ACT processes in terms of systemic change 
possibilities are entirely my own.  
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, or ACT, may be briefly defined as: 
an approach to psychological intervention defined in terms of certain 
theoretical processes, not a specific technology. In theoretical and process 
terms we can define ACT as a psychological intervention based on modern 
behavioral psychology, including Relational Frame Theory, that applies 
mindfulness and acceptance processes, and commitment and behavior 
change processes, to the creation of psychological flexibility. (ACBS 
Website)   
There are six key processes in ACT that, when working well in a person’s 
experience, form the basis of psychological flexibility. They are self-as-context, cognitive 
defusion, being present, acceptance, committed action, and values (Hayes et al., 1999). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to give a full explication of ACT, I 
would like to explore these processes principally in relation to two of the three of 
Goodman et al.’s (2004) main areas of focus in counselling work, that is, the individual 
and family level, or the micro, and the systemic level, or macro. It has been the 
argument of this dissertation that it is within the level of the macro, the capitalist system 
and its neoliberal ideologies, that real change must take place for an appreciable impact 
on mental health concerns, but that most individual counselling at the micro-level is not 
up to the task of nurturing such change due to its complicity with the system itself. 
However, I have also argued that consciousness, the source of meaning, value, justice, 
connection and identity, has been missing from our materialist world-view, the same 
world-view that gave us individual psychotherapies. Returning the experience and 
understanding of consciousness to its place as the intrinsic nature of things, including 
human beings, significantly undermines the capitalist relation with therapy and opens up 
the possibilities of a truly emancipatory individual therapy based on a foundation of an 
ethic of justice and democracy. Thus, I believe that individual therapy does have a place 
in effecting change at both the individual and the systemic levels. Keeping in mind the 
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previously mentioned outcomes of my explorations so far - that consciousness is 
ubiquitous throughout all things; that individual therapy may offer a means to eroding the 
neoliberal paradigm from within, carving its own pathways through the capitalist agenda 
and providing new ways of being in the world; and that the totality of things, in mind and 
matter, are wholly present in each individual thing - I propose that approaches like ACT 
can furnish ways to accomplish this goal. I explore these ideas while taking into 
consideration Goodman et al.’s (2004) six principles of a) on-going self-examination, b) 
sharing power, c) giving voice, d) facilitating consciousness raising, e) building on 
strengths, and f) leaving clients with the tools for social change, as a guiding framework 
for social justice practices at all levels. In the following discussion I will use these 
principles randomly to highlight the discussion. 
I begin by providing some explanations of each of the six ACT processes. They 
are described as processes because they are fluid and flexible, each one connected to 
the others, but also, importantly, each one found within the others. This is a reflection of 
the fluidity and changing nature of life itself and a demonstration of how phenomena are 
intra-connected, as I have argued. They are not techniques, although sometimes 
techniques are used to illustrate and practice them. I have taken some liberties in my 
explication of each of the processes, especially the key one for my purposes, self-as-
context, in order to illustrate my contention that micro-level interactions have macro-level 
effects. Thus, contrary to Relational Frame Theory’s understanding of self-as-context, for 
example, as a verbal relational frame of I-Here-Now as opposed to You-There-Then, 
emphasizing a solely linguistic basis for perspective-taking, I consider self-as-context to 
be an actual ontological category, and I explain the process in these terms. Either way, 
whether one considers this aspect of the self as a mere verbal frame formed through the 
acquisition of language, reinforced through operant conditioning, or whether one 
proposes an actually existent sense of self, the manifestation in practice of the process 
is the same.   
I have also illustrated each process with a short vignette of a counselling 
interaction, aimed to provide a sense of it; again, it should be borne in mind that this is 
somewhat artificial since there can be considerable movement between each process as 




Self-as-context is undoubtedly the most difficult process to understand for both a 
counsellor and a client and yet it is the one that has the most relevance to this 
discussion. For many people the notion of self-as-context seems familiar as it has 
comparisons to their spiritual practices. In Buddhism, for example, it is known as anatta, 
the no-self, a term with many interpretations depending upon tradition, but which points 
to a sense of self beyond our usual conceptual and storied understandings of ourselves. 
In contrast to our familiar socially-constructed narratives and descriptions of who or what 
we are in the world, which can generally be described as self-as-content, self-as-context 
indicates the ‘I’ that holds or contains these stories and self-depictions. It is experiencing 
itself, the subject, the sense ‘here I am’ (Hayes, 2005). This has also been called the 
‘observing self’ (Deikman, 1982), or the ‘witness-consciousness’ (Albahari, 2009), and is 
another name for awareness or simply, as I have used the term in this dissertation, 
consciousness itself. This essential and central consciousness is qualitative, in that it it is 
only accessible from a first-person subjectivity, and thus is not observable through the 
quantitative methods of a third-person science. Self-as-context, or consciousness, is a 
way of being rather than having, a vital distinction for a liberatory praxis since ‘having’ is 
essential to capitalist production and accumulation, but ‘being’ is beyond all 
appropriation and commodification. 
Deikman (1982) clarifies the necessary distinctions to be made by asserting that 
at the heart of psychopathology lies a fundamental confusion between the 
self as object and the self of pure subjectivity. Emotions, thoughts, 
impulses, images, and sensations are the contents of consciousness: we 
witness them; we are aware of their existence. Likewise, the body, the self-
image, and the self-concept are all constructs that we observe. But our core 
sense of personal existence - the “I” - is located in awareness itself, not in 
its content. (p. 10)   
Hence, the observing self is pure subjectivity and, consequently, cannot be described as 
possessing any particular attributes. Nevertheless, it is experienced as spacious, 
timeless, ever-present, and, because it is not an object, it is not a thing. No-thing. As 
mentioned before in previous chapters of this dissertation, this is the true empty (sunyata 
for Buddhists) self which is the intrinsic nature of all matter, and for people in our 
capitalist society it is that which is obscured by the adopted empty self of neoliberal 
ideology (Rose, 1996). The neoliberal empty self is almost like a shadow form of the 
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intrinsic observing self of consciousness. Superficially, it goals and intentions seem 
attractive enough: it seeks love, peace, connection, justice, and creativity, for example, 
but it does so through the consumption of commodities because it has adopted and is 
enacting the social relations in which it is embedded. As we noted in Chapter One, the 
commodified relationships found in capitalism are fundamentally distorted, however, and 
cannot ultimately satisfy the person. The Buddhists call this condition dukkha, or 
unsatisfactoriness, which manifests as personal and social unhappiness. In contrast, the 
observing self of consciousness naturally manifests the values and qualities so desired 
by the commodity-obsessed empty self. So, for example, since consciousness is itself 
empty of objects, a pure subjectivity, it is experienced as a spacious openness, 
welcoming of everyone and everything, and thus is love itself. As it is that within which 
phenomenal objects of all sorts arise and depart, consciousness-as-subject itself 
remains completely still, and is experienced as peace. Finally, since it is a pure 
subjectivity inherent within all things, with no objective thing to separate it from ‘others’, it 
is the ground of equality itself. Of course, how these values and qualities manifest within 
a society remains to be explored, but the intimate experience of being grounded in the 
true empty self is essential and, happily, always available. 
Specifically, within helping environments people often present with narrow and 
inflexible narratives of themselves, others, and their relationships, which tend to become 
descriptions of who they are at their core. These stories are often personally 
unsatisfactory and causal of difficulties in their lives. They tend to be constricted and 
limited accounts of themselves and their situation which undermine or obscure possible 
new directions. As discussed, these narratives are the internalized relations of the 
capitalist society in which people are living, stories that become the essence of the 
person (Cohen, 1986). As such, they are assumed aspects of the self that can be 
objectified and commodified by the socio-cultural ideology. Self-as-context is a 
conceptualization of the self which evacuates such narratives, uncovering the actual 
intrinsic nature of people as consciousness itself. From a helping perspective, this is the 
sense of self that assists clients to connect with something that is unchanging and 
existentially safe, and from which they can non-judgmentally observe all passing 
contents of consciousness, including their old stories of who they are (Hayes et al., 
1999). As Deikman indicates, contact with the self-as-context helps people to 
differentiate who they really are at center from their passing peripheral thoughts, 
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feelings, emotions, and memories. Touching this sense of self is both enlarging and 
empowering. Above all, it is simultaneously liberating at the personal and systemic levels 
since this aspect of self is pure subjectivity and, therefore, cannot be commodified and 
mined for surplus value as objects can.  
In order to access this aspect of themselves in a session, I oftentimes use 
metaphors, which are extremely useful for by-passing the rational mind, so valued in 
contemporary discourses, but which can sometimes become an impediment in therapy. 
For example, if a person plays, or knows how to play, chess, I may ask them to imagine 
a chess board with all the pieces on full display (Hayes et al., 1999). Each piece 
represents thoughts and feelings, or stories about who the person is. The conversations 
may take different directions but usually after identifying the pieces as the circumstances 
of the person’s life, and, most importantly, who they are, the person is asked if there is 
another part of the chess-board that might represent another, different aspect of self. 
The answer, of course, is that they are the board itself, which, despite the struggles and 
narratives raging on top of it, is quite indifferent, safe, and secure. The board holds all 
the pieces but is unaffected by their movements. I also point out that despite a shift in 
identity from the pieces on the board to the board itself, the pieces do not necessarily 
disappear; they may indeed remain but with the switch in identity their influence over the 
person is reduced. 
When people move from their storied self-as-content identities to a broader, 
capacious self-as-context identity they perform a radical act of defiance. They usurp the 
neoliberal internalized self and replace it (actually, it was always there unacknowledged, 
a primordial source of alienation) with consciousness itself, a pure subjectivity. Here, 
then, is a crack in the fortress of the oppressive capitalist domain that can be nurtured 
and encouraged within a counselling session. For it is a small step to subsequently 
realize that everyone’s essence is the same and that we are one in inter-subjectivity, 
each deserving of equality, justice, and care. Finally, this experiential understanding may 
further open up the realization that all things have consciousness as their intrinsic 
nature. This might take the form, when the opportunity presents itself, of having 
conversations, perhaps initiated through the person’s spirituality (Hayes, 1984; 
Westgate, 1996), around the sense of self that exists beyond the rational and emotional 
mind ordinarily conceived, and which is, in fact, present everywhere. Many mindfulness 
based therapists, rooting their approaches within Eastern meditative traditions, have 
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pioneered this kind of approach (Deikman, 1983; Welwood, 2002; Wilber, 1979; Wilber, 
2000).  
ACT integrates this broader sense of ourselves into conversations in order to 
enlarge people’s perspectives on their lives and to gently challenge narratives they may 
hold which are self-defeating and constraining to their valued life directions. In a sense, 
conversations around self-as-context reflect the principle of consciousness-raising in its 
truest form. Specifically, when consideration is given to consciousness-raising people 
may, at the micro-level of the individual self, experience that part of themselves that is 
free (as context) of the designation of potentially limiting and oppressive descriptions 
(the content) like worker, consumer, order-taker, not-good-enough, not-worthy-enough, 
controlled, beggared, or deprived, for example. Consciousness-raising would involve 
both realizing this liberating aspect of themselves and assisting them to abide within its 
more centered and grounded presence, while, at the same time, opening up 
conversations around possibilities for resistance, speaking out, organization, refusal, 
dissent, and non-conformity in the workplace. Drawing on the work of Paul Freire, 
Goodman et al. (2004) articulate the power of consciousness-raising as a means to 
achieve an awareness of people’s socioeconomic position and their cultural contexts, 
normalize distressed thoughts and feelings as understandable responses to neoliberal 
inequities, and open prospects to challenge and change those realities through 
conversations that highlight systemic oppression caused by ideologies, social 
institutions, and societal expectations and norms. 
The following vignette demonstrates how an experience of self-as-context might 
be introduced within a counselling session. It is not intended to show the full scope of 
these kinds of conversations, which often involve moving to other processes, and circling 
back later on in session or further sessions once progress is made, but it nevertheless 
captures the possibilities of this kind of approach.  
Client:         I feel like I’ve taken on too much. My wife always says we should   
                   just have had one kid...now we have three. There’s just more   
                   responsibility with more kids. And I have to work more, harder   
                   too…I’d like to just leave, take off, and forget about everything. I  
                  mean I wouldn’t but I think about it. 
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Counsellor: Do you remember the other day we were talking about the chess- 
                   board, how it contains all the different pieces, holding them all, but  
                   itself not affected one way or another by the battle going on on top of  
                   it? 
Client:         Yeah, I was thinking afterwards how that would apply to me. I mean I  
                   do seem to be juggling a lot all at one...I’m a husband, I’m a dad, I’m  
                   an employee, though apparently not a very productive one according  
                   to my boss, and on top of all that my mom’s not been doing too well. 
Counsellor: That’s interesting. You say ‘I am a father, son, husband,  
                   employee’...I’m sure you can think of other parts you play. Every role  
                   seems different relatively speaking, but I wonder about the thread  
                   that runs through all the identities you’ve taken on?  
Client:         What thread is that? 
Counsellor: Here, let’s write them out [client writes each out on a sheet of paper]:   
                   ‘I am a man’, ‘I am a husband’, ‘I am an employee’, ‘I am a father’, ‘I  
                   am a son’. You could add a whole string of others: ‘I am 43 years  
                   old’, ‘I am Caucasian’, and so on. 
Client:         Oh, I see now...the common thread is ‘I am’. 
Counsellor: Exactly, all these roles you play, the identities you have, the  
                   descriptions you might have of yourself...all of them come and go,  
                               but you are always there. What’s that phrase ‘Everywhere you go  
                               there you are?’ Anyway, the ‘I am’ is always there...it was there when  
                               you were 2 years old and it will be there when you’re 82. All these   
                   other identities you have had changed, and will change, in time, but  
                   the sense of ‘I am’ remains throughout. 
Client:         I see that but what difference does it make? I mean how is it going to  
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                   get me out from all this mess I’ve got myself into? 
Counsellor: I can’t really speak for you but its a good place from which to decide  
                   what you want to do. Would you rather live out of a space that is  
                   constant, grounded, and centered or from one of the limited,  
                   temporary identities you have, some of which are causing you some  
                   real trouble? 
Client:         Yeah, I see what you mean...that’s the board that holds all the pieces  
                    together. 
Counsellor: Yes. Perhaps we can explore some ways to stay with this self. 
5.5.2. Cognitive Defusion 
Cognitive defusion is the process by which people are able to see thoughts as 
thoughts, feelings as feelings, memories as memories, and so on, without reacting to 
them or giving them undue power in their lives that could lead to distress. It involves the 
ability to respond to thoughts in a non-habitual and non-judgmental manner, and to 
choose to act on thoughts only if they align with the person’s chosen values (Blackledge, 
2015; Hayes et al., 1999). Defusion from thoughts means in practice that the person can 
look at thoughts and not from them. As with all the ACT processes, defusion is very 
much related to self-as-context, and it may be worked on simultaneously. The 
importance of just noticing thoughts is vital. There is no need to change thoughts, 
swapping so-called negative thoughts for positive ones. The person is merely asked to 
watch thoughts come and go, compassionately and non-critically. This approach can be 
contrasted to other approaches (for example, cognitive behavioural therapy) which label 
specific thoughts as unwelcome and whose aim it is to get rid of them. When certain 
thoughts and feelings are labeled ‘negative’ or ‘undesirable’, it inevitably leads to 
subjecting thoughts to surveillance for ideological purposes. For example, we discover 
that cognitive therapy encourages a person to understand that “our perception of an 
event or experience powerfully affects our emotional, behavioral, and physiological 
responses to it” so that the client learns “to test the meaning and usefulness of various 
thoughts [they] have during the day and to change the thinking patterns that keep [them] 
locked into dysfunctional moods, behaviors, or relationship interactions” (Greenberger & 
Padesky, 1995, p. 2). There is no weight given here to social context or to the simple 
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fact that perhaps anger or sadness or anxiety are normal human responses to 
environmental conditions that are oppressive.54 Furthermore, such conceptualizations of 
persons (made plain in the name of the therapy and the title of this particular book, Mind 
Over Mood) privileges the rational over the emotional for good reason. Emotions exist on 
a level that is beyond the rational, individualistic sphere. Neoliberal philosophy, 
consequently, cannot allow the emotions to get out of control. As Holmes (2004) notes 
with respect to anger:  
Anger matters politically because it both motivates and continues to fuel 
activity and conflict. Analysis of anger can also assist in the exploration of 
the supposed personalization of politics. Does anger inevitably contribute 
to nationalism, racism, self-centred individualism and division, or does it 
challenge injustice, resist the bureaucratization of politics and allow greater 
celebration of diversity? (p. 123) 
If anger is considered as a response to oppression and injustice (Watts, 2004), it is no 
wonder that it is to be tamed via the disciplinary power of psychology. 
When exploring feelings of alienation, defusion may be viewed as a way in which 
clients can at last gain some distance from their constructed and confining identities and 
allow them to ‘give voice’ to their class position. In relation to class, I suggest that giving 
voice invites a deep curiosity into the working life of the client, their stories and 
experiences of work, their history of work, their goals, expectations, and possibilities 
from being employed, the nature of relationships made at work, the meaning they make 
of their work life and careers, and an inquiry into their understanding of their place in 
society as a result of their work. Explorations of these and other questions will not 
necessarily change the person’s status or attitude toward their employment, but it will 
assist to illuminate an activity performed for a vast majority of the day, and which 
shapes, or at least strongly influences, the person’s life outside of work. Within my 
counselling practice I often hear from men who have thrown themselves into working life 
with the idea that their work is the extent of their role and obligation in their lives. 
Meanwhile, their interests disappear, they no longer connect with friends, community, or 
family, and their partners are unhappy with their relationship. I once saw a couple for 
counselling who were about to separate for good. They had two children, each from 
previous relationships. This couple had lost touch with each other to the extent that they 
                                                
54 See Hagan & Donnison (1999) for a discussion of how individually focused psychotherapies like cognitive behavioural 
therapy might engage with social contexts. 
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could not talk about anything without fighting. It became apparent that the man had an 
extremely narrow view of his role in the relationship. He saw himself as a ‘man’s man’: 
he had been raised to work hard and to support his family at all costs. He thought that 
any other role was either secondary or not worthy of his attention. In ACT parlance, he 
was ‘fused’ with a literal description of who he was and what role he should play, and 
there was for him no other options. However, as their lives changed (i.e. his wife started 
her own business, which he, incidentally, disapproved of) his fusion with the narrative of 
himself as worker/provider increasingly began to limit the possibilities of changing with 
the new circumstances. Individual counselling with him involved using mindful defusion 
strategies (for example, the Leaves on a Stream exercise encourages clients to visualize 
sitting by a stream and placing every thought and feeling that comes up on a leave 
which floats by, without grasping or pushing away the thought) to try to create a little 
space between himself and his conceptualized self. Along with conversations around 
work and its place in his life, these defusion exercises were helpful for at least giving 
some broader social and historical context to very personal and distressing difficulties, 
and to offering an experiential sense of not being limited to narrow story lines.  
Working life, and general expectations around roles within society, can be 
especially appropriate to consider under current circumstances in the West where wages 
are stagnant but there is a perpetual expectation to consume more to ‘get ahead’ in life. 
Social demands foster a pervasive insecurity, not just economically but also personally, 
as persons are, despite working hard, bombarded by cultural messages to feel ‘not good 
enough’ in multiple ways. Advertising is especially pernicious in this regard with daily 
reminders that our appearance is not good enough, or that we are not smart enough, or 
that our cars, houses, furniture, vacations, or gadgets do not measure up. For many 
people the solution is to work harder, longer hours, or perhaps obtain second jobs to 
support themselves and their families, in order to keep up with everyone else (who are, 
of course, doing the same thing).   
However, it can be especially difficult for people whose work, supposedly the 
solution to the cultural messages of insufficiency, itself generates feelings of deep 
despair and distress. For example, workers involved in precarious employment, 
becoming part of the ‘precariat’, are those who partake in unstable, insecure labour, 
usually involving casual labour, temping, on-call labour, platform cloud labour and 
others. Perhaps even worse than that experienced by those employed in steady five day 
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a week jobs, this kind of employment leaves persons with no sense of connection, 
community, or creativity. They are obliged to spend many unpaid hours working to find 
paid work, a reality that is obscured by the politicians and economists, and ultimately the 
employment that is eventually secured is “below their education or qualifications, and 
have low mobility upwards. All this creates frustration, insecurity and stress” (Standing, 
2018, Chapter 16, para. 17). Such work promotes exclusion from community, loneliness, 
depression, anxiety, and anger.  
Yet, as discussed, alienation does not only show up for the precariat. A large 
portion of those in so-called stable employment feel that their employment contributes 
nothing to the world. The sociologist David Graeber (2018), citing a YouGov poll, points 
out that 37% of people did not think their job made any contribution, whereas 50% 
thought that it did, with 13% being unsure. He asks as a result: 
Could there be anything more demoralizing than having to wake up in the 
morning five out of seven days of one’s adult life to perform a task that one 
secretly believed did not need to be performed - that was simply a waste 
of time or resources, or that even made the world worse? Would this not 
be a terrible psychic wound running across our society? Yet if so, it was 
one that no one ever seemed to talk about. (Preface, para. 3)   
If Graeber is correct in his assessment of the situation, and I think he is, it truly is 
a tragic state of affairs with deep moral and spiritual consequences. Thus, challenging 
societal narratives within the counselling session can perhaps open up possibilities for 
new ways of working in the life of the person.  
The following is an example of how cognitive defusion might be utilized within a 
counselling session. The counsellor had previously given the person the Leaves On the 
Stream exercise to try (as described above) and he uses it to encourage the person to 
separate from some unhelpful self-stories, and to open up some space to connect with 
what matters to him:  
Client:         My father always said I wouldn’t amount to much though. He thought  
                    I was lazy. I guess I’ve just tried to prove him wrong over the years.     
                    It feels like I’ve been living for him more than for me. 
Counsellor: And so what do you tell yourself about all that? 
Client:         I tell myself that I’m a loser and if I don’t keep making money I’ll be  
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                   out in the streets. 
Counsellor: So your mind really is giving you a hard time. I wonder if you could  
                   put those thoughts on the leaves too? 
Client:         OK. Still, I can’t stop thinking about it, especially when I leave here. 
Counsellor: Where do all these stories about what you should be come from… 
                    your dad ? 
Client:         Yes, for sure. He always said you’ve got to work hard to get  
                   anywhere in life.  
Counsellor: And that’s what you’ve done... 
Client:         Yes, but I always beat myself up for not getting things right, and not  
                   really getting what I want. My dad always preferred my brother Joe  
                   and now he’s really successful. I’m a total failure at what I do in  
                   comparison with Joe. 
Counsellor: There’s another thought that you can put on a leaf. We talked about                  
                   your values before, about what really matters to you in your life. Does  
                   what you’re telling yourself line up with what’s important to you really,  
                   or not? 
Client:         Not really. I mean, I feel like I’d like to get into forestry…I know I’d be  
                   good at that, and it’s something I’ve always wanted to do. 
Counsellor: So, what steps could you take to make that happen for yourself? 
5.5.3. Contact with the Present Moment 
This process involves assisting people to return their attention to the present 
moment, to the now. Recognizing that life happens only in the present moment, persons 
are encouraged to bring their awareness to whatever is happening to them, or within 
them, on a moment-to-moment basis (Hayes et al., 1999; Luoma, Hayes, & Walser, 
2007). This process is useful for those who find their minds spiralling off into thoughts of 
the past or the future, who struggle with worry, or who find themselves to be overly 
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analytical. It is also useful for bringing attention to aspects of experience that have been 
avoided, which is theorized by ACT researchers to contribute to the development of 
mental health issues. This may be particularly applicable to people’s workplace 
situations. As mentioned previously, a vast portion of the working population feel utterly 
disengaged with something they do for eight hours in a day, and yet no one talks about it 
(Graeber, 2018). Present moment awareness assists in developing fluid and flexible self-
knowledge, by bringing painful thoughts and feelings into awareness (Hayes et al., 
1999). Avoidance of these aspects of our lives has significant costs for living life in an 
authentic and fulfilling manner. Bringing attention to the present moment encourages 
people to get in touch with feelings of alienation due to workplace arrangements, and to 
share them with others. It is by connecting to what is happening in the now-moment 
through an open non-judgemental awareness of current mind/body experience that 
individuals and communities can together re-establish an unalienated sensuous life. 
Awareness in the moment is not only beneficial for clients but also for 
counsellors. Attention to the present moment is invaluable to learning about ourselves 
and facilitating on-going self-examination. Goodman et al. (2004) rightly point out that 
ongoing self-examination is necessary in order to identify values, biases, stereotypical 
attitudes, racism, sexism, ageism, and other proclivities which may influence, impede, or 
obscure the counselling process. Since we all carry culturally imbued values and 
assumptions, these need to be clarified, reflected on, and assessed, and decidedly not 
hidden away or, even worse, denied (Odegard & Vereen, 2010). Additionally, we need to 
attend to power and the movement of power within relationships, and make it visible and 
named. It is imperative that a counsellor scrutinize their ‘positionality’, meaning their 
relative power in connection with race, ethnicity, culture, and gender (Goodman et al., 
2004). To this, however, I would also add class. Class relations come through in perhaps 
unexpected but subtle ways within the counselling interaction. Psychological models and 
therapeutic interactions are themselves political, and therefore express a particular 
ideology. Despite a general belief, common to both the general public and therapists 
themselves, that because interventions are supported by some research evidence and 
are thus empirically verified, they are, therefore, entirely objective and value neutral. On 
the contrary, the ‘psychologization’ of contemporary society makes counselling 
psychology, and other such practices, a perfect means to maintaining the capitalist 
status quo. Counselling interactions are designed to replicate the class arrangements 
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found within society (Roberts, 2015). Therapeutic practices that locate mental distress 
within persons, encouraging them, through the provision of techniques, to diligently ‘work 
on themselves’ to eradicate their distress, all in the exchange for a fee which goes to the 
counsellor, mirrors the power relations set up by the division of labour in the workplace. 
Thus, self-reflection in connection with class involves not only considering one’s own 
class position but, more importantly to counselling practice, how class is reproduced 
within the helping setting. Conventional counselling may assist in solidifying class 
division within sessions, while at the same time obscuring this practice under a veneer of 
scientific objectivity. That the counsellor and the client belong to the same class - the 
working class - is unimportant; it is the reification of the isolated self and its expeditious 
return to producing and consuming within the capitalist system that is the main goal of 
most counselling practices. Consequently, awareness in the present moment of class 
issues can help to open up conversations around this topic and facilitate a less 
oppressive approach to therapy. 
The following brief vignette demonstrates helping a client connect with supressed 
feelings by bringing attention directly to their experience of them in the here and now. 
Also, the counsellor is shown to take a chance by voicing their in the moment 
impressions of what is being said by the client, inferred by non-verbal cues. This is 
instructive for the person because it demonstrates the ability to not be seduced by 
narratives, which often lead to unhelpful past/future thinking, only serving a superficial 
social politeness, and to return to the authenticity of the present moment. It also shows 
that the counsellor is engaged with the same process together with the person. 
Client:         I mean it’s not so bad. Actually, it’s pretty good  At least we get to  
                   work inside. And the pay’s good. 
Counsellor: You don’t seem too certain. 
Client:         Well, the pay is good. [Laughs]. It’s kept the kids in braces at least.  
                   And, you know, I help people. 
Counsellor: I noticed some hesitation when you said that. What are you feeling  
                   right now? 
Client:         I dunno. [pause] Well, I suppose I feel a little sad… 
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Counsellor: Where in your body are feeling that? 
Client:         In my chest. I don’t know why. Like I say, the job has been pretty  
                   secure and I’ve been OK with it. 
Counsellor: [noticing a lowered and slower cadence in the client’s voice]: If you  
                   don’t mind me making this observation but I get the impression what  
                   your heart is telling you doesn’t match what your mouth is saying. Am  
                   I wrong about that? 
Client:         No, you’re right. I just can’t afford to dwell on things too much. If I  
                   thought about all my regrets I’d never be able to get anything done. 
Counsellor: What kind of emotions are you feeling right now as you say that? 
5.5.4. Acceptance 
Acceptance, which could perhaps be more accurately described as willingness, 
is a process that counters our tendencies to try to control inner experiences (Hayes et 
al., 1999). It is indeed common experience, supported by research, that trying to avoid, 
control, stuff, ignore, or repress what we perceive to be negative emotions is virtually 
impossible and, in fact, only perpetuates them (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). According to 
ACT theory, our attempts at controlling and escaping from unwanted thoughts and 
feelings, otherwise known as experiential avoidance, results in strategies that have more 
negative impact than allowing the original experience to be felt (Luoma et al., 2007). 
Control strategies often lead to ‘stuck’ cycles where the person’s life becomes about 
managing their internal experience, and which ultimately leads to a life lacking in vitality 
(Polk, 2014). For example, I have met many clients who control their social anxiety by 
staying home. Their anxiety does indeed go down in the short term, but it comes back 
and in the meantime their control efforts have robbed them of the opportunity to 
participate in the kind of life they desire. As a result, their life interests diminish as their 
life increasingly becomes more about controlling their fears.  
There are four general reasons why we think control might work to mitigate 
unwanted emotions. The first is that it seems to work so well in the outer world. The 
second is that we are often given cultural cues that it is possible to control emotion. For 
example, we are often asked to not be afraid, or to stop crying. Third, as children we 
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observe that the adults around us always seem able to control emotion, since their 
avoidance strategies (like, for example, using drugs or alcohol) are often deliberately 
hidden from us. Lastly, we have been able at times to calm ourselves down through 
breathing or some other technique, at least for a while (Hayes et al., 1999). As adults, 
we often come to realize, perhaps not soon enough, that our control strategies for 
getting rid of inner experience generally do not work. Willingness is the alternative 
choice we can make to open up to all the experiences of life, good and bad, and to 
decide to move in valued directions, even in the presence of unwanted thoughts and 
feelings.   
The control agenda is oftentimes extended to other people. In order to avoid 
anxious thoughts and feelings, we often attempt to make others behave in the way we 
want them to, and we become annoyed when they do not (Eifert, McKay, & Forsyth, 
2006). These often subtle, but also often grossly overt, attempts to control other people’s 
behaviour are really avoidant means to mitigate our own unwanted thoughts and 
feelings.   
In terms of our present discussion, control of both our inner experience and of 
others are representative of cultural disciplinary expectations in the interests of the 
consumerist neoliberal agenda. These practices are very often found within helping 
professions like counselling where emotions are categorized and disciplined under the 
supervision of the expert clinician. Willingness, practiced by both the helper and the 
person in session, can function as a model for sharing power, thus exemplifying equality 
and respect. Sharing power, from this perspective, means that counsellors need to 
become aware on an ongoing basis that the helping interaction itself contains power 
differentials and that there is always the possibility of abuse. Consequently, a 
counsellor’s willingness to acknowledge difficult thoughts and feelings around the expert 
position and give up the need to control the person is a particularly useful process to 
embody within the counselling session, and can provide a radical re-imagining of the 
power relations between people. This principle invites consensual decision making and 
the acknowledgement that the therapist is not an expert in the person’s life but another 
source of perspective and encouragement informed by wisdom and experience. The 
therapist is positioned as a co-learner, renouncing the idea that the they are some sort of 
emancipator who deigns to share expert knowledge (Goodman et al., 2004). In many 
ways the therapist/client relationship is like a shared journey toward the client’s 
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destination, during which the person determines the level of co-operation and readiness 
for change, while the counsellor asks appropriate questions that guide the person in the 
direction they wish to go (Lipchik, 2002). This quality of interpersonal interaction 
becomes a model for the democratic societies both counsellor and client hope to build.  
By abandoning the idea of the ‘expert’ and by walking beside the client rather 
than leading, the counsellor is able to model co-operation, relationship, and some level 
of equality and empowerment during the therapy session. This is in contrast to more 
disease-model or individualistic approaches which empower the therapist as expert, 
disseminating their expert knowledge to the masses. That ‘client-as-broken’ models 
reflect the class division of our society is no accident. Again, these approaches 
substantiate and actively promote the capitalist status quo by reproducing unequal 
power relations within the therapy setting (Proctor, 2008; Rossiter, 2000). In the case of 
a worker, for example, the capitalist ideology is reified as the essence of the employee, 
manifesting as psychological qualities like ‘agreeableness’, ‘conscientiousness’, or 
‘resilience’. When these, and other such, attributes, are seen to be lacking, it is a 
depoliticised psychology’s function to blame the individual, force them to passively 
consume psychological truths, and divert attention away from the real source of lack of 
conformity to norms which is the system itself (Roberts, 2015). 
Sharing power must become a necessary principle to combat, and to dismantle, 
albeit within the limited confines of a 50-minute counselling session, the inequality and 
elitism of the counselling therapeutic relationship (Smail, 1995), thereby providing a 
model of possibilities for change within the socio-political life of the person. Willingness, 
or acceptance, is a useful process to assist the person to allow unwanted thoughts and 
feelings into their experience without avoidance, and to minimize the desire to control 
others. Furthermore, when practiced by the counsellor, it allows for improved helping 
relationships based on equality and respect. 
The following vignette demonstrates a person’s control agenda around anxiety. 
She is treating it as the enemy, something that she needs to push down. The therapist 
instead invites it in, expressing their own anxiety to the client, and begins to encourage 
the client to engage with their goals. This demonstrates that both client and counsellor 
are human beings each moving toward what matters to them, even in the presence of an 
unwanted emotion which is not only fully accepted as part of their mutual journeys, but 
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considered as a potent source of information for their lives. The alienation between 
reason and emotion, ordinarily perpetuated by the emotional disciplinary mores of our 
society, is thereby healed. 
Client:         I’m feeling pretty anxious about the whole situation at work. The  
                   bosses don’t like any talk of unionizing. I keep a straight face but  
                   inside I’m really worried. I can’t get rid of it. 
Counsellor: How does your anxiety show up? 
[Client spends some time describing her thoughts and feelings] 
Counsellor: What do you think your anxiety is saying to you? I mean if it had a  
                   message, what would it be? 
Client:         I don’t know. Maybe to forget about making waves. Just settle down  
                   and just be thankful we all have jobs right now. 
Counsellor: Could be. What if you’re anxiety was telling you that you’re doing   
                   something worthwhile, that its about time the employees stood up for  
                   themselves? It’s uncertain, sure, but it’s something important and  
                   worth doing. 
Client:         I suppose so. Still, I don’t like the feeling. I’d rather feel a lot of  
                   courage [laughs]. 
Counsellor: Maybe your anxiety is the price for doing something that matters. I  
                   mean I feel anxious when you describe what’s going on and what  
                   everyone is thinking of doing. Can we let that anxiety in the room and  
                   figure out a way forward? 
5.5.5.  Committed Action 
Committed action means establishing ongoing patterns of behavior in line with a 
person’s values or what matters to them in their lives (Hayes et al., 1999). Commitment 
is concerned with creating a new life, one that is in the service of how the person would 
like to be in the world. In many ways, commitment requires a focus on the abilities and 
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strengths of the person which may have heretofore been hidden. A person’s strengths 
are very often obscured for different reasons, and, in terms of this discussion, 
subjugated by systemic oppression. A focus on strengths at the broader systemic level 
means tapping into abilities and resources that the person or community have already 
used, or has the potential of using in the future, to accomplish social justice values. 
Clients and communities must be encouraged by counsellors to remember, bring 
prominence to, and then accentuate, those abilities which they have found to have 
worked in their lives in the past. This might be in relation to systemic ideological change 
they may have had, or currently do have, experiences of democratic decision making, of 
fair and just practices that work in favour of all participants, of instances of refusal, 
dissention, opposition, or of protest that have changed events in their lives for the better 
of all concerned, and so on. These events can be highlighted in sessions, with the 
counsellor asking questions of the person that bring attention to those positive qualities 
within themselves that made opposition to injustice possible. The process of shining light 
on such instances assists in strengthening perhaps forgotten skills and abilities, and 
inspires a determination to push forward even in the face of difficulties and barriers. 
Counselling psychologists may help clients struggling with so-called negative thoughts 
and feelings which may come up as they fight for fairness and equality in their lives. 
They may give new perspectives on emotions like anger or anxiety, normalizing these as 
expected human reactions to unfair conditions. Similarly, the stresses that people feel as 
they work to meet societal expectations around making money, and consuming goods 
and services, can be re-framed in light of an awareness of a commodity fetishism that 
fosters the destruction of relationship and real human connection in their lives. 
It is in the realm of committed action that justice ideals are realized in practice. 
Individual counselling that normally involves individual commitments to personally valued 
goals can easily begin to be generalized more broadly to workplace settings and to the 
amelioration of alienating conditions. Within workplaces workers may start to organize 
and take steps towards the democratization of the workplace (Wolff, 2012). At the same 
time, counselling psychologists are well-placed to engage in advocacy, outreach, 
prevention programs, and psychoeducational interventions (Vera & Spreight, 2004), 
alternative helping roles, out-of-office interventions (Kennedy & Arthur, 2014), and other 
non-traditional ways of enacting social justice (Kiselica, 2004; Koch & Juntunen, 2014). 
Counsellors could be active, for example, in supporting, advocating for, and participating 
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in organizing collective action by not only providing psychosocial supports but by 
assisting in arranging for other supports, perhaps using media like the internet, 
television, or newspapers to promote the cause (Kiselica & Robinson, 2001). 
The following vignette focuses mainly on the importance of de-emphasizing 
perfection as a goal and instead embracing mistakes and shortcomings as necessary 
ingredients for attaining valued ends. Ideas of perfection not only sustain empty 
consumerist standards for living, along with their messages of unworthiness, but they 
inevitably interfere with change, impeding progress toward social justice goals. 
Client:         I just give up after a while. You know, I get distracted by other things.  
                   I’ve been try my hardest to get ahead with my art, but I it seems like  
                   there is so many barriers that get in my way. No-one seems to  
                   appreciate what I do. Maybe my stuff is garbage. 
Counsellor: That’s an interesting thought your mind is giving you...can you  
                    acknowledge it, thank your mind for it, and move on. 
Client:         Yes. I’ve been doing all that. Still, I can’t get it right. I want it to be  
                   perfect, for everything to go smoothly like in the movies or  
                   something. 
Counsellor: Perfection. That’s another interesting thought your mind is giving  
                   you. We were talking about commitment...is perfection part of that? 
Client:         Yes, if you’re committed then things should turn out perfectly. 
Counsellor: What if the commitment is simply to get back on the horse again  
                   every time you fall off? And, as you know well now, you will fall off.  
                   So what? 
Client:          I want to get it perfect though, just like a Michael Jordan or someone  
                    like that, except in the world of art. 
Counsellor: That’s a nice example...how many hundreds of times did Michael  
                   Jordan fail to sink his most famous shots before he was able to do it  
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                   perfectly, as you put it? 
Client:         Probably many hundreds. 
Counsellor: Right. Commitment isn’t about perfection, it’s about staying true to  
                   what matters to you and pushing on, with all the successes and              
                   failures. 
5.5.6. Values 
In ACT values are defined as verbally constructed, global, desired, and chosen 
life directions (Luoma et al., 2007). They are the qualitative dimension to what we do in 
life; we may value engaging in relationships with respect and kindness, for example, or 
interacting with friends in a caring way, or being a dependable and conscientious 
employee. Values tend to be verbs rather than nouns and, in contrast to goals which 
have a beginning and an ending, values are usually life-long qualities of the heart. 
Interestingly, it is often within our anxieties and fears that values can be found. A client I 
worked with had an intense social anxiety. They did not want to go out and refused 
invitations in order to avoid their fears. At first glance, it seemed that they were just 
incredibly anti-social, but, after some conversation, it became clear that they longed for 
connection with others and meaningful relationships. Their anxiety was exactly about 
their value of being in community with others. Similarly, I have had many conversations 
with men who struggle with anger and who discover that their anger is an expression of 
their sense of injustice, and their desire to make things right. In ACT values are the 
guiding principle for all the other processes; thus, we do not simply accept unwanted 
thoughts and feelings for their own sake, or abide in the present moment as an end in 
itself. Rather, these processes are enacted in order to connect with our values and to 
move forward purposefully into our lives. Here again is a representation within the 
practice itself of the dual aspect nature of reality I have proposed in this dissertation. 
There is an equal emphasis on engaging with one’s conscious center to connect with 
values while, at the same time, moving out from there into the world to effect change. 
This is why the six ACT processes are often described as mindfulness and acceptance 
processes, and commitment and behaviour change processes (Luoma et al., 2007). 
When people are engaged with their values, their lives tend to feel more vital, alive, and 
meaningful. Engaging with values means connecting with the intrinsic conscious nature 
of the self.  
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As mentioned previously, all the ACT processes are inter-connected (Hayes et 
al., 1999). As a client (and the counsellor too for that matter) engages with self-as-
context, or what I have called consciousness, they are well placed to choose valued 
ways of being in the world that matter to them. An experiential understanding of the 
centrality of consciousness naturally produces valued ways of living, unencumbered by 
conceptualized narratives of the self which are so often connected to limitation and 
avoidance. Furthermore, even although values are personal and should be freely chosen 
by an individual, it has been my experience that peoples’ values are, ultimately, some 
expression of the desire for love, which is the grounding for the expression of the 
equality/fairness, democracy/freedom, and community/solidarity espoused by Wright 
(2019) as the core values of a social justice oriented perspective. From love comes a 
sense of justice and, in terms of this discussion, it is as people engage fully with their 
values within an individual therapy session that they begin to have a taste of the 
possibilities of the establishment of justice and democracy in the outer world, and, 
specifically, in the workplace.  
The following conversation focuses on exploring client values. Often the values 
of the neoliberal culture are expressed in session, a manifestation of the commodified 
empty self that has internalized society’s ideological structures. Yet, because the false 
empty self is a mere reflection of the intrinsic self of consciousness, the conversation 
involves a ‘digging down’ to unearth the inevitably familiar fundamental values that we all 
share as human beings, and which constitute the basis for the good life. Alienation from 
oneself is overcome as we begin to engage with what matters to us, thereby engaging 
with others and the world in a more authentic and compassionate fashion.   
Counsellor: I mean, what is it that you really want from going in to work day after  
                   day? 
Client:         One word…money. I want as much money as I can make. 
Counsellor: What would you do with all that money? 
Client:         I’d buy all the nice things I‘ve always wanted...a nice car, a house,  
                   good clothes, all the things I never had when I was growing up. 
Counsellor: Why is having those things important to you? 
Client:         Because then I’d have some security for my family and, I suppose, a  
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                   sense of being grounded and at home. 
Counsellor: Any why is that important? What is it about feeling secure and  
                   grounded that is desirable? 
Client:         I’d feel like I was showing love to my wife and kids and I’d have a  
                   sense of peace in the security, a sense of connection. 
Counsellor: So, if we really scratch the surface of your workaholism, it’s really all  
                   about love and peace. 
Client:         Yeah, I guess so...at the end of the day, yes, it’s about connecting to  
                    the people I love. 
5.6.     Chapter Summary 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate ways in which the micro-levels of 
counselling normally conceived, can be viewed as practices that work on the macro-level 
of systematic change. Emphasizing three themes explored in this dissertation - the 
distortion of genuine relationship within capitalist society into relationships based on 
commodity fetishism and capital accumulation; the ubiquity of consciousness as a 
source of an ethic of value and therefore of justice, with the centrality of consciousness 
as the intrinsic nature of human beings; and the philosophical notion of an enminded 
universe, with the part being fully present in the whole just as the whole is fully present in 
the part - I argued that therapy may be able to liberate itself from the capitalist ideology 
within which it has grown, and indeed provide emancipatory practices for both 
counsellors and their clients. I used Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, or ACT, as 
an example of a therapy approach that can easily be used to pursue these ends. 
Although it is difficult to give a comprehensive account of how the ACT processes work 
within an actual session, I outlined each of the processes and gave some short 
examples of how conversations might proceed while focused on each of them. This is 
not to say, of course, that ACT is the only therapy that could be used to effect broader 
systemic change. Many of the newer mindfulness-based therapies and, indeed, some of 
the older therapies like Jungian approaches which theorize expansive conceptions of 
consciousness, could similarly be used (Whitney, 2018).  
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My contention is not that a therapy session must always involve conversations 
connected with the broad systemic causes of a client distress, nor must they always lead 
to the status of the person in the workplace. People seek help for all sorts of reasons 
and the counsellor must follow the client’s lead. However, I do say that the workplace 
cannot be neglected as a possible site for the exploration of a theory of a case, and that 
even if it is not directly connected to the predominant presenting issue, the socio-
economic, educational, and ideological histories of the person’s experience, so aligned 
as they are within our current society toward the production of obedient workers, must 
be accentuated when engaged in conversations with people. 
Those in the environmental movement are sometimes asked how it is that they 
drive in their gas-powered vehicles to a march protesting the oil industry. It was the 
same objection raised against those who opposed the slave trade for wearing clothes 
made by slaves. Persons who take a stand against any harmful practice within a society 
are usually also participants within the systems they want to change. They are well 
aware of the fact that they too are complicit; but whereas others give up and accept the 
status quo, some individuals accept the reality of their current situation, knowing it is not 
ideal, and push ahead to effect change. The helping professional works within a system 
that is unequal and often unjust. It is certainly not democratic. The result is that the 
helper is often involved with practices that seem to perpetuate the very inequities that 
they are trying to oppose. As I have described, their very methods may have been born, 
developed, and shaped within those unsatisfactory social conditions. Yet, helpers cannot 
abandon helping; they can only recognize the problems, remain clear-eyed, and do the 
best they can to make a difference, always with an aspiration to change larger, unequal 
systems like capitalism. Consequently, their practices may be messy and appear 
inconsistent, perhaps even hypocritical to those looking from the outside. Indeed, 
therapy will undoubtedly look completely different in major respects in a post-capitalist 
world. In the meantime, much like the bodhisattvas of Buddhism, social justice oriented 
helpers must continue to act, grounded in the present moment, and work without 





I write this epilogue, in May of 2020, at the time of the global COVID-19 
pandemic which to date has caused thousands of deaths in North America and around 
the world, made hundreds of thousands more sick to varying degrees, while rupturing 
economies, and drastically changing the way we live our lives on multiple levels. It 
currently remains to be seen what will happen in the future and whether some or all of 
the impacts that societies are experiencing will forever become, to some extent or 
another, permanent features of people’s lives. Despite the refrain that ‘we are all in this 
together,’ it is undeniable that the impact of the pandemic has had varying impacts in the 
lives of people depending on their class position. In particular, this crisis has revealed in 
readily apparent ways the foundational role and value of work within modern society, 
while exposing the imbalances in the way in which some forms of work are valued over 
others. At least in some quarters, there has been a clear recognition of the importance to 
society of those who provide not only essential health services but also the basic 
necessities of life - store workers, postal workers, truck drivers, farmers, cleaners, small 
business owners of all kinds, and so on - many of whom have contributed to society in 
ways that have heretofore been underappreciated or completely ignored. A substantial 
number of these occupations have been historically performed for poor wages, little or 
no benefits, no protections, or under precarious conditions, and much of it by 
marginalized groups of people. In many ways, the current pandemic has, even if 
temporarily, exposed the inequalities and distortions of capitalist systems. Some of the 
very same workers who are working in occupations that provide essential services are 
also those more likely to contract and die from COVID-19 due to the precarity of their 
working conditions, the inability to access care, and their level of income. Minorities have 
been particularly affected. In England and Wales, it was reported by the Office for 
National Statistics that the death rates in the poorest areas of those countries were 
double that of more affluent areas.55   
Our current society values work based on market demands and the flow of 
capital accumulation, with no real consideration of the important significance of social 
contribution. It is revealing that in the United States there are record unemployment 
                                                
55 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/01/covid-19-deaths-twice-as-high-in-poorest-areas-in-england-and-wales 
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numbers due to the pandemic’s devastation to the economy, unequaled since the Great 
Depression, and yet the stock markets are performing very well. A crisis like the COVID-
19 pandemic demonstrates the impoverishment of a market system which valorizes 
occupations involved with the flow of monopoly-finance capital, most of which involves 
nothing more than moving money and paper, creating ‘negative externalities’, the costs 
of which are transposed onto the society itself, while at the same time revealing the 
indispensable value of service-oriented work that contributes to the material needs of 
society. Such work creates and sustains ‘positive externalities’ since not only is it itself 
beneficial to society, but it also derivatively creates the spaces, conditions, and 
atmospheres within the public sphere where people meet, are entertained, or play, thus 
nurturing the psychological, cultural, and spiritual terrain of our lives (Herzog, 2020).  
I have argued in this dissertation that it is the way our society arranges our 
engagement with nature through work that causes alienation and the inevitable mental 
health issues that follow. This can be conceived as a dual matter of production and 
consumption, with the problem and the remedy found within the assumptions of both 
domains. On the one hand, as crises like the current pandemic continue to highlight the 
failures of capitalism within the economic, ecological, epidemiological, and public health 
spheres, the systemic inequalities within modes of production within our work 
arrangements, based on divisions between those who live off wealth and those who live 
off work (Blakely, 2019), have exposed the ways in which our societies are 
fundamentally undemocratic and unjust. On the other hand, we are educated and 
socialized to believe the illusion that the personal consumption and accumulation of ever 
more products, most of them unnecessary to living a fulfilling life, is the way to move 
successfully and happily through this world. In contrast to these ways of being, I have 
suggested that democratization of workplaces, whereby workers have control of their 
labour, benefiting themselves and their communities, and a panpsychic vision of the 
world, wherein consciousness is found to be ubiquitous, creating an inter-related 
partnership of the human and non-human worlds, with corresponding values and 
purpose based on real relational needs, are both required to radically and effectively 
transform our notions of production and consumption. 
The helping professions have a large role to play in this transition. For just as our 
present systems of production and consumption are based on a philosophical foundation 
built on a de-spirited and materialistic individualism, along with a profound greed, which 
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in turn is based on a deep fear - a fear borne from a feeling of separation and 
disconnection - helping professions like counselling psychology can potentially introduce 
people to new ways of being that assists in re-establishing genuine relationship and 
authentic community. This is a process of education, not in the sense of imparting new 
knowledge to others, but in the sense of assisting them to re-discover parts of 
themselves that have been obscured by the ideology of contemporary capitalist society.  
Education from this perspective is a radical act of personal and societal transformation 
which grounds itself in contemporaneous realities that serve to challenge the 
philosophical and ideological systems upon which our society is based. Where, then, 
does such an educational project ground itself, and is it relevant to the education of 
those in helping professions? 
In a chapter entitled, ‘Five Basic Orientations to the Curriculum,’ Elliot Eisner 
(1985) suggested five ways in which curriculum might be thought of within educational 
institutions: the development of cognitive processes; academic rationalism; personal 
relevance; social adaption and social reconstruction; and curriculum as technology. He 
is careful to provide the proviso that each of these categories are not pure descriptions, 
and are certainly removed from their situational contexts, but that in specific educational 
settings one of the orientations usually takes precedence over the others. Thus, 
although these classifications are really primarily foci for analytic purposes, he is clear 
that context matters and that “different contexts may justify emphasis on different 
orientations” (p. 85). As I read through his article and his analysis, I felt a connection to 
many of the issues and proposals indicated in each of the orientations. It becomes an 
interesting form of self-reflection to consider how each of the curriculum forms have 
played out in one’s own educational experience, with the recognition that some of the 
orientations, while seeming so obvious and important on paper, had no practicable 
bearing on one’s life course in retrospect, whereas other perspectives, perhaps initially 
seeming tenuous, would perhaps have made all the difference in the world to one’s life 
trajectory had they been emphasized. Generally, the fulfillment of economic imperatives 
always seemed to displace social and planetary concerns. 
I have argued that Marx’s understanding of alienation from labour is intimately 
linked to the alienation of human beings from nature, and that both alienations are 
contextually shaped by the current capitalist system within which we are educated and 
live (Foster, 2000). Our alienation from nature, manifested through capitalist workplace 
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practices, has now led to the threat of a global climate crisis which, if it hasn’t done so 
already, will soon impact every level of human and non-human activity on the planet. It is 
beyond the purview of this dissertation to examine the impacts of global warming, except 
to say that it is already having massive impacts on developing countries, marginalized 
populations, women, children, and the poor.56 In 2018 the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change issued a report on the potential impacts of a rise in global temperature 
of 1.5 degrees Celsius or more, with the authors concluding that global carbon dioxide 
emissions must be curbed well before 2030 to avoid the most severe consequences of 
global warming.57 These will include massive poverty and inequality as human and 
natural systems break down; however, unless there are almost immediate socio-
economic changes, it is apparent that by current projections proposed carbon emission 
targets will not be met.58 Clearly, multiple systemic breakdowns will have extremely 
adverse consequences for human health, both physical and mental, and its increasing 
probability demands a response from a social justice perspective. 
Thus, if Eisner’s categories were to be listed in terms of pedagogical imperative, I 
would suggest that, given the impending reality of the utter devastation to the planet by 
climate change caused by human beings living their lives under capitalist systems, his 
category of ‘social reconstruction’ should be the pre-eminent contextual academic 
framework adopted by educational institutions in these current times.59 Eisner (1985) 
defines this approach as 
basically aimed at developing levels of critical consciousness among 
children and youth so that they become aware of the kinds of ills that the 
society has and become motivated to learn how to alleviate them. 
Programs having this orientation will frequently focus on controversial 
issues, what some writers in the social studies have called the closed areas 
                                                
56 This article from The Guardian reveals just one example of the intersectionality between climate change and mental 
health issues: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/23/rising-temperatures-linked-to-increased-suicide-rates 
57 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018). Summary for policymakers. In V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, 
H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J. B. R. 
Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, & T. Waterfield (Eds.), Global warming of 
1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, 
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_HR.pdf 
58 For example, the 2019 G20 Brown to Green Report indicates that not only did Canada’s emissions increase by 17% 
between 1990 and 2016, but that it will currently not meet its 2050 goal of 80% emissions reduction from 2005 levels. See: 
https://www.climate-transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Brown-to-Green-Report-2019.pdf 
59 This article from The Guardian describes Italy’s adoption of compulsory education in the effects of climate change on the 
planet, with subjects taught from the perspective of sustainability:  https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2019/nov/06/italy-to-school-students-in-sustainability-and-climate-crisis 
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of society: religious values, sexual preferences, political corruption, race 
prejudice, and the like. The aim of such programs is not primarily to help 
students adapt to a society that is in need of fundamental change but rather 
to help them to recognize the real problems and do something about them. 
(p. 76) 
A social reconstruction approach to curriculum, focused around a perspective that 
advocates for planetary sustainability, would invite a complete challenge to the prevailing 
socio-economic culture since the climate crisis has been generated by a capitalist 
system and a neoliberal philosophy that has had no consideration for the life of the 
planet.  
            Our current climate predicament has not arrived within an ahistorical bubble. It is 
not primarily due to human nature’s proclivity toward ‘greed’, an explanation that tends to 
atomize the problem within individuals and which can serve to obscure the movement of 
ideological power, but is directly related instead to current relations of production, 
namely, a rapacious capitalism, with the culture surrounding and sustaining it. Malm 
(2018) correctly points out that “the rise of large-scale fossil fuel combustion has not 
occurred in the sphere of play, sex, sleep, leisure, philosophical contemplation or 
aesthetic appreciation but precisely, and evidently, in that of labour” (Chapter 5, para. 8). 
It is social property relations, relations reproduced between human beings, and the 
ideologies that underwrite them, that determine the manner in which humans interact 
with the rest of nature. 
The destruction of the earth for the profit of a few is a consequence of our current 
social and economic systems. The inevitability of this destruction is considered a mere 
externality in the drive to increase profits and personal wealth for a relatively few 
individuals. The failure of governments and business to act to reverse the huge costs 
that will be paid by the planet and its inhabitants reflects an intransigence linked to 
maintaining the status quo. Moreover, the changes that are required to avoid disaster 
cannot merely be in the form of solutionism, an adjusting of the current system, as in, for 
example, an increase in regulation, more environmental legislation, or the introduction of 
carbon taxes. Since we are now experiencing systemic failure on a planetary scale it is 
vital that there must be a radical re-organization of our political and economic systems to 
address the challenge. Such changes have been advocated by Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez in the United States, for example, through a Green New Deal, but it remains to be 
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seen if these suggestions, even if implemented today, would be enough to avert disaster 
(Blakley, 2019).  
The idea that education and the helping professions should constitute 
themselves within a framework that prioritizes planetary sustainability over capitalist 
accumulation may initially appear far-fetched. Yet already the climate crisis has 
substantially impacted multiple areas of human and non-human activity around the 
world, and is having noticeable impacts on human health, and notably mental health 
(Cunsolo & Ellis, 2018; Fritze, Blashki, Burke, & Wiseman, 2008; Page & Howard, 2010). 
Education functions as a means to change socio-cultural practices for the benefit of all. 
But educational pedagogy is not apolitical; as with counselling psychology, education is 
very much associated with the movement and generation of capital, and its practices 
support it. An educational curriculum rooted within the social reconstructionism that 
Eisner outlines would prioritize the planet itself as a basis for knowledge acquisition and 
societal change. This requires the centering of social justice and democracy as essential 
requirements in education in general, but particularly for those training within the helping 
professions.  
As we have seen counselling psychologists have struggled with how to approach 
the issue of social justice. They have generally settled on multiculturalism as a 
foundation for engaging with social justice practices, with educational practices following 
accordingly. Nevertheless, there have been voices calling for a wider conceptual 
understanding of what social justice might look like in connection with counselling, even 
within the framework of the multicultural approach. In light of the current crises in the 
world, it seems clear that we must go beyond multiculturalism and consider something 
altogether different (Palmer and Parish, 2004). 
I have proposed in this work that we do indeed need something altogether 
different: we require a return to an unalienated connection with nature. This involves a 
recognition of consciousness within nature, along with the ethical imperatives which 
accompany such a shift, and a concurrent transformation of our politics. There has been 
no substantive debate within counsellor educational circles around the issue of relations 
of production as a generator of alienation amongst working people, and as a source of 
mental health issues, or a critique of capitalist class politics, economics, and social 
systems as directly responsible for the phenomenon of climate change, another 
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intersectional source of all manner of physical and mental suffering. These are the 
issues with which counselling has an obligation to engage if it is truly serious about 
committing to social justice within its practices. They are also the essential issues that 
would frame a radical social reconstructionist approach to education.   
There is much agreement among those who advocate for the implementation of 
social justice concerns within the profession of counselling psychology that an effective 
education of graduate level counsellors is essential (Baluch et al., 2004; Collins & Arthur, 
2010; Constantine et al., 2007; Ginsberg & Sinacore, 2015; Goodman et al., 2004; 
Palmer & Parish, 2008; Koch & Juntunen, 2014; McMahon, Arthur, & Collins, 2008; Vera 
& Speight, 2003; Young & Lalande, 2011). Clearly, ongoing work, research, and 
participation should continue to be carried on within the realms of the micro-levels of 
individual practices and in the meso-levels of community and organization (Miller & 
Sendrowitz, 2011; Motulsky, Gere, Saleem, & Trantham, 2014). Here, there must be a 
primary emphasis within counselling educational institutions on the development of 
courses that cover psychology’s history of scientific racism; antiracism education to 
oppose White nationalism and racism; cross-cultural competency training; 
interdisciplinary studies with a focus on public policy, public health, anthropology, 
history, and ethnic, gender, religious, and sexual orientation studies; historical 
perspectives on the profession’s identity (Baluch et al., 2004); offerings of real world 
experiential opportunities in courses and for internships like service-learning training 
programs (i.e. working with educational, legal, and public policy institutions); working in 
social justice training settings that support less traditional helping roles; emphasizing 
more preventative interventions (Ali, Liu, Mahmood, & Arguello, 2008; Constantine et al., 
2007); and partnering with activist organizations or community organizations that 
specialize in serving marginalized populations (Ali & Sichel, 2014).  
On a personal level, educators must act as role models to students, striving to 
incorporate multiple sources into their teaching; being willing to have uncomfortable 
conversations with colleagues; be prepared to take public positions and to show up on 
the front lines (Arredondo & Perez, 2003); establish an ongoing reflective practice (Ancis 
& Ali, 2005; Brady-Amoon, Makhija, Dixit, & Dator, 2012) and involve themselves in 
advocacy and activism (Chang et al., 2010). In the last chapter of this dissertation, I 
proposed that therapies like Acceptance and Commitment Therapy may offer processes 
that can affect the macro-levels of system change while working with clients on a one-to-
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one basis. ACT’s processes can simultaneously develop an appreciation of the intrinsic 
reality of consciousness, along with the development of values, and at the same time 
encourage the creation of societies that truly honour social justice. 
The issue of changing climate on this planet invites the opportunity to position 
ourselves, as educators, whether of counselling psychology students or students in other 
helping disciplines, at the forefront of engaging with social justice issues at the macro-
level. The threat of the very existence of the planet, and the life that it generates, 
provides a touchstone for considering and, hopefully, realizing new ways of being 
together. I have argued in this dissertation that radical change will involve a 
simultaneous looking outwardly at the economic and social systems in which we are 
embedded, and inwardly at the consciousness which is at the heart of all. Both ways of 
looking are required. Educators are truly in a consequential position to critique our 
current systems and to offer new ways of seeing the world, a world that is experienced 















Acheson D. (1998). Independent inquiry into inequalities in health report. British   
            Department of Health. Retrieved from 
            https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
            uploads/attachment_data/file/265503/ih.pdf                                                                                  
Aitken, R. (1996). Original dwelling place: Zen Buddhist essays. Washington:  
            Counterpoint.  
Ajunwa, I. (2017, January 19). Workplace wellness programs could be putting your   
            health data at risk. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from  
            https://hbr.org/2017/01/workplace-wellness-programs-could-be-putting-your-  
            health-data-at-risk 
Albahari, M. (2009). Witness-consciousness: Its definition, appearance and reality.   
            Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(1), 62-84. 
Albee, G. W. (1998). Fifty years of clinical psychology: Selling our soul to the devil. 
Applied and Preventive Psychology, 7(3), 189-194. doi:10.1016/S0962-
1849(05)80021-6 
Albee, G. W. (2000). The Boulder model’s fatal flaw. American Psychologist, 55(2), 247-
248. doi:10.10371/0003-066X.55.2.247 
Alexander, B. (2010). The globalization of addiction: A study in poverty of the spirit.  
            New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ali, A., & Sichel, C. E. (2014). Structural competency as a framework for training in 
counseling psychology. The Counseling Psychologist, 42(7), 901-918. doi: 
10.1177/0011000014550320  
188 
Ali, S. R., Liu, W. M., Mahmood, A., & Arguello, J. (2008). Social justice and applied 
psychology: Practical ideas for training the next generation of psychologists. 
Journal for Social Action in Counseling and Psychology, 1(2), 1-13. 
Allen, K., & O’Boyle, B. (2011). Marx and the alternative to capitalism. Retrieved from 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sfu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3386386 
Alvaredo, F., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2018). World inequality  
            report. Retrieved from https://wir2018.wid.world/download.html 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental  
            disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychological Association. APA dictionary of psychology. Retrieved from  
            https://dictionary.apa.org/helping-professions 
Ancis, J. R., & Ali, S. R. (2005). Multicultural counseling training approaches: 
Implications for pedagogy. In C. Z. Enns & A. L. Sinacore (Eds.), Teaching and 
social justice: Integrating multicultural and feminist theories in the classroom (pp. 
85-97). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1037/10929-000 
Andrew, E., & Ollman, B. (1973). Alienation: Marx’s conception of man in capitalist 
society. Contemporary Sociology, 2(2), 163-166. doi:10.2307/2063708 
Archibald, W. P. (2009). Marx, globalization and alienation: Received and 
underappreciated wisdoms. Critical Sociology, 35(2), 151-174. 
doi:10.1177/0896920508099190 
Arredondo, P. (1999). Multicultural counseling competencies as tools to address 
oppression and racism. Journal of Counseling & Development, 77(1), 102-108. 
doi:/10.1002/j.1556-6676.1999.tb02427.x 
Arredondo, P., & Perez, P. (2003). Expanding multicultural competence through social  
189 
            justice leadership. The Counseling Psychologist, 31(3), 282-289.   
            doi:10.1177/0011000003031003003  
Association for Contextual Behavioral Science website. The six core processes of ACT.  
            Retrieved from https://contextualscience.org/the_six_core_processes_of_act 
Atkinson, D. R., Thompson, C. E., & Grant, S. K. (1993). A three-dimensional model for  
            counseling racial/ethnic minorities. The Counseling Psychologist, 21(2), 257-277.  
            doi:10.1177/0011000093212010  
Bakhir, J. A. (2001). Marxism without apologies: Integrating race, gender, class; A  
            working class approach. Race, Gender & Class, 8(2). Retrieved from  
            http://www.jstor.org/stable/41674975 
Baluch, S. P., Pieterse, A. L., & Bolden, M. A. (2004). Counseling psychology and social 
justice: Houston … we have a problem. The Counseling Psychologist, 32(1), 89-
98. doi:10.1177/0011000003260065 
Bannerji, H. (2011). Building from Marx: Reflections on “race,” gender, and class. In S. 
Carpenter, & S. Mojab (Eds.), Educating from Marx: Marxism and education. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi-
org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/10.1057/9780230370371_3 
Bartlett, F. H., & Shodell, J. (1963). Fromm, Marx and the concept of alienation. Science  
            and Society, 27(3), 321-326. 
Bedi, R. P., Haverkamp, B. E., Beatch, R., Cave, D. G., Domene, J. F., Harris, G. E., & 
Mikhail, A. M. (2011). Counselling psychology in a Canadian context: Definition 
and description. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 52(2), 128-138. 
doi:10.1037/a0023186 
190 
Bell, L. E. (2016). Theoretical foundations for social justice education. In M. Adams, & L. 
A. Bell (Eds.), Teaching for diversity and social justice. Retrieved from 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sfu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4355263. 
Benton, T. (2018, June). What Karl Marx has to say about today’s environmental 
problems. The Conversation. Retrieved March 7, 2019, from 
http://theconversation.com/what-karl-marx-has-to-say-about-todays-
environmental-problems-97479 
Berinato, S. (2015, May 1). Corporate wellness programs make us unwell: An interview 
with André Spicer. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from 
https://hbr.org/2015/05/corporate-wellness-programs-make-us-unwell 
Biglan, A. (2015). The nurture effect: How the science of human behavior can improve 
our lives and our world [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Billig, M. (1999). Commodity fetishism and repression: Reflections on Marx, Freud, and 
the psychology of consumer capitalism. Theory & Psychology, 9(3), 313-329. 
Bird‐David, N. (1999). “Animism” revisited: Personhood, environment, and relational 
epistemology. Current Anthropology, 40(S1), S67-S91. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/200061 
Blackledge, J. T. (2015). Cognitive defusion in practice. Oakland, CA: Context Press. 
Blakeley, G. (2019). Stolen: How to save the world from financialisation. London: 
Repeater Books. 
Blustein, D. L., McWhirter, E. H., & Perry, J. C. (2005). An emancipatory communitarian 
approach to vocational development theory, research, and practice. The 
Counseling Psychologist, 33(2), 141-179. doi:10.1177/0011000004272268 
Bostock, J., & Smail, D. (1999). The influence of power on psychological functioning: 
Community psychology perspectives. Journal of Community & Applied Social 
191 
Psychology, 9(2), 75-78. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-1298(199903/04)9:2<75::AID-
CASP520>3.0.CO;2-B 
Brady-Amoon, P., Makhija, N., Dixit, V., & Dator, J. (2012). Social justice: Pushing past 
boundaries in graduate training. Journal for Social Action in Counseling and 
Psychology, 4(2), 85-98. 
Brien, K. M. (2009). Rethinking Marx and the spiritual. Rethinking Marxism, 21(1), 103-
116. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935690802542473  
Brown, L. S., & Ballou, M. (Eds.). (1994). Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist 
Reappraisals (Reprint edition). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Burnes, T. R., & Manese, J. E. (2008). Social justice in an accredited internship in 
professional psychology: Answering the call. Training and Education in 
Professional Psychology, 2(3), 176-181. doi:10.1037/1931-3918.2.3.176 
Burston, D. (1988). Laing and Heidegger on alienation. Journal of Humanistic 
Psychology, 38(4), 80-93. 
Byron, C. (2016). Essence and alienation: Marx’s theory of human nature. Science & 
Society, 80(3), 375-394. 
Callinicos, A. (2012). The revolutionary ideas of Karl Marx [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved  
            from www.amazon.ca 
Canadian Psychological Association, Counselling Psychology Section. Retrieved from   
            https://cpa.ca/sections/counsellingpsychology/counsellingdefinition/ 
Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Retrieved September 
16, 2019, from http://consc.net/papers/facing.html website: 
http://cogprints.org/316/1/consciousness.html 
192 
Chang, C. Y., Crethar, H. C., & Ratts, M. J. (2010). Social justice: A national imperative 
for counselor education and supervision. Counselor Education & Supervision, 50, 
82-87. 
Chomsky, N. (2017). Requiem for the American dream: The 10 principles of  
            concentration of wealth & power [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from   
            www.amazon.ca 
Clarke, J. J. (1971). “The end of history”: A reappraisal of Marx’s views on alienation and 
human emancipation. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4(3), 367-380. 
Cleary, T. (1983). Entry into the inconceivable: An introduction to hua-yen Buddhism.  
            Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Climate Accountability Institute. (2019, October). Top Twenty Carbon Majors 1967-2017,  
            1 million tonnes CO2e … every forty minutes. Retrieved from Climate   
            Accountability website:  http://climateaccountability.org/news.html 
Climate Transparency. (2019). Brown to green: The G20 transition towards a net-zero  
            emissions economy. Berlin: Germany.  Retrieved from  https://www.climate- 
            transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Brown-to-Green-Report-2019.pdf           
Coburn, D. (2000). Income inequality, social cohesion and the health status of   
            populations: The role of neo-liberalism. Social Science & Medicine, 51, 135-146. 
Cohen, B. M. Z. (2016). Psychiatric hegemony: A Marxist theory of mental illness.  
            London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cohen, C. I. (1986). Marxism and psychotherapy. Science & Society, 50(1), 4-24. 
Cole, M. (2003). Might it be in the practice that it fails to succeed? A Marxist critique of 
claims for postmodernism and poststructuralism as sources for social change 
and social justice. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 24(4), 487-500. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01425690301922 
193 
Cole, M., & Hill, D. (1995). Games of despair and rhetorics of resistance:  
            Postmodernism, education, and reaction. British Journal of Sociology of  
            Education, 16(2), 165-182.    
            Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/stable/1393366 
Collier, A. Marx: A beginner's guide [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Collins, S., & Arthur, N. (2010). Culture-infused counselling: A fresh look at a classic 
framework of multicultural counselling competencies. Counselling Psychology 
Quarterly, 23(2), 203-216. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515071003798204 
Constantine, M. G., Hage, S. M., Kindaichi, M. M., & Bryant, R. M. (2007). Social justice 
and multicultural issues: Implications for the practice and training of counselors 
and counseling psychologists. Journal of Counseling & Development, 85(1), 24-
29. doi:10.1002/j.1556-6678.2007.tb00440.x 
Coontz, S. (2006). Marriage, a history: How love conquered marriage. New York: 
Penguin Books. 
Cosgrove, L., & Wheeler, E. E. (2013). Industry’s colonization of psychiatry: Ethical and 
practical implications of financial conflicts of interest in the DSM-5. Feminism & 
Psychology, 23(1), 93-106. doi:10.1177/0959353512467972 
Cox, J. (1998). An introduction to Marx’s theory of alienation. International Socialism, 79. 
Crabtree, S. (2013, October 8). Worldwide, 13% of employees are engaged at work. 
Gallup News. Retrieved from https://news.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-
employees-engaged-work.aspx 
Crethar, H. C., Rivera, E. T., & Nash, S. (2008). In search of common threads: Linking 
multicultural, feminist, and social justice counseling paradigms. Journal of 
Counseling & Development, 86(3), 269-278. doi:10.1002/j.1556-
6678.2008.tb00509.x 
194 
Crethar, H. C., & Winterowd, C. L. (2012). Values and social justice in counseling. 
Counseling and Values, 57(1), 3-9. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2161-
007X.2012.00001.x 
Crinson, I., & Yuill, C. (2008). What can alienation theory contribute to an understanding 
of social inequalities in health? International Journal of Health Services, 38(3), 
455-470. doi:10.2190/HS.38.3.e 
Cunsolo, A., & Ellis, N. R. (2018). Ecological grief as a mental health response to climate 
change-related loss. Nature Climate Change, 8, 275-281. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0092-2 
Cushman, P. (1995). Constructing the self, constructing America: A cultural history of  
            psychotherapy. Boston: Da Capo Press. 
Davies, W. (2015). The happiness industry: How the government and big business sold 
us well-being [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
de Quincey, C. (2010). Radical nature: The soul of nature [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved  
            from www.amazon.ca 
Deacon, B. J., & Baird, G. L. (2009). The chemical imbalance explanation of depression: 
Reducing blame at what cost? Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 28(4), 
415-435. https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2009.28.4.415 
Deighton, J., Lereya, S. T., Casey, P., Patalay, P., Humphrey, N., & Wolpert, M. (2019). 
Prevalence of mental health problems in schools: poverty and other risk factors 
among 28,000 adolescents in England. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 215, 
565-567. doi:10.1192/bjp.2019.19  
Deikman, A. J. (1982). The observing self. Boston: Beacon Press.  
Devlin, H. (2019, February 7). Scientists find some fish can ‘recognise themselves’ in 




Dew, K., & Taupo, T. (2009). The moral regulation of the workplace: presenteeism and 
            public health. Sociology of Health and Illness, 31(7), 994-1010. 
Dowden, R. (1978, December 22). The Thatcher philosophy. Catholic Herald. Retrieved  
            from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103793 
Eagleton, T. (2011). Why Marx was right [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from 
www.amazon.ca 
Eifert, G. H., McKay, M., & Forsyth, J. P. (2006). ACT on life not on anger. Oakland, CA: 
New Harbinger Publications. 
Eisner, E. (1985). Five basic orientations to the curriculum. In E. Eisner, The educational  
            imagination: On the design and evaluation of school programs (pp. 61-86). New   
            York: Macmillian Publishing. 
Erazo, E., & Hazlett-Stevens, H. (2014). Cultural competency and mindfulness-based  
            cognitive therapy for depression. In A. Masuda (Ed.), Mindfulness and   
            acceptance in multicultural competency (pp. 93-108). Oakland, CA: New  
            Harbinger Publications. 
Erikson, K. (1986). On work and alienation. American Sociological Review, 51(1), 1. 
doi:10.2307/2095474 
Ferraiolo, W., Owens, J., & Heil, J. (1996). Individualism and Descartes. Teorema: 
Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 16(1), 71-86. 
Fish, V. (1993). Poststructuralism in family therapy: Interrogating the 
narrative/conversational mode. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 19(3), 
221-232. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-0606.1993.tb00983.x 
Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx's ecology: Materialism and nature [Kindle PC version].  
196 
            Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Foster, J. B., & Clark, B. (2018). The expropriation of nature. Monthly Review, 69(10), 1-
27. doi:10.14452/MR-069-10-2018-03_1 
Foster, J. B. (2019). Absolute capitalism. Monthly Review, 71(1), 1-13. 
doi:10.14452/MR-071-01-2019-05_1 
Fox, D. (2008). Confronting psychology’s power. Journal of Community Psychology, 
36(2), 232-237. doi:10.1002/jcop.20233 
Fritze, J. G., Blashki, G. A., Burke, S., & Wiseman, J. (2008). Hope, despair and 
transformation: Climate change and the promotion of mental health and 
wellbeing. International Journal of Mental Health Systems, 2(1), 13. 
doi:10.1186/1752-4458-2-13 
Fromm, E. (1955). The sane society. New York: Fawcett Premier. 
Fromm, E. (1994). Escape from freedom. New York: Holt Paperbacks. 
Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, (16), 3-18. Retrieved  
            from http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/stable/24027184 
Gagliano, M., Vyasovskiy, V. V., Borbély, A. A., Grimonprez, M., & Depczynski, M.  
            (2016). Learning by association in plants. Scientific Reports, 6(38427), 1-9.    
            doi:10.1038/ srep38427 
Geras, N. (2016). Marx and human nature: Refutation of a legend [Kindle PC version]. 
Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Gergen, K. J. (2009).  Relational being: Beyond self and community. New York: Oxford  
            University Press. 
Gilroy-Ware, M. (2017). Filling the void: Emotion, capitalism & social media [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
197 
Gimenez, M. E. (2001). Marxism, and class, gender, and race: Rethinking the trilogy. 
Race, Gender & Class, 8(2), 1-11. 
Ginsberg, F., & Sinacore, A. L. (2015). Articulating a social justice agenda for Canadian 
counselling and counselling psychology. In A. L. Sinacore & F. Ginsberg (Eds.), 
Canadian counselling and counselling psychology in the 21st century (pp. 254-
272). Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sfu-
ebooks/detail.action?docID=3332849. 
Glantz, K., & Bernhard, J. G. (2018). Self-evaluation and psychotherapy in the market 
system [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and fundamental reality. Retrieved from doi:   
            10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001 
Goff, P. (2019a). Did the universe design itself? International Journal for Philosophy of  
            Religion, 85(1), 99-122. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9692-z 
Goff, P. (2019b). Galileo's error: Foundations for a new science of consciousness [Kindle  
            PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Goodman, L. A., Liang, B., Helms, J. E., Latta, R. E., Sparks, E., & Weintraub, S. R. 
(2004). Training counseling psychologists as social justice agents: Feminist and 
multicultural principles in action. The Counseling Psychologist, 32(6), 793-836. 
            doi:10.1177/0011000004268802 
Graeber, D. (2006). Turning modes of production inside out: Or, why capitalism is a 
transformation of slavery. Critique of Anthropology, 26(1), 61-85. 
doi:10.1177/0308275X06061484 
Graeber, D. (2018). Bullshit jobs: A theory [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from  
            www.amazon.ca 
198 
Greenberger, D., & Padesky, C. A. (1995). Mind over mood: Change how you feel by 
changing the way you think. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Greene, K. R. (2011). Why we need more Marxism in the sociology of race. Souls, 13(2), 
149-174. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999949.2011.574570 
Guerra, M. D. (2013) Descartes, Locke, and the virtue of the individual. In P. A. Lawler &  
            M. D. Guerra (Eds.), Science of modern virtue: On Descartes, Darwin, and Locke  
            (pp. 143-159). DeKalb, US: Northern Illinois University Press. 
Hagan, T., & Donnison, J. (1999). Social power: Some implications for the theory and 
practice of cognitive behaviour therapy. Journal of Community & Applied Social 
Psychology, 9(2), 119-135. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-
1298(199903/04)9:2<119::AID-CASP512>3.0.CO;2-X 
Harriford, D., & Thompson, B. (2008). When the center is on fire: Passionate social 
theory for our times. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Harvey, G. (2017). Animism. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd. 
Haverkamp, B. E., Robertson, S. E., Cairns, S. L., & Bedi, R. P. (2011). Professional 
issues in Canadian counselling psychology: Identity, education, and professional 
practice. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 52(4), 256-264. 
doi:10.1037/a0025214 
Hayes, S. (1984). Making sense of spirituality. Behaviorism, 12, 99-110. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment 
therapy: The process and practice of mindful change. New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Hayes, S. C. (2005). Get out of your mind and into your life. Oakland, CA: New 
Harbinger Publications. 
199 
Heinz, W. R. (1991). Changes in the methodology of alienation research. International 
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 11(6/7/8), 213-221. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/eb013155 
Henry, R. C. (2005). The mental universe. Nature, 436(7), 29.  
Herzog, L. (2020, April). What does the corona crisis teach us about the value of work?  
            New Statesman. Retrieved from  
            https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/economy/2020/04/what-does-corona-  
            crisis-teach-us-about-value-work                               
Hickinbottom-Brawn, S. (2013). Brand “you”: The emergence of social anxiety disorder 
in the age of enterprise. Theory & Psychology, 23(6), 732-751. 
doi:10.1177/0959354313500579 
Hochschild, A. (2011). Emotional life on the market frontier. Annual Review of Sociology, 
37(1), 21-33. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150137 
Holmes, M. (2004). The importance of being angry: Anger in political life. European 
Journal of Social Theory, 7(2), 123-132. doi:10.1177/1368431004041747 
Horton, J. (1964). The dehumanization of anomie and alienation: A problem in the 
ideology of sociology. The British Journal of Sociology, 15(4), 283. 
doi:10.2307/588861 
Horwitz, A. V. (2015). The DSM-5 and the continuing transformation of normal sadness 
into depressive disorder. Emotion Review 7(3), 209-215. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073915575401 
Humphreys, K. (1996). Clinical psychologists as psychotherapists. American 
Psychologist, 8. 
Ingold, T. (2006). Rethinking the animate, re-animating thought. Ethnos, 71(1), 9-20. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00141840600603111 
200 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018). Summary for policymakers. In V. 
Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H. O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P. R. Shukla, A. 
Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J. B. R. Matthews, 
Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M. I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, & T. 
Waterfield (Eds.), Global warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report on the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global 
response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to 




Ivey, A. E., & Collins, N. M. (2003). Social justice: A long-term challenge for counseling 
psychology. The Counseling Psychologist, 31(3), 290-298. 
doi:10.1177/0011000003031003004 
Kandal, T. R. (1996). Gender, race, ethnicity: Let's not forget class. Race, Gender &  
            Class, 4(1), 143-165. 
Karen, R. (1994). Becoming attached: First relationships and how they shape our   
            capacity to love. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Karman, A. (2012). The reasonability of panpsychism. Journal of Experimental & 
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 24(2), 231-246. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0952813X.2012.654930 
Kasser, T. (2015). Materialistic values and goals. Annual Review of Psychology, 67,  
            489-514. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033344 
201 
Katz, J. H. (1985). The sociopolitical nature of counseling. The Counseling Psychologist, 
13(4), 615-624. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000085134005 
Kendi, I. X. (2019). How to be an anti-racist [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from  
            www.amazon.ca 
Kendi, I. X. (2019, August 13). How to be an anti-racist: Ibram X. Kendi. Interview by A.  
            Goodman & J. Gonzalez. Democracy Now! [Television broadcast]. New York:  
            Independent Global News. 
Kennedy, B. A., & Arthur, N. (2014). Social justice and counselling psychology: 
Recommitment through action. Canadian Journal of Counselling and 
Psychotherapy, 48(3), 186-205. 
Kiselica, M. S. (2004). When duty calls: The implications of social justice work for policy, 
education, and practice in the mental health professions. The Counseling 
Psychologist, 32(6), 838-854. doi:10.1177/0011000004269272 
Kiselica, M. S., & Robinson, M. (2001). Bringing advocacy counseling to life: The history, 
issues, and human dramas of social justice work in counseling. Journal of 
Counseling & Development, 79(4), 387-397. doi:10.1002/j.1556-
6676.2001.tb01985.x 
Klein, N. (2009). No logo: Taking aim at the brand bullies [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved  
            from www.amazon.ca 
Klein, N. (2014). This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Klotz, M. (2006). Alienation, labor, and sexuality in Marx’s 1844 manuscripts. Rethinking 
Marxism, 18(3), 405-413. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935690600748124 
202 
Koch, J. M., & Juntunen, C. L. (2014). Non-traditional teaching methods that promote 
social justice: Introduction to the special issue. The Counseling Psychologist, 
42(7), 894-900. doi:10.1177/0011000014551772 
Kohda, M., Hotta, T., Takeyama, T., Awata, S., Tanaka, H., Asai, J-y., & Jordan, A. L.  
            (2019) If a fish can pass the mark test, what are the implications for  
            consciousness and self-awareness testing in animals? PLoS Biol 17(2), 1-17.  
            https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000021           
Komlosy, A. (2018). Work: The last 1,000 years [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from 
www.amazon.ca 
Kottasová, I. (2018, January 21). The 1% grabbed 82% of all wealth created in 2017.  
            Retrieved May 12, 2018, from CNNMoney website:  
            http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/21/news/economy/davos-oxfam-inequality-  
            wealth/index.html 
Lee, M. A., Smith, T. J., & Henry, R. G. (2013). Power politics: Advocacy to activism in 
social justice counseling. Journal for Social Action in Counseling and 
Psychology, 5(3), 70-94. 
Lichtenberg, J. W. (2017). Reflections: Thoughts on moral diversity and counseling 
psychology’s commitment to social justice. The Counseling Psychologist, 45(1), 
113-124. doi:10.1177/0011000016688096 
Lipchik, E. (2002). Beyond technique in solution-focused therapy. New York: The  
            Guilford Press. 
Llera, D., Saleem, R., Roffman, E., & Dass-Brailsford, P. (2009). Teaching to transform: 
Multicultural competence and classroom practice. Asian Journal of Counselling, 
16(1), 51-66. 
Loy, D. (2019). Ecodharma: Buddhist teachings for the ecological crisis [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
203 
Luoma, J. B., Hayes, S., & Walser, R. D. (2007). Learning ACT: An acceptance &  
            commitment therapy training manual for therapists. Oakland, CA: Context Press. 
Maddux, J. E. (2005). Stopping the 'madness': Positive psychology and the 
deconstruction of the illness ideology and the DSM. In Cr. R. Snyder & S. J. 
Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 13-25). Oxford University 
Press. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sfu-
ebooks/detail.action?docID=3052021. 
Malm, A. (2018). The progress of this storm: Nature and society in a warming world  
            [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Mandel, E. (1973). The Marxist theory of alienation: Three essays by Ernest Mandel and 
George Novack. New York: Pathfinder Press. 
Manusco, S., & Viola, A. (2013). Brilliant green: The surprising history and science of  
            plant intelligence [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Marmot, M., & Bell, R. (2010). Challenging health inequalities—implications for the 
workplace. Occupational Medicine, 60(3), 162-164. doi:10.1093/occmed/kqq008 
Marzluff, J. & Angell, T. (2012). Gifts of the crow: How perception, emotion, and thought  
            allow smart birds to behave like humans [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from  
            www.amazon.ca 
Marx, K. (2015). Grundrisse. Retrieved from  
            https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/index.htm 
Marx, K. (2016). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844 (M. Milligan, Trans.)  
            [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Marx, K. (2018). Capital: Vol. 1-3 complete edition [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from  
            www.amazon.ca 
Maslow, A. H. (1971). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Viking Press. 
204 
Mason, P. (2015). Postcapitalism: A guide to our future [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved 
from www.amazon.ca 
Mather, K., & Seifert, R. (2011). Teacher, lecturer or labourer? Performance 
management issues in education. Management in Education, 25(1), 26-31. 
doi:10.1177/0892020610388060 
Mathews, F. (2003). For love of matter: A contemporary panpsychism. Albany: State 
Univ of New York Press. 
Matthews, D. (2019). Capitalism and mental health. Monthly Review, 70(8), 49-62. 
McMahon, M., Arthur, N., & Collins, S. (2008). Social justice and career development: 
Views and experiences of Australian career development practitioners. Australian 
Journal of Career Development, 17(3), 15-25. doi:10.1177/103841620801700305 
Mental Health Commission of Canada. (2009, November). Toward recovery & well- 
            being: A framework for a mental health strategy for Canada. Retrieved from                                                          
            https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/sites/default/files/ 
            FNIM_Toward_Recovery_and _Well_Being_ENG_0_1.pdf 
Mental Health Commission of Canada. (2012). Changing directions, changing lives: The 
mental health strategy for Canada. Calgary, AB: Author. Retrieved from 
https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/sites/default/files/MHStrategy_Strategy_
ENG.pdf 
Meszaros, I. (2006). Marx’s theory of alienation. Delhi: Aakar Books. 
Mishel, L., & Wolfe, J. (2019). CEO compensation has grown 940% since 1978  
            (Economic Policy Institute Report). Retrieved from Economic Policy Institute  
            website: https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-2018/ 
Miller, S., Hubble, M., & Duncan, B. (1996). Escape from Babel: Toward a unifying  
            language for psychotherapy. New York: W.W. Norton. 
205 
Miller, M. J., & Sendrowitz, K. (2011). Counseling psychology trainees’ social justice 
interest and commitment. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 58(2), 159-169. 
doi:10.1037/a0022663 
Mohai, P., & Saha, R. (2015). Which came first, people or pollution? Assessing the  
            disparate siting and post-siting demographic change hypotheses of  
            environmental injustice. Environmental Research Letters, 10(11), 1-17.  
            doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/11/115008 
Mondibot, G. (2017). Out of the wreckage: A new politics for an age of crisis [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Motulsky, S. L., Gere, S. H., Saleem, R., & Trantham, S. M. (2014). Teaching social 
justice in counseling psychology. The Counseling Psychologist, 42(8), 1058-
1083. doi:10.1177/0011000014553855 
Moya, C. J. (1997). Was Descartes an individualist? A critical discussion of W. 
Ferraiolo’s “Individualism and Descartes.” Teorema: Revista Internacional de 
Filosofía, 16(2), 77-85. 
Muntaner, C., & Lynch, J. (1999). Income inequality, social cohesion, and class 
relations: A critique of Wilkinson’s neo-Durkheimian research program. 
International Journal of Health Services, 29(1), 59-81. doi:10.2190/G8QW-TT09-
67PL-QTNC 
Mushtaq, R., Shoib, S., Shah, T., & Mushtaq, S. (2014). Relationship between 
loneliness, psychiatric disorders and physical health ? A review on the 
psychological aspects of loneliness. Journal of Clinical and Diagnostic Research : 
JCDR, 8(9), 1-4. doi:10.7860/JCDR/2014/10077.4828 
Musto, M. (2010). Revisiting Marx’s concept of alienation. Socialism and Democracy, 
24(3), 79-101. https://doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2010.544075 
206 
Nagel, T. (1974) What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435-450.  
            doi:10.2307/2183914 
Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and cosmos: Why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of 
nature is almost certainly false. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Navarro, V. (2004). Commentary: Is capital the solution or the problem? International 
Journal of Epidemiology, 33(4), 672-674. doi:10.1093/ije/dyh179 
Neilson, D. (2015). Class, precarity, and anxiety under neoliberal global capitalism: From 
denial to resistance. Theory & Psychology, 25(2), 184-201. 
doi:10.1177/0959354315580607 
Nichols, J. The 's' word: A short history of an American tradition…socialism [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Odegard, M. A., & Vereen, L. G. (2010). A grounded theory of counselor educators 
integrating social justice into their pedagogy. Counselor Education and 
Supervision, 50(2), 130-149. doi:10.1002/j.1556-6978.2010.tb00114.x 
Ollman, B. (1977). Alienation: Marx’s conception of man in capitalist society (2nd ed.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Olson, R., Verley, J., Santos, L., & Salas, C. (2004). What we teach students about the 
Hawthorne studies: A review of content within a sample of introductory I-O and 
OB textbooks. The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist, 41(3), 23-39. 
doi:10.1037/e578812011-002 
Oxfam International, (2019, January). Public good or private wealth? (Oxfam Briefing  
            Paper). Retrieved from: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream 
            /handle/10546/620599/bp-public-good-or-private-wealth-210119-summ-en.pdf 
Page, L. A., & Howard, L. M. (2010). The impact of climate change on mental health (but  
            will mental health be discussed at Copenhagen?) Psychological Medicine, 40,   
207 
            177-180. doi:10.1017/S0033291709992169             
Palmer, A., & Parish, J. (2008). Social justice and counselling psychology: Situating the 
role of graduate student research, education, and training. Canadian Journal of 
Counselling, 42(4), 278-292. 
Parker, E. O., & McDowell, T. (2017). Integrating social justice into the practice of CBFT: 
A critical look at family schemas. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 43(3), 
502-513. doi:10.1111/jmft.12205 
Parker, I. (1998). Against postmodernism: Psychology in cultural context. Theory & 
Psychology, 8(5), 601-627. 
Parker, I. (2007). Revolution in psychology: Alienation to emancipation. Retrieved from 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sfu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3386461 
Perel, E. (2017). Mating in captivity: Unlocking erotic intelligence. New York: Harper 
Paperbacks. 
Petrović, G. (1963). Marx's theory of alienation. Philosophy and Phenomenological  
            Research, 23(3), 419-426. 
Pieterse, A. L., Evans, S. A., Risner-Butner, A., Collins, N. M., & Mason, L. B. (2009).  
            Multicultural competence and social justice training in counseling psychology and  
            counselor education: A review and analysis of a sample of multicultural course  
            syllabi. The Counseling Psychologist, 37(1), 93-115.  
            doi:10.1177/0011000008319986 
Plumwood, V. (1993). Feminism and the mastery of nature. London and New York:  
            Routledge. 
Polk, K. L. (2014). The psychological flexibility warm-up. In K. Polk, & B. Schoendorff  
            (Eds.), The ACT matrix: A new approach to building psychological flexibility  
            across settings & populations (pp. 7-14). Oakland, CA: New Harbinger  
208 
            Publications. 
Prakash, P. (1998). The yoga of spiritual devotion: A modern translation of the narada 
bhakti sutras. Rochester, Vt: Inner Traditions. 
Prilleltensky, I. (1997). Values, assumptions, and practices. American Psychologist, 
52(5), 517-535. doi:/10.1037/0003-066X.52.5.517 
Prilleltensky, I. (2003). Understanding, resisting, and overcoming oppression: Toward 
psychopolitical validity. American Journal of Community Psychology, 31(1-2), 
195-201. doi:10.1023/A:1023043108210 
Prilleltensky, I. (2008). The role of power in wellness, oppression, and liberation: The  
            promise of psychopolitical validity. Journal of Community Psychology, 36(2), 116-  
            136. doi:10.1002/jcop.20225 
Proctor, G. (2008). CBT: The obscuring of power in the name of science. European 
Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 10(3), 231-245. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13642530802337975 
Quin, J. (2009). Growing social justice educators: A pedagogical framework for social 
justice education. Intercultural Education, 20(2), 109-125. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14675980902922192 
Raekstad, P. (2015). Human development and alienation in the thought of Karl Marx.  
            European Journal of Political Theory, 0(0), 1-24. 
            doi:10.1177/1474885115613735  
Ratner, C. (2018). Overcoming pathological normalcy: Mental health challenges in the  
            coming transformation. In H. Waitzkin (Ed.), Health care under the knife: Moving  
            beyond capitalism for our health. Retrieved from https://sfu-primo.hosted.exlibris  
            group.com/permalink/f/usv8m3/01SFU_ALMA51277392760003611              
209 
Ratts, M. J. (2009). Social justice counseling: Toward the development of a fifth force 
among counseling paradigms. The Journal of Humanistic Counseling, Education 
and Development, 48(2), 160-172. doi:10.1002/j.2161-1939.2009.tb00076.x 
Ratts, M. J. (2011). Multiculturalism and social justice: Two sides of the same coin. 
Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, 39(1), 24-37. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2161-1912.2011.tb00137.x 
Reed, A. (2013). Marx, race, and neoliberalism. New Labor Forum, 22(1), 49-57.  
            doi:10.1177/1095796012471637 
Resnick, S. A., & Wolff, R. D. (2013). Marxism. Rethinking Marxism, 25(2), 152-162. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2013.769352 
Richardson, M. S. (1993). Work in people’s lives: A location for counseling 
psychologists. Journal of Counselling Psychology, 40(4), 425-433. 
Roberts, R. (2015). Psychology and capitalism: The manipulation of mind [Kindle PC 
version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Rose, N. S. (1998). Inventing our selves: Psychology, power, and personhood. New  
            York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenthal, S., Campbell, P., & Roberts, R. (2016). Marxism and psychology [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Rossiter, A. (2000). The professional is political: An interpretation of the problem of the 
past in solution-focused therapy. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 70(2), 
150-161. doi:/10.1037/h0087656  
Rubinštejn, S. L., & Blakeley, T. J. (1987). Problems of psychology in the works of Karl 
Marx. Studies in Soviet Thought, 33(2), 111-130. 
Saez, E. (2013). Striking it richer: The evolution of top incomes in the United States 
(Updated with 2012 preliminary estimates). Updated version of “striking it richer: 
210 
The evolution of top incomes in the United States”, Pathways Magazine, Stanford 
Center for the Study of Poverty and Inequality, (Winter 2008), 6-7. 
Sayers, S. (2011). Marx and alienation: Essays on Hegelian themes. Retrieved from 
https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/book/10.1057%2F9780230309142 
Scambler, G., & Higgs, P. (1999). Stratification, class and health: Class relations and 
health inequalities in high modernity. Sociology, 33(2), 275-296. 
Scambler, G., & Higgs, P. (2001). ‘The dog that didn’t bark’: Taking class seriously in the 
health inequalities debate. Social Science & Medicine, 52(1), 157-159. 
doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(00)00292-6 
Schmitt, R. (1988). A new hypothesis about the relations of class, race and gender: 
Capitalism as a dependent system. Social Theory and Practice, 14(3), 345-365. 
Schmitt, R. (1996). Marx’s concept of alienation. Topoi, 15, 163-176. 
Seeman, M. (1959). On the meaning of alienation. American Sociological Review, 24(6), 
783-791. doi:10.2307/2088565 
Seeman, M. (1983). Alienation motifs in contemporary theorizing: The hidden continuity 
of the classic themes. Social Psychology Quarterly, 46(3), 171-184. 
doi:10.2307/3033789 
Segal, L. (2017). Radical happiness: Moments of collective joy [Kindle PC version]. 
Retrieved from https://www.versobooks.com/books/2819-radical-happiness 
Seligman, M. E. P. (1972). Learned helplessness. Annual Review of Medicine, 23, 407- 
            412.  
Seligman, M. E. P. (2009, November 10). Choosing optimism: An interview with Martin  
            EP Seligman, Ph.D. (J. Freedman, Interviewer). Six seconds: The emotional   
            intelligence network. Retrieved from https://www.6seconds.org/1999/11/10/ 
            choosing-optimism-an-interview-with-martin-ep-seligman-ph-d/ 
Sharma, T. R. (1979). Karl Marx: From alienation to exploitation. The Indian Journal of   
211 
            Political Science, 40(3), 339-366. 
Sheldrake, R. (1994). The rebirth of nature: The greening of science and God [Kindle PC  
            version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Sheldrake, R. (2012). Science set free: 10 paths to new discovery [Kindle PC version].   
            Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Silva, N. R. (2017). Alienation theory and ideology in dialogue. Rethinking Marxism, 
29(3), 370-383. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2017.1368623 
Sinacore, A., Borgen, W. A., Daniluk, J., Kassan, A., Long, B. C., & Nicol, J. J. (2011). 
Canadian counselling psychologists’ contributions to applied psychology. 
Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 52(4), 276-288. 
doi:10.1037/a0025549 
Sinacore, A. L. (2011). Canadian counselling psychology coming of age: An overview of  
            the special section. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 52(4), 245- 
            247. doi:10.1037/a0025331 
Sinacore, A. L., & Ginsberg, F. (2015). Canadian counselling and counselling 
psychology in the 21st century. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Skrbina, D. (2007). Panpsychism in the west. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Skrbina, D. (2009). Minds, objects, and relations. In D. Skrbina (Ed.), Mind that abides:  
            Panpsychism in the new millennium (pp. 361-382). Amsterdam, Netherlands:  
            John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aicr.75.25skr 
Smail, D. (1994). Community psychology and politics. Journal of Community & Applied 
Social Psychology, 4(1), 3-10. doi:10.1002/casp.2450040103 
Smail, D. (1995). Power and the origins of unhappiness: Working with individuals. 
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 5(5), 347-356. 
doi:/10.1002/casp.2450050506 
212 
Smail, D. (2001). De‐psychologizing community psychology. Journal of Community & 
Applied Social Psychology, 11(2), 159-165. doi:10.1002/casp.621 
Smith, L., Baluch, S., Bernabei, S., Robohm, J., & Sheehy, J. (2003). Applying a social 
justice framework to college counseling center practice. Journal of College 
Counseling, 6(1), 3-13. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2161-1882.2003.tb00222.x 
Solon, O. (2018, February 1). Amazon patents wristband that tracks warehouse workers’ 
movements. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/31/amazon-warehouse-
wristband-tracking 
Spira, R., & Russell, P. (2016). The transparency of things: Contemplating the nature of 
experience [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Standing, G. (2018). Rentier capitalism and the precariat: The case for a commons fund.  
            In J. McDonnell (Ed.), Economics for the many [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved  
            from https://www.versobooks.com/books/3031-economics-for-the-many  
Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. In A.  
            Freeman (Ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: Does physicalism entail  
            panpsychism? (pp. 3-31). Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic. 
Stoller, A. (2015). Taylorism and the logic of learning outcomes. Journal of Curriculum 
Studies, 47(3), 317-333. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220272.2015.1018328 
Strickland, B. (2000). Misassumptions, misadventures, and the misuse of psychology. 
American Psychologist, 55(3), 331-338. doi:10.1037//0003-066X.55.3.331 
Sue, D. W., Arrendondo, P., & McDavis, R. J. (1992). Multicultural counseling  
            competencies and standards: A call to the profession. Journal of Counseling and  
            Development, 70(4), 477-486.  
Sugarman, J. (2015). Neoliberalism and psychological ethics. Journal of Theoretical and   
            Philosophical Psychology, 35(2), 103-116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038960 
213 
Sunkara, B. (2019). The socialist manifesto: The case for radical politics in an era of  
            extreme inequality [Kindle PC version]. Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Swain, D. (2012). Alienation: An introduction to Marx’s theory. London: Bookmarks. 
Swidler, E. (2018). Invisible exploitation: How capital extracts value beyond wage labor. 
Monthly Review, 69(10), 29-36. doi:10.14452/MR-069-10-2018-03_2  
Theise, N. D., & Kafatos, M. C. (2013). Sentience everywhere: Complexity theory, 
panpsychism & the role of sentience in self-organization of the universe. Journal 
of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 4(4), 378-390. 
Theise, N. D., & Kafatos, M. C. (2016). Fundamental awareness: A framework for 
integrating science, philosophy and metaphysics. Communicative & Integrative 
Biology, 9(3), e1155010. https://doi.org/10.1080/19420889.2016.1155010  
Thompson, C. E., & Shermis, S. S. (2004). Tapping the talents within: A reaction to  
            Goodman, Liang, Helms, Latta, Sparks, and Weintraub. The Counseling  
            Psychologist, 32(6), 866-878. doi:10.1177/0011000004269277 
Thompson, L. A. (1979). The development of Marx's concept of alienation: An 
introduction. Mid-American Review of Sociology, 4(1), 23-38. 
Toporek, R. L., Kwan, K.-L. K., & Williams, R. A. (2012). Ethics and social justice in 
counseling psychology. In N. A. Fouad, J. A. Carter, & L. M. Subich (Eds.), APA 
handbook of counseling psychology, Vol. 2: Practice, interventions, and 
applications (pp. 305-332). doi:10.1037/13755-013 
Vera, E. M., & Speight, S. L. (2003). Multicultural competence, social justice, and 
counseling psychology: Expanding our roles. The Counseling Psychologist, 
31(3), 253-272. doi:10.1177/0011000003031003001 
214 
Wampold, B. E., Ahn, H., & Coleman, H. L. K. (2001). Medical model as metaphor: Old 
habits die hard. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 48(3), 268-273. 
doi:10.1037//0022-0167.48.3.268 
Ward, K. (2010). More than matter?: What human beings really are [Kindle PC version].  
            Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Watkins, M. & Shulman, H. (2008). Toward psychologies of liberation. New York:  
            Palgrave Macmillan. 
Watts, R. J. (2004). Integrating social justice and psychology. The Counseling 
Psychologist, 32(6), 855-865. doi:10.1177/0011000004269274 
Weber, M. (1976). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York: Charles  
            Scribner's Sons. 
Wegner, D. M., & Zanakos, S. (1994). Chronic thought suppression. Journal of 
Personality, 62(4), 615-640. doi:10.1111/1467-6494.ep9501250103 
Welwood, J. (2002). Toward a psychology of awakening: Buddhism, psychotherapy, and 
the path of personal and spiritual transformation. Boston, Mass.: Shambhala. 
Westgate, C. E. (1996). Spiritual wellness and depression. Journal of Counseling & 
Development, 75(1), 26-35. doi:10.1002/j.1556-6676.1996.tb02311.x 
Weyher, L. F. (2012). Re-reading sociology via the emotions: Karl Marx’s theory of 
human nature and estrangement. Sociological Perspectives, 55(2), 341-363. 
doi:10.1525/sop.2012.55.2.341 
White, G. B. (2015, February 25). Workers wages aren’t rising even though they’re more 
productive. Retrieved August 20, 2018, from The Atlantic website: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/why-the-gap-between-
worker-pay-and-productivity-is-so-problematic/385931/ 
White, M. (2007). Maps of narrative practice. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
215 
White, M. (2011). Narrative practice: Continuing the conversations. New York: W. W.  
            Norton & Company. 
Wilber, K. (1979). No boundary: An illuminating overview of eastern and western 
approaches to personal growth. Los Angeles: Great Eastern Book Co. 
Wilber, K. (2000). Integral psychology: Consciousness, spirit, psychology, therapy. 
Boston: Shambhala. 
Wilkinson, R., Pickett, K., & Reich, R. B. (2009). The spirit level: Why greater equality 
makes societies stronger. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Wilhelm, S. M. (1980). Can Marxism explain America’s racism? Social Problems, 28(2), 
98-112. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/800145 
Wolff, R. D. (2012). Democracy at work: A cure for capitalism [Kindle PC version]. 
Retrieved from www.amazon.ca 
Woodford, P. (2017). Millennials are aliens and they are alienated. Futurism. Retrieved  
            from https://vocal.media/futurism/millennials-are-aliens-and-they-are-alienated 
Wright, E. O. (2019). How to be an anti-capitalist in the 21st century [Kindle PC version]. 
Retrieved from https://www.versobooks.com/books/3065-how-to-be-an-
anticapitalist-in-the-twenty-first-century 
Young, R. A., & Lalande, V. (2011). Canadian counselling psychology: From defining 
moments to ways forward. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 
52(4), 248-255. doi:10.1037/a0025165  
Young, T. R. (1975). Karl Marx and alienation: The contributions of Karl Marx to social 
psychology. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 2(2). Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23262018 
Yuill, C. (2005). Marx: Capitalism, alienation and health. Social Theory & Health;  
            London, 3(2), 126-143. http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/ 
216 
            10.1057/palgrave.sth.8700046 
Yuill, C. (2011). Forgetting and remembering alienation theory. History of the Human 
Sciences, 24(2), 103-119. doi:10.1177/0952695111400525 
Zembylas, M. (2007a). Mobilizing anger for social justice: The politicization of the 
emotions in education. Teaching Education, 18(1), 15-28. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10476210601151516 
Zembylas, M. (2007b). Theory and methodology in researching emotions in education. 
International Journal of Research & Method in Education, 30(1), 57-72. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17437270701207785 
Zembylas, M., & Fendler, L. (2007). Reframing emotion in education through lenses of 
parrhesia and care of the self. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 26(4), 319-
333. doi:10.1007/s11217-007-9042-6 
 
 
 
